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Abstract
Essays on International Payout, Governance, and Information
by
Richard Clifton Herron
Adviser: Professor Jay Dahya
This dissertation consists of four chapters that span international payout policy, firm- and
country-level governance, and information in capital markets.
Chapter 1 This chapter tests if information gathered by investment bankers during a
firm’s initial public offering (IPO) creates value in a subsequent acquisition of that same
firm. In a sample of 1,519 all-public acquisitions, for 54 of these acquisitions the target’s
IPO underwriter later becomes the acquirer’s adviser. These “same adviser” acquisitions out-
perform, with three-day acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) that are 4% higher,
all else equal. This outperformance is through both better acquisitions and better prices,
and combined CARs are significantly better with little evidence that target CARs are sig-
nificantly worse, although by one measure deal premiums are 13.8% lower. This effect is
robust to subperiod analysis, acquirer adviser unobserved heterogeneity, and selection on
both observables and unobservables.
Chapter 2 For a sample of over five million fund-firm-director-year observations across
2,226 funds, 2,150 firms, and 18,085 directors over 1997–2005, funds make larger initial in-
vestments in companies when the initial investments are coincidental with the arrival of a
new director with whom the fund has a previous investment. These “follower” funds make
new investments that are 5% to 30% larger than those of non-follower funds. Followed direc-
tors’ previous firms outperform with respect to both operating performance and valuation,
vbut there is little evidence that this outperformance follows directors to their new firms.
These results are robust to unobserved fund, firm, and director traits, correction for within
group correlation, and selection on observables and unobservables.
Chapter 3 This chapter analyzes the impact of firm- and country-level governance on
corporate payout policy. For a panel of 1,828 firms across 20 countries over 2004–2008, the
results are consistent with the “outcome” model of payout at both the firm- and country-level.
In weak legal regimes increased firm-level governance is associated with increased dividend
and total payout ratios. However, in strong legal regimes increased firm-level governance
is associated with decreased dividend and total payout ratios, but substitution from rigid
dividends to flexible, tax-advantaged share repurchases. With respect to payout initiation, in
strong legal regimes increased firm-level governance is associated with increased probability
of repurchases. These results are robust to an instrumental variable approach, alternative
definitions of payout, and alternative definitions of firm- and country-level governance.
Chapter 4 For a sample of 30,071 firms, 30 countries, and 21 years there is a strong
negative relation between dividends and changes in dividend taxation. Consistent with
the “old view” of dividend taxation, firms alter dividend payout in response to dividend
tax changes, both absolute and relative to capital gains tax rates, to reduce shareholders’
tax loads. This relation is robust to both increases and decreases in dividend tax rates,
defined as either shocks or continuous variation, and to both dividend payer status and
dividend payout ratios. The relation is strongest in countries that afford a high level of legal
shareholder protection and suggests a dividend taxation elasticity of -0.4.
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Chapter 1
How much does your banker’s
experience matter?
1.1 Introduction
Clearly knowledge and expertise matter for outcomes, but what is the impact of local, event-
specific knowledge relative to global knowledge? This chapter examines if local knowledge
and expertise can achieve better outcomes for the acquirer and target. The context for this
analysis is the two biggest events in the life of a public firm: initial public offering (IPO) and
subsequent acquisition. The IPO underwriting process generates large amounts of hard and
soft information, but as the firm matures, evolves, and discloses information, the relevance
of this information decays, possibly quite quickly. In any case, this information is valuable
and privileged, and could be very valuable to a subsequent acquirer, if only it could be
tapped. One way for the acquirer to access this information could be to hire the target’s
IPO investment banker as an adviser for the acquisition. This chapter tests the impact of
IPO knowledge on subsequent acquisition and finds that it improves outcomes, particularly
for the acquirer.
1
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Of the 1,519 all-public acquisitions from 1985 through 2010 with sufficient data, 54 have
the same adviser characteristic (i.e., the acquirer’s lead adviser is the same investment bank
that managed the target’s IPO). While this is a small fraction of all-public acquisitions over
this period, both acquirers and targets in the same adviser subset are similar to the broader
sample of public acquisitions along many observable dimensions. If the same adviser has
special information that it relays to the acquirer, then the market should respond positively
upon acquisition announcement. Despite the similarities between the same adviser and
different adviser acquisitions, the same adviser acquisitions deliver a 4% three-day cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) to the acquirer relative to different advisers, all else equal.
There are two channels through which the same adviser effect could occur. Relative to
the total sample of all-public acquisitions the same adviser acquisitions could obtain either
better prices or better acquisitions in terms of synergies. To be sure, these channels are
not mutually exclusive and it could be the case that same adviser acquirers achieve positive
abnormal returns through a mix of these two channels. The results indicate that this is the
case and that same adviser acquirers outperform through a combination of lower acquisition
premiums and better synergies. With respect to deal pricing or takeover premiums, along
at least one metric same adviser acquirers pay lower takeover premiums than their different
adviser peers. Although long-term performance of a new, merged company is difficult to
gauge, at deal announcement the CAR of the value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and
target earns a positive significant CAR.
Finally, the same adviser effect is robust to alternative ways of measuring the information
channel from IPO to acquisition. Including other advisers that participated in the IPO
and subsequent acquisition supports the conclusion that this information channel improves
acquirer outcomes. This conclusion holds whether the proxy for this additional channel is the
absolute overlap between the IPO managers and acquirer advisers or the overlap normalized
by the maximum possible overlap.
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It could be that a host of alternative explanations explain the same adviser effect. That
is, the same adviser indicator variable could be correlated with some attribute that generates
abnormal returns, and that the same adviser is not directly responsible for better acquisition
outcomes. Likely alternatives are industry and acquirer adviser effects, and time trends.
With respect to industry effects, the results are robust to Fama and French (1997) 49-
industry fixed effects (FEs). With respect to time trends, the same adviser acquisitions are
distributed throughout the 1985–2010 sample period and the results are robust to year FEs.
Looking more closely and dividing the sample into subperiods shows that the same adviser
effect is strongest in the second half of the sample, but the same adviser effect is economically
meaningful (at 2% or better) and statistically significant in both halves of the sample.
Another leading alternative explanation is that same adviser acquirers outperform not
by picking the adviser that served as the IPO lead manager, but by picking that particular
adviser. That is, the acquirer adviser is special rather than the acquirer adviser’s past
relation to the target, or global skill is more important than local experience. This alternative
explanation is close to the Carter and Manaster (1990) reputation literature. But this is also
not strictly the case and the same adviser effect is robust to acquirer adviser FEs. Replacing
the 49-industry FEs with the acquirer adviser FEs reduces the point estimate of the coefficient
on the same adviser indicator variable, but the nominal size and statistical significance of
the same adviser effect remains the same. Additional tests show that the investment banks
that serve as same advisers do not outperform in their other acquisitions (i.e., their other
acquisitions in the sample for which they do not play the same adviser role). Further, same
adviser outperformance is not driven by well-known or salient investment banks that serve
as same advisers, such as Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley.
It could also be that the same adviser acquisitions are somehow different enough from
different adviser acquisitions so that different adviser acquisitions do not provide the correct
counterfactual. That is, the same adviser deal status is not randomly assigned by nature.
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This chapter employs two solutions to this possible treatment selection bias. The primary
solution is a treatment selection model as in Campa and Kedia (2002) or Greene (2002,
page 705), and the alternative solution is a genetic algorithm that finds the best matched
acquisitions on a set of 20 independent variables as in Sekhon (2011).1 The genetic matching
algorithm finds the best match on the common observable M&A parameters to the point
where the treatment and control groups (i.e., the same adviser and different adviser acqui-
sitions) are statistically the same along these matched dimensions in paired t-tests of the
independent variables. Under this matching model the economic size and statistical signifi-
cance of the same adviser effect remain unchanged. It appears that treatment selection bias
through selection on either unobservables or observables is not a concern for analysis of the
same adviser effect.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 summarizes the related literature and places
the same adviser effect in the context of recent studies on investment bank reputation and
the role of information in M&A transactions. Section 1.3 discusses data sources, screens,
and collation. Section 1.4 presents the main results. Section 1.5 addresses two alternative
explanations that might explain the same adviser effect and Section 1.6 addresses selection
bias concerns. Section 1.7 discusses takeover premiums and value creation, and Section 1.8
concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
The same adviser effect builds on two literatures. The first on banker reputation and the
second on special information in M&A transactions, particularly special information via
relations between board members.
With respect to the investment bank reputation literature, Carter and Manaster (1990)
1Another alternative would be to generate a propensity score model, then match on the propensity score,
but propensity score models are less robust to model misspecification (Sekhon, 2011).
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propose a theoretical IPO model in which low-risk firms attempt to reveal their low risk to the
market by selecting high-reputation underwriters. In turn, the high-reputation underwriters
want to maintain their high reputation and only underwrite IPOs for low-risk firms. They
conduct an empirical analysis to support their model and find an inverse relation between
IPO price run-up and underwriter reputation in a sample of 501 IPOs over 1979–1983. As
well, they find an inverse relation between IPO price run-up variability and underwriter
reputation. In short, they conclude that investment banker reputation does drive first day
returns.
Fang (2005) extends Carter and Manaster (1990) to debt markets and finds similar re-
sults. Specifically, Fang (2005) finds that high reputation banks underwrite lower yield bonds
and charge higher fees, but that with higher net proceeds for the issuing firm. This literature
suggests that investment bank reputation is valuable and that banks have a strong incen-
tive to maintain their reputation. Because banks work hard to maintain their reputation,
reputation has positive, observable outcomes.
Early studies on investment bank reputation and M&A do not find a positive relation
between investment bank reputation and performance. Rau (2000) uses market share as
his reputation measure and finds that M&A fee structures are related to investment banker
reputation and that for high reputation banks a much higher fraction of fees are conditional
on deal completion. He also finds that market share is positively related to the fraction of
deals completed in the past, but not with post-acquisition performance of past deals. In
fact, the relation between acquirer adviser market share and future acquisition performance
is negative. A handful of other studies find similar results. Both Bowers and Miller (1990)
and Michel et al. (1991) use adviser prestige as their reputation measure and find no relation
between adviser quality and outcomes. Servaes and Zenner (1996) find no advantage to
hiring an M&A adviser at all, regardless of reputation.
However, more recent studies find a positive relation between adviser reputation and
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M&A performance. Kale et al. (2003) focus on the relative bargaining power and nego-
tiating skills of acquirer and target advisers. They find a positive relation between M&A
performance and acquirer adviser reputation relative to target adviser reputation, albeit in
a limited subset of 324 successful takeovers over 1981–1994. Two later articles identify a
positive relative between acquirer adviser reputation and outcomes in a broader data set
using two different identification strategies.
Rather than deal volume or league tables as a measure of investment bank quality, Bao
and Edmans (2011) use acquirer adviser FEs to identify the portion of announcement re-
turns attributable to advisers rather than acquirers. They propose that prior studies fail
to find the positive relation adviser quality and outcomes in the broader data because deal
volume and reputation are the wrong quality measures. Acquirer adviser FEs identify the
portion of abnormal returns attributable to the adviser without any conjecture about the
true measure of adviser quality. Using advisers with at least ten deals (public or private)
over 1980–2007 they find that the interquartile range of FEs is 1.26% relative to a sample
mean announcement CAR of 0.72% and an F-test rejects that the FEs are equal at the 1%
significance level. Further, they find that adviser skill is persistent and that past abnormal
returns predict future abnormal returns at one, two, and three-year horizons. Unlike mutual
funds (Berk and Green, 2004), there is no performance chasing in M&A advisers, which could
be efficient if clients build up relationship capital with advisers. They find that retaining the
past adviser is associated with worse future performance, but there could be other benefits
and services that don’t appear in the data. Conversely, non-chasing could be inefficient if
clients incorrectly choose advisers based on deal volume, consistent with both practitioners’
and academics’ fixation on league tables.
In a related study, Golubov et al. (2012) find additional support for acquirer adviser skill.
They use a comprehensive sample of public, private, and subsidiary acquisitions over 1996–
2009 to examine the relation between reputation and quality and M&A performance. Rather
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than acquirer adviser FEs, they split the sample into public and private target acquisitions
and use an indicator for the top eight (or five or ten) banks in the league tables. In the public
acquisition subset they find the abnormal return attributable to the high-skilled acquisition
adviser is 1.01% improvement to bidder returns. They propose that reputation effects are
concentrated in all-public acquisitions because this is where reputation is most at risk and
skill is most valuable in aggressively negotiating deals. Consistent with Kale et al. (2003),
they find that these gains are through both higher synergies and a greater share of share of
synergies accruing to the acquirer with high quality adviser. As well, the acquirer’s share
of synergies is decreasing in the reputation of the target’s adviser. In all, the reputations
literature finds that there are benefits to acquirer adviser quality, both in terms of synergies
and deal premiums.
This chapter’s contribution is not directly related to the studies discussed above, but is
tangent. The finding here is an event that separates reputation from event- or transaction-
specific experience and knowledge. The previous studies focus on acquirer adviser reputation
or quality. The same adviser effect separates global expertise and knowledge from local
expertise and knowledge. Controlling for bank reputation, the results here show that event-
specific knowledge can generate large rewards for acquirers and obtain better acquisitions
at better prices. Alternatively, the same adviser effect separates the outcomes of reputation
from the mechanism that builds and sustains it. This work is seminal in tracking information
production and use from cradle to grave. It isn’t clear if same adviser knowledge is latent and
revealed ex post after the acquisition is proposed, planned, and executed, or this knowledge is
appreciated and used to aggressively seek deals that outperform. However, if it were strictly
the latter, then a larger fraction of public acquisitions would be same adviser deals, rather
than no more than a handful each year. As well, the results show that there is no difference
in acquirer fees between same and different adviser deals. Without more soft information
on the evolution of these deals it is difficult to discern the correct channel, or the relative
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weighting on each channel if both are factors, but the data do consistently show that the
same adviser effect is real, economically meaningful, and statistically significant.
The second literature investigates the effects of various relations and soft information in
M&A. The most closely related are Cai and Sevilir (2012), who show that board connections
are positively related to acquirer outcomes. They also examine acquisitions of U.S. public
firms by other U.S. public firms, but look at board connections rather than target IPO
underwriter and acquirer adviser connections. They focus on acquisitions where one director
serves on both the target and the acquirer boards (“first-degree connections”) and where
directors from both acquirer and target serve together on a third firm’s board (“second-
degree connections”). The results from this study show that both cases improve acquirer
outcomes. First-degree acquisitions tend to have lower takeover premiums, while second-
degree connections tend to have higher value creation. The work in this chapter is related
and shows the value of connections between acquirers and targets. Where Cai and Sevilir
(2012) show a contemporaneous connection through boards of directors, the connection in
the same adviser effect is an intertemporal connection through target IPO underwriter and
acquirer adviser, which are the same investment bank.
Rather than directly observable board connections, Ishii and Xuan (2014) look at so-
cial connections at both the board and executive levels between acquirers and targets. They
identify social connections through educational background and past employment, but unlike
professional connections, social connections between acquirer and target produce uniformly
worse outcomes for the acquirer relative to no connection at all. Announcement date abnor-
mal returns are significantly negative for both the acquirer and combined entity. Contrasting
these results with Cai and Sevilir (2012), it isn’t clear why these acquisitions go forward, but
Ishii and Xuan (2014) explain this by showing that social connections increase the odds that
the target’s CEO and directors continue to serve the new combined entity after the merger.
As well, acquirer CEOs are more likely to receive bonuses and are more richly compensated
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for completing mergers with socially connected targets, even though these acquisitions with
social connections are more likely to be later divested for performance reasons.
Stuart and Yim (2010) look at board networks and show that firms with connected boards
are more likely to be taken private in private equity (PE) deals. There is an additional
statistically and economically significant effect of having connected board members with PE
experience via service on a different firm’s board. Their explanation is that PE-experienced
directors are more likely to have relations to the PE market and thus more likely to be known
by PE firms seeking deals.
Also closely related to these studies are Agrawal et al. (2013), who look at common
advisers between the acquirer and target on the same M&A deal. These are cases where
both the acquirer and target waive the conflict of interest and the same investment bank
represents both parties. They find that the decision to waive the conflict of interest and have
the same adviser represent both parties is, on average, made sensibly, but that deals with
common advisers tend to take longer to complete and provide lower premiums to targets.
They also find that there is no significant difference in overall deal quality and that common
adviser deals tend to be better for the acquirer than the target. Their results favor a conflict
of interest hypothesis over a deal improvement hypothesis. The effort here is similar to
Agrawal et al. (2013), but rather than simultaneously representing both the acquirer and
target, the same adviser captures information on the target at IPO and potentially exploits
this information against the target several years later at acquisition. Again, the same adviser
effect is an intertemporal information transfer rather than contemporaneous. This chapter’s
results are qualitatively similar to Agrawal et al. (2013), but greater in magnitude, and show
that some of the acquirer’s benefits come at the expense of the target’s takeover premium.
However, the lack of a clear conflict of interest results in deal outcomes that are objectively
better and without value destruction.2
2In untabulated results, there are seven common adviser acquisitions in the 1,519 all-public acquisitions
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Finally, though not directly related to investment bankers, Allen et al. (2004) identify
the certifying power of relationship lenders in M&A, particularly for targets. Rather than
the acquirer adviser having special information and knowledge of the target, they focus
on information generated within the target’s or adviser’s ongoing lending relations. They
hypothesize that information generated in an ongoing lending relation can lead to greater
certification and more accurate valuations than can investment bank advisers not involved
in a lending relation. Their competing hypothesis is that this relation creates a conflict
of interest, such as providing loan coverage or future profits in the lending channel, which
reduces the certification effect. Empirically they find a net positive certification effect for
targets only. Acquirer returns are either negative or not significantly different from zero.
Again, this chapter relates to the literature above, but it is based on local expertise rather
than global expertise as in the investment banker reputation literature. With respect to the
information production literature, it is a new and novel channel that is easily observable both
at the time of the acquisition as well as ex post to the econometrician. Additionally, given
that the information channel is intertemporal rather than contemporaneous, the conflict
of interest between acquirer and target is removed, which allows focus on the information
channel, which should be non-negative, rather than disentangling the relative weights of the
conflict of interest and information channels as has been done in prior studies. In sum, the
results are consistent with the literature that information produces better outcomes.
used here (i.e., the same investment bank advises and represents both the acquirer and target.). Of these
seven common adviser acquisitions, one is also a same adviser acquisition. That is, there is one case where
the same investment bank advises both the acquirer and the target in the acquisition, as well as the target
at IPO. This same adviser and common adviser acquisition is Dow Jones’ acquisition of Telerate (row four
in Table 1.1e). Either dropping this acquisition or adding a “common adviser” indicator variable does not
change any results throughout this chapter. In fact, the common adviser indicator variable, as either level or
level and interaction with same adviser, is not significantly different from zero in acquirer CAR regressions.
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1.3 Data
Data collection begins with all acquisitions by public U.S. firms of public U.S. firms that have
IPOs on U.S. exchanges. IPO and acquisition data are from Thomson Reuters’ Securities
Data Company (SDC) Platinum, data on stock prices and returns are from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and firm fundamentals data (e.g., total assets, leverage,
and market-to-book) are from the CRSP-Compustat Merged (CCM) database. The variable
of primary interest is a same adviser indicator variable, which requires information on the
target’s IPO and IPO underwriters, as well as the target’s and acquirer’s investment banking
advisers. This section describes in detail how to assemble these data and generate the same
adviser indicator variable, as well as other variables used throughout the analysis.
The starting point for data collection is the SDC Platinum new issues database, which
provides data on the IPOs of U.S. public companies quoted on U.S. exchanges. An important
initial screen is that information on the lead IPO underwriter, issue date, and six-digit CUSIP
are available. The lead IPO underwriter field may contain more than one manager, in which
case the first listed manager is the lead manager and the additional managers are labeled
as supporting managers. If there is a same adviser effect through information transmission
from IPO to acquisition via an investment bank that is both IPO manager and acquirer
adviser, then supporting managers could also play this role and relay special information
about the target to the acquirer. Section 1.4 discusses this additional channel at greater
length and introduces IPO underwriter manager and acquirer adviser overlap variables.3
In the SDC Platinum M&A database the acquirer adviser field must not be not blank,
and the announcement date and the acquirer and target six-digit CUSIPs must also be
available. SDC Platinum’s six-digit CUSIP links the IPO firm in the new issues database
to the acquisition target in SDC Platinum’s mergers and acquisitions (M&A) database, and
3Using the intersection of IPO managers and acquirer advisers also guards against data errors, if the lead
IPO manager or lead acquirer adviser are incorrectly coded.
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the lead manager and lead adviser fields determine if the acquisition adviser is the same as
the IPO underwriter.
The next stage in the data collection matches the acquirer and target six-digit CUSIPs
from SDC Platinum to valid PERMNOs from CRSP, which reduces the sample to 2,338
acquisitions. Sufficient stock price information to conduct a market model event study
further reduces the sample to 2,041 acquisitions. Imposing minimum data requirements for
control variables from both CCM (fundamentals) and CRSP (market) data further reduces
the sample to 1,655. Finally, requiring complete data on the variables in Table 1.2a reduces
the sample to 1,519. Of the sample of 1,519 all-public deals, 54 acquisitions use the same
adviser and the remaining 1,465 use a different acquirer adviser than used by the target
to underwrite its IPO. These are the 1,519 acquisitions with sufficient data to conduct the
analysis in this chapter. The screens above are consistent with Schwert (2000) and there
are no additional screens on target, acquirer, or deal characteristics. Cai and Sevilir (2012)
and others use additional screens, such as deal values (e.g., greater than $1 million or $5
million), deal values greater than one percent of acquirer market equity, acquisitions that
push acquirer ownership above 50%, and only completed deals. Given that the choice and
number of screens differ throughout the M&A literature, and that the analysis here focuses
on all-public deals, the main analysis uses only the screens described above. Untabulated
results show that the results are robust and qualitatively unchanged with or without the
additional screens described above, but applying these additional screens reduces the sample
by one fifth. Additionally, the results are not driven by outliers and are robust to trimming
CARs by 1% in both tails, although untrimmed CARs are used throughout the tabulated
analysis.
The main dependent variable in this analysis is acquirer cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) centered on the SDC Platinum announcement date. Two-, three-, five-, and seven-
day CARs centered on the announcement date [i.e., (-1, 0), (-1, 1), (-2, 2), (-3, 3)] are from
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a single factor market model with a value-weighted CRSP market factor using 252 trading
days that end 43 days prior to the acquisition announcement.
Target and acquirer fundamentals data on sample firms are from CCM and are from
the most recent annual report that is at least six months prior to the announcement date,
but no older than three years (Fama and French, 1992). The key fundamentals data are
total assets, return on assets, book leverage, and market-to-book ratio. Return on assets
is operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets (ROA = OIBDP/AT), book
leverage is book value of current and long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets
[BDR = (DLC + DLTT) / AT], and market-to-book ratio is book value of total assets
minus book value of common equity plus market value of common equity, scaled by book
value of total assets [M/B = (AT - CEQ + ME) / AT]. The market value of common equity
(ME) is closing price times number of common shares outstanding from CRSP two months
before the acquisition announcement date, but no older than two years.
The next two subsections characterize the same adviser indicator variable and other
variables.
1.3.1 Same Adviser Characteristics
Table 1.1 provides several panels of descriptive statistics on same adviser versus different
adviser acquisitions. Table 1.1a provides the frequency of each acquisition type versus the
time from IPO to acquisition in years, which is in five-year bins to smooth the data. Al-
though the same adviser acquisitions all occur within 15 years of IPO, the distribution is
not markedly different from the different adviser acquisitions, of which all but 129 (8.8%
of different adviser acquisitions) occur within the first 15 years after IPO. The results are
qualitatively similar throughout this chapter without any acquisitions that occur more than
15 years after the IPO date. If the same adviser indicator variable is simply a proxy for
acquisitions made shortly after IPO, then including the time from IPO to acquisition as an
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independent variable should absorb this variation and the same adviser indicator variable
should have no explanatory power. Later, the multivariate results show that this is not the
case and the p-value for the chi-squared test on Table 1.1a is 45.2% and fails to reject the
null that these events occur independently.4
Rather than frequency of acquisition type versus time from IPO to acquisition, Table 1.1b
shows frequency of each acquisition type versus calendar year. The overall trend follows
Moeller et al. (2005) with a large peak in the second half of the 1990s. Although there is
a peak in same adviser acquisitions in the second half of the 1990s, this coincides with the
peak in both different adviser acquisitions and total sample acquisitions. The chi-squared
test rejects that these adviser groups are independently assigned through calendar time.
In any case, if the same adviser indicator variable were a proxy for some period of time
(e.g., the lead up to the dot com crisis), then announcement year fixed effects (FEs) should
absorb this trend, and the same adviser indicator variable should have no explanatory power.
Additionally, if the same adviser effect were due to firms related to the dot com crisis,
then acquirer 49-industry FEs should absorb this variation. Interestingly, when acquisitions
are divided into two subperiods, the same adviser effect is still economically material and
statistically significant in both halves of the sample period and slightly stronger in the second
half of the sample.
Table 1.1c breaks down the 54 same adviser acquisitions by investment bank adviser
name. There are 21 different investment banks that act as a same adviser at some point
during the sample period. This list includes both very well-known banks and less well-known
banks. Goldman Sachs plays the same adviser role on 16 occasions, which is just over one
quarter of the sample, while Morgan Stanley plays the same adviser role nine times. There
could be reputation effects at play along the lines of Carter and Manaster (1990) or Rau
4Given that some cells have zero counts, Fisher’s exact test may be more appropriate. In untabulated
results the conclusion is similar and the p-value for Fisher’s exact test is 42.1%.
CHAPTER 1. HOW MUCH DOES YOUR BANKER’S EXPERIENCE MATTER? 15
(2000), but later analysis in Section 1.5 shows that these results are robust to unobserved
acquirer adviser heterogeneity. Further, the two most salient same advisers (i.e., Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley) are unrelated to acquirer CARs after controlling for the same
adviser role. With respect to investment bankers, these results confirm that roles (and local
knowledge) matter more than actors (and global knowledge). Table 1.1d expands these same
adviser role counts into a panel over 1985 through 2010 in five-year bins. For the top two same
advisers, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, there is some loose clustering, but otherwise
there are no discernible patterns in the same adviser acquisitions data. A chi-squared test
weakly rejects that within the same adviser acquisitions the relation between acquirer adviser
and calendar time is independent with a p-value of 12.0%.5 Finally, Table 1.1e provides more
specifics on these 21 same advisers and their 54 same adviser acquisitions. Same adviser
acquisition deal values appear to run the gamut in terms of acquirers, targets, and deal
values and the next subsection provides descriptive statistics of the differences between same
and different adviser acquisitions.
1.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.2 provides several panels of descriptive statistics on the sample of U.S. all-public
acquisitions with sufficient information. Table 1.2a provides descriptive statistics on the
pooled sample of public acquisitions of public companies, regardless of same adviser or
different adviser classification. About 3.6% of sample deals have the same adviser for the
target’s IPO and acquirer’s acquisition. This is only a fraction of all-public acquisitions, but
similar to Cai and Sevilir (2012)’s finding of 65 first-degree connections in 1,664 acquisitions
(65/1, 664 = 3.9%). The intent of the overlap variables is to broaden the search for additional
acquisitions that might use the same information channel and to reduce concerns about
5Again, because there are many zeros on this table, Fisher’s exact test may be more appropriate. In
untabulated results, the conclusion is similar with a p-value of 9.7%.
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adviser coding errors, and Table 1.2a shows that the maximum overlap between acquirer and
IPO is one adviser. In the sample of 1,519 public acquisitions of public companies the largest
overlap between the teams of IPO managers and acquisition advisers is one investment bank.
However, the overlap variable does find about 0.045/0.036− 1 = 25% more acquisitions that
have this information channel through common members on the IPO manager and acquirer
adviser teams. Because both the max overlap and max overlap fraction are one, at least one
of the same adviser acquisitions has only one IPO manager that is also the only acquisition
adviser. That the mean overlap fraction is not much smaller than the mean overlap suggests
that mean maximum number of IPO managers or acquisition advisers is not much larger
than one.
The remaining variables in Table 1.2a are consistent with the M&A literature on the
acquisition of U.S. public firms. Most notably the acquirer CAR values for the four event
windows are all significantly less than zero at the 1% significance level. The various size
measures (deal value, total assets, and market equity) are all right skewed with mean values
much larger than median values. As well, the size measures show that on average acquirers
are one order of magnitude larger than targets. Relative size, which is the natural log of






adjusts for the right skew in these size variables and has a mean much closer to the median.
Unfortunately, the acquirer and target fees variables are not widely available enough to
facilitate an in-depth analysis, but both are nominally 1% of deal value, which is often
quoted in the M&A literature.
Table 1.2b compares the means of key explanatory variables between the same and dif-
ferent adviser groups. The major differences between the two groups are for targets, rather
than acquirers, and t-tests fail to reject that the acquirers in the two groups are statistically
different along key attributes, such as total assets, market equity, profitability, leverage, and
valuation (i.e., M/B). Same adviser acquisitions have lower deal value, shorter IPO to acqui-
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sition time spans, lower relative size, but same adviser targets have higher ROA. However,
the same adviser targets are statistically the same with respect to valuations and leverage
(i.e., M/B and BDR). The next section presents results for several empirical analyses of the
same adviser effect.
1.4 Results
This section presents the main results across two subsections, each with both univariate and
multivariate results. Subsection 1.4.1 presents results at the acquirer level and subsection
1.4.2 presents results at the target and combined acquirer and target levels.
1.4.1 Acquirers
The analysis begins with acquirer performance based on announcement day CARs in both
univariate and multivariate settings (subsections 1.4.1 and 1.4.1).
Univariate Results
The base result that same adviser acquisitions outperform is clear from the simple univariate
tests in Table 1.3. Table 1.3a presents means and t-tests, and Table 1.3b presents medians
and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests between same and different adviser acquisitions. Both sets of
univariate results suggest that same adviser acquisitions outperform other public acquisitions
on average by a statistically significant 3.5% that is not driven by outliers.
For all four event windows [(-1, 0), (-1, 1), (-2, 2), and (-3, 3)] the difference between
means is positive and statistically significant at better than the 1% level. Equally important
is that these differences are economically meaningful at about 3.5%, which is on par with
abnormal return values for outcome determinants elsewhere in the M&A literature. In this
sample the mean acquirer market equity is $12.9 billion, so a conservative estimate of 3.5%
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abnormal return is an additional $451.5 million of market equity relative to the mean different
adviser acquisition. As well, the same adviser effect is not through lower under-performance,
but through a positive CAR, although same adviser CARs alone are not significantly different
from zero. The result is stable across all four event windows, and although these t-tests don’t
control for covariates, they suggest that there is a meaningful positive relation between same
adviser acquisitions and announcement date abnormal returns for acquirers.
Given that the descriptive statistics in Table 1.2a show a right skew, particularly in size,
it could be that the univariate results are driven by outliers. One solution to outliers is to
compare medians rather than means and perform Wilcoxon rank-sum tests rather than t-
tests. Table 1.3b presents acquirer CAR medians and Wilcoxon rank-sum test p-values. In all
cases the median CARs are close to mean CARs and the same adviser effect does not appear
to be driven by outliers. The rank-sum tests in Table 1.3b are non-parametric and robust
to outliers, but provide the same conclusions that same adviser acquirer outperformance is
statistically significant. Further, this outperformance is again due to positive CARs rather
than less negative CARs, with the same adviser medians well above zero (and the different
adviser medians well below zero). While univariate tests don’t control for covariates or within
group correlation, they do provide evidence that same adviser acquisitions outperform. The
multivariate models that follow present results with the three-day CAR [i.e., (-1, 1)] as the
dependent variable, but the results are also robust to two- and five-day CARs [i.e., (-1, 0)
and (-2, 2)].
Multivariate Results
The univariate results show a strong positive relation between the same investment bank-
ing advisers and acquisition performance as measured by acquirer CARs. This subsection
presents multivariate models that address the possibility that the same adviser is explained
by either other independent variables or within group correlation. In sum, the key univariate
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findings that the same adviser is value enhancing for the acquirer continues to hold. Ta-
ble 1.4 presents results for linear models where the dependent variable is the (-1, 1) acquirer
CAR and the independent variables are the key abnormal return predictors from the M&A
literature, as well as 49-industry and announcement year FEs. All models cluster standard
errors by 49-industry to correct for within group correlation.
Specification (1) in Table 1.4 is the base case and includes only the same adviser indicator
variable and 49-industry and announcement year FEs. This replicates the univariate test
from Table 1.3a, but controls for unobserved heterogeneity at the 49-industry and year
levels, as well as within industry correlation. Here the point estimate of the same adviser
effect is 3.952%, which is slightly larger than the univariate point estimate of 3.742% (Table
1.3a, row 2), although statistically indistinguishable. The univariate results are not due to
either industry effects or time trends and support the view that same adviser acquisition
performance is higher as measured by CARs.
Specification (2) adds back the most common M&A abnormal return predictors, but the
relation between acquirer CARs and the same adviser indicator variable remains unchanged
in both economic magnitude and statistical significance. The independent variables in speci-
fication (2) either enter with the expected sign or are not statistically significant. It could be
that many of the effects from the M&A literature are reduced in this sample, which includes
only public targets and public acquirers that went public within the lifetime of SDC Plat-
inum. The IPO to acquisition time span is not significant in any specification in this table.6
Even though the same adviser acquisitions are clustered in the first 15 years after IPO, it
doesn’t seem to be the case that the same adviser indicator variable is a proxy for firms at
6The IPO to acquisition time span in years is not significant in any subsequent regression, either. This
is true whether time from IPO to acquisitions is the span in integer years or indicator variables for five-year
bins. As well, interactions between the same adviser indicator variable and the IPO to acquisition time
space in years are not significant, either. This suggests that knowledge or expertise decay is not a significant
problem given that all of the same adviser acquisitions occur within 15 years of IPO, with the majority
occurring within five years.
CHAPTER 1. HOW MUCH DOES YOUR BANKER’S EXPERIENCE MATTER? 20
a certain point in their life cycle. The same industry indicator variable is not statistically
different from zero, either, so it seems that in this sample diversifying acquisitions perform
statistically the same as focused deals, although Morck et al. (1990) find that same-industry
acquisitions provide positive CARs, all else equal. Consistent with the literature, all-stock
deals perform worse and all cash deals perform better (Travlos, 1987), all else equal, at -1%
for all-stock acquisitions and 2% for all-cash acquisitions, although the all-stock indicator is
not statistically significant at conventional levels with a t-statistic of -1.562. Consistent with
Moeller et al. (2004), as the target becomes larger, acquirer under-performance also becomes
larger (i.e., more negative CAR), although not statistically significant at conventional lev-
els with a t-statistic of less than one. Acquirer operating performance (i.e., ROA) appears
to have little impact on acquirer CARs, but acquirer CARs are decreasing in target ROA.
Neither acquirer nor target leverage has a statistically significant impact on acquirer abnor-
mal returns, but these models include 49-industry FEs and are identified off within industry
variation. It could be that there is too little cross-sectional variation in leverage within each
industry to identify a leverage effect. Likewise for acquirer and target valuations (i.e., M/B).
As well, there is no relation between hostile offers and acquirer CARs, which is consistent
with Schwert (2000). There is a positive relation between tender offers and mergers of equals
and acquirer CARs, which is consistent with Jensen and Ruback (1983) . Finally, the coeffi-
cient on the number of bidders variable is negative, which is consistent with Kagel and Levin
(1986) and Cai and Sevilir (2012) in that additional bidders decrease acquirer bargaining
power and lead to higher acquisition prices and lower acquirer CARs, all else equal (i.e., the
winner’s curse). Across both regression specifications the relation between acquirer CARs
and the same adviser indicator variable is stable, positive, and statistically significant at the
1% level.
If the channel that provides abnormal acquisition performance is special knowledge in
the target’s IPO to acquisition channel, then it isn’t necessary that this information flows
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only when one investment bank serves as both the lead IPO manager and the lead acquirer
adviser. Any investment bank participating in both deals, in either lead or supporting roles,
could convey to the acquirer information developed during the IPO underwriting process.
There is nothing sacred about the lead roles on both deals and any participant in both deals
could have relevant knowledge and experience to improve acquirer outcomes. The amount of
overlap between target IPO underwriters and acquirer advisers tests this idea and Table 1.5
presents these results. As before, these multivariate models include 49-industry and year
FEs, and cluster standard errors by 49-industry.
Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 1.5 use the overlap between the target’s team of IPO
managers and the acquirer’s team of acquisition advisers to broaden the possible information
channel. The overlap variable measures the number of advisers that overlap between the IPO
and acquisition teams. For example, if there are two advisers in common between the target’s
IPO managers and acquirer’s acquisition advisers, then overlap is two. The upper bound
on overlap is the lower of the number of IPO managers and acquisition advisers, however in
this sample the maximum overlap value is one (see Table 1.2a). The differences between the
same adviser dummy variable and the overlap variable are not large and Table 1.2a shows
that the means differ by one percentage point, but this approach does refine the empirical
tests by capturing all potential information flows in the same adviser channel. Empirically
the mean of the overlap variable is about 25% larger than the mean of the same adviser
indicator variable (i.e., 0.045/0.036 − 1 = 25%) and the point estimate for the overlap
coefficient is about 20% smaller than the point estimate for the same adviser coefficient [i.e.,
3.183/4.049 − 1 = −21.4% from specification (2) in Tables 1.5 and 1.4]. The loadings on
and interpretation of all other independent variables is qualitatively unchanged. Again, all
cash, tender offer, and merger of equal indicator variables have a strong positive impact on
acquirer CARs, and number of bidders has a strong negative impact.
Specifications (3) and (4) reduce the potential for heteroskedasticity by scaling the overlap
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variable by the lower of the number of IPO managers or acquisition advisers so that overlap
fraction lies on the zero to one interval, inclusive. Continuing the example from above, if
there are two IPO managers that also serve as acquisition advisers in any capacity, and there
are five IPO managers and three acquisition advisers, then the overlap fraction variable is
2/3 = 66.7%. Again, the results throughout are qualitatively similar to the main results
in Table 1.4 and the overlap level results in specifications (1) and (2) in Table 1.5. A
slight difference between the overlap and overlap fraction results is that the mean overlap
fraction is about 80% of the mean overlap in Table 1.2a (i.e., 0.036/0.045 = 80%), so
the overlap coefficient point estimates in specifications (1) and (2) are about 80% of their
overlap fraction counterparts in specifications (3) and (4) [i.e., 3.183/3.843 = 82.8% from
comparing specifications (2) and (4) in Table 1.5]. The results and interpretation of the
other independent variables in this table are qualitatively unchanged.
Although the similarity between the same adviser indicator and overlap variables prevents
drawing too strong a conclusion from these results, they do suggest that the channel for
outperformance is information gathered during the IPO process that is later useful to the
acquirer in the acquisition process. At this point it is difficult to completely rule out adviser
skill or reputation over localized knowledge and expertise, but Section 1.5 addresses this
concern and other alternative explanations.
1.4.2 Targets and Combined Acquirer-Target Portfolios
The empirical results so far suggest that there is a special information channel that produces
better acquirer outcomes if the acquirer’s advisers were involved in the target’s IPO. The
logical next question is if these acquisitions produce better outcomes absolutely or if the
acquirers’ outperformance is merely a wealth transfer from targets to acquirers achieved
through special knowledge and bargaining power.
To better understand these two alternatives, imagine two scenarios. In the first scenario
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hiring an expert acquisition adviser with special knowledge of the target puts the acquirer
in a better bargaining position and allows the acquirer to extract rents from the target by
setting an acquisition offer that just satisfies the target’s lowest acceptable price. On average
this first scenario would transfer wealth from targets to acquirers, at least relative to different
adviser acquisitions, without necessarily producing acquisitions with overall better economic
outcomes. In the second scenario the expert acquisition adviser with special knowledge of
the target finds better matches between acquirers and targets, and avoids value-destroying
acquisitions. On average this second scenario produces acquisitions with better economic
outcomes.
Scenario one predicts target CARs that are significantly less than target CARs under no
information or different adviser acquisitions. Since the target can always reject the offer (or
the failed negotiations never appear in the SDC Platinum acquisition database) in neither
scenario should target CARs be significantly less than zero. Because in scenario one the
acquirer’s gains come at the expense of the target’s shareholders rather than creation of
real economic value, the CARs of the value-weighted portfolio of the combined acquirer and
target should be no higher than under the different adviser case. Combined CARs that
are either not significantly greater than zero or significantly less than zero also satisfy this
scenario. Scenario two makes no strong predictions about target CARs, but they should be
no less than the target CARs in the no information or different adviser acquisitions if there is
no wealth transfer. Because in scenario two acquirer gains come through better acquisitions
and real economic value creation, the combined CAR should be significantly higher than in
the different adviser sample.
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 can’t differentiate between these two scenarios because with respect to
acquirer CARs the observable outcomes would be the same (i.e., positive significant CARs
for the acquirer). Acquirers with knowledgeable advisers make better acquisitions whether
“better” is defined as rent extraction from disadvantaged targets or better acquisitions that
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create more economic value. To differentiate between these two scenarios the following
subsection repeats the above analyses for the target and the value-weighted portfolio of the
acquirer and target.
Univariate Results
Table 1.6 repeats the univariate analyses for the target and value-weighted portfolio of ac-
quirer and target. Table 1.6a presents the means and t-tests, and Table 1.6b presents the
medians and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.
The first four rows in Table 1.6a are target CARs over four different event windows that
mirror those for the acquirer CARs in Table 1.3a. In all four event windows the same adviser
target fares worse than the different adviser target, but the difference is only statistically
significant at better than the 10% level for the two-day event window [i.e., (-1, 0) with a
p-value of 6.6%]. Further, these non-results are not due to outliers. The first four rows in
Table 1.6b report the medians and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for the target CARs. Again,
in all cases the rank-sum tests fail to reject that the distributions of target CARs centered
on the announcement date are different between the same and different adviser groups. The
smallest p-value is 51.6%, although in all cases the same adviser target median is slightly
less than the different adviser target median. There is weak evidence, at best, that the
significantly positive acquirer CARs are due to a wealth transfer from target to acquirer, or
target under-performance relative to the different adviser target CAR.
To better understand same adviser acquisitions the last four rows in Tables 1.6a and
1.6b repeat these univariate analyses with the CARs from a value-weighted portfolio of the
acquirer and target, where the weights are each firm’s market value of equity two-months
before the acquisition announcement date. In all eight cases the positive differences are
significant at the 5% level or better. The means and medians in these tests are larger for
the same adviser acquisitions than for the different adviser acquisitions by nominally the
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same percentage point difference as in the acquirer CAR univariate results in Table 1.3.
Given that acquirers are one order of magnitude larger than targets, it isn’t surprising that
acquirers dominate the portfolio.
In all, the univariate results indicate that same adviser acquisitions are significantly better
at the acquirer and combined levels and this outperformance is not due to wealth transfers
from the target to the acquirer, but rather better acquisitions that create greater economic
value at the combined level. The following subsection repeats these target and combined
acquirer-target analyses in a multivariate setting.
Multivariate Results
Table 1.7 mimics the specifications from Table 1.4, but with target and combined acquirer-
target CARs rather than acquirer CARs. These models include 49-industry and announce-
ment year FEs, and cluster standard errors by 49-industry. Once again, the multivariate
results are consistent with the univariate results of outperformance at the combined level
without underperformance at the target level. Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 1.7 test
target CARs and the same adviser indicator variable coefficients are negative at about -2%,
similar to the univariate tests in Table 1.6a, but not less than zero at anywhere near con-
ventional significance levels with t-statistics less than one. Specifications (3) and (4) repeat
these tests with the value-weighted portfolio of acquirer and target CARs and find strongly
positive coefficients on the same adviser indicator variable. These results are wholly con-
sistent with the acquirer CAR results in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 and the target and combined
portfolio univariate results in Table 1.6.
In all, these results support earlier results that same adviser acquisitions outperform
different adviser acquisitions. Furthermore, the same adviser effect is not due to industry
effects or times trends, and is robust to including standard explanatory variables from the
M&A literature. The same adviser acquirer abnormal performance is due to better acqui-
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sitions and new, combined entities with greater economic value, rather than simply wealth
transfers from target to acquirer. That these results are so stable to the inclusion of FEs,
controls, and standard error clustering suggests that the same adviser effect is not related
to other clearly observable traits and can be attributed to special information in the same
adviser channel.
However, there is still room for alternative explanations based on adviser reputation and
investment bank quality. The next section addresses alternative explanations and reduces
these concerns.
1.5 Alternative Explanations
1.5.1 Acquirer Adviser Unobserved Heterogeneity
One alternative explanation is that the same adviser effect is just that, an adviser effect,
which is along the lines of Bao and Edmans (2011) and Golubov et al. (2012). Tables 1.4 and
1.7 control for unobserved heterogeneity at the industry and announcement year level, but not
at the acquirer adviser level. Note in Table 1.1c that the same adviser role is played by a small
subset of acquisition advisers, so it could be that there is something special about this small
subset of acquisition advisers that drive these results. The next test addresses this concern by
replacing the 49-industry FEs with acquirer adviser FEs and clustering standard errors at the
acquirer adviser level. Table 1.8 repeats the multivariate models from Tables 1.4 and 1.7, but
with acquirer adviser FEs and robust standard errors clustered by acquirer adviser. Given
there are 1,519 observations and 244 unique acquisition advisers (i.e., investment banks) this
is a sufficiently high hurdle and absorbs unobserved heterogeneity at the acquirer adviser
levels and corrects for correlation in acquirer adviser abnormal performance. If adviser
unobserved heterogeneity is time-invariant, then this identification strategy rules out that
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same advisers are simply special advisers in all acquisitions. If the same adviser effect persists
with acquirer adviser FEs, then this supports the hypothesis that same advisers are put into
a role that gives them local expertise based on access to better information rather than same
advisers having global skill and expertise.
Table 1.8 shows that the acquirer adviser FEs absorb some of the same adviser out-
performance, but the acquirer CAR loading on the same adviser indicator variable is still
positive significant at the 5% level for the three-day event window. The coefficient is about
two-thirds the size of the same specification in Table 1.4 (2.720/4.049 = 67.2%), although
this difference is not statistically significant. That the acquirer adviser FEs remove about
1% of the same adviser effect is consistent with to nominal 1% contribution from top advisers
in Bao and Edmans (2011) and Golubov et al. (2012).Moreover, the target and combined
acquirer-target CAR loading on same adviser are statistically and economically similar to
the main results with 49-industry FEs in Table 1.7. The coefficients on all the other control
variables are consistent with the literature and the all cash indicator variable is still positive
significant with a 2% point estimate. Time-invariant acquirer adviser characteristics cannot
explain the same adviser effect, which continues to be driven by the role the acquisition
adviser plays rather than the adviser itself.
1.5.2 Subperiod Analysis
A second alternative explanation is that the same adviser effect is a time trend, or at least its
identification coming from a specific subperiod rather than throughout the sample period.
The regressions models in Tables 1.4, 1.5, and 1.7 control for both the public age of the
firm (i.e., the IPO to acquisition time span in years) and announcement year FEs, but the
distribution of same adviser acquisitions is not uniform in time (see Table 1.1b), so it could
be that the results are driven by some specific subperiod. Table 1.9 addresses this concern
by dividing the sample in half so that specifications (1) and (2) include all observations for
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1985 through 1998, and specifications (3) and (4) include all observations for 1999 through
2010. All models include 49-industry and year FEs, and cluster standard errors by 49-
industry. Again, the Table 1.9 results are consistent with the main result throughout that
same adviser acquisitions achieve better outcomes.
Splitting the sample into two halves offers two further observations. First, the same
adviser indicator coefficient point estimates are higher in the second half of the sample than
in the first half, and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests
that the information channel is stronger in the second half of the sample. It could be
that technology and improved information retention and transfer between groups within the
same adviser investment bank during the sample helps explain the improvements in same
adviser outcomes. In untabulated results the IPO to acquisition timespan for same adviser
acquisitions is significantly longer in the second half of the sample (i.e., 5.92 years versus 3.95
years) so it isn’t just a case of much faster use of information. However, in both subperiods
the same adviser acquisitions occur about two years earlier in the public life of the target,
consistent with the differences in Table 1.2b.
Second the same adviser relation is relatively robust in comparison to some of the previ-
ously identified CAR determinants. Typically the strongest relations are between acquirer
CARs and all stock, all cash, or tender indicator variables, but in splitting the sample in half
the all stock and tender offer indicator variables are no longer significant in the subperiods
relative to the same adviser effect. This could be driven by the reduction in the sample size
by dividing the sample in half.
1.5.3 Refinements to Unobserved Acquirer Adviser Heterogeneity
Earlier analysis with acquirer adviser FEs rejected unobserved acquirer adviser heterogeneity
as the source of the same adviser effect (see Table 1.8). The acquirer adviser FEs reduce
the same adviser effect point estimate, but not significantly. A logical next question is
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if using acquirer adviser indicator variables rather than using the within transformation
makes it possible to observe outperformance of these same advisers in other, different adviser
acquisitions. Given that only 21 of 244 acquirer advisers serve the same adviser role at
any point in the sample, it is important to more sharply address the characteristics of
advisers that serve as same advisers during the sample. This subsection better addresses
the uniqueness of same advisers with three new indicator variables. The first indicator
variable, same adviser anywhere, is one for all of the 21 acquirer advisers that serve the
same adviser role at any point in the sample (see Table 1.1c for the names of these acquirer
advisers). Specification (1) in Table 1.10 replicates the baseline result from specification
(2) in Table 1.4 for comparison and specification (2) in Table 1.10 adds the same adviser
anywhere indicator variable. Again, all specifications include 49-industry and year FEs, and
cluster standard errors by 49-industry. The basic results are unchanged and the loading on
the same adviser indicator variable is positive significant and statistically the same as in
every other model of (-1, 1) acquirer CARs in this chapter. Further the loading on the same
adviser anywhere indicator variable is positive, but only 20% of the same adviser coefficient
(i.e., 0.668/3.683 = 18.1%) and not significant at conventional levels. Note that the same
adviser point estimate decreases by only 10% and is not significantly different from the
baseline model. There is weak evidence that the same adviser investment banks have some
global skill and expertise, but it does not reduce the impact of local skill and expertise or
explain any sizable portion of the same adviser effect.
Next, recall that Goldman Sachs was potentially an outlier adviser, even in the same
adviser group, because it accounted for 16 of the 54 same adviser acquisitions. Could it be
that the entire same adviser effect is a proxy for Goldman Sachs? To address this question
the second variable is an indicator variable, Goldman Sachs, that is one if the acquisition
adviser is Goldman Sachs and zero otherwise. Specification (3) adds the Goldman Sachs
indicator variable, including an interaction with the same advisor indicator variable, and
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shows that the loading on the same adviser indicator variable remains statistically significant
at the 1% level and is statistically the same as elsewhere in (-1, 1) acquirer CAR models.
Although Carter and Manaster (1990) show that underwriter reputation plays a strong role
in IPO performance (and Bao and Edmans (2011) and Golubov et al. (2012) do the same
for M&A), in this sample of all-public acquisitions, controlling for the major determinants
and the same adviser role, Goldman Sachs does not predict M&A performance, either as a
same adviser (interaction term) or as any acquirer adviser (level term). The third indicator
variable is for Morgan Stanley and is defined the same as the Goldman Sachs indicator
variable. Specification (4) adds the Morgan Stanley indicator variable (level and interaction)
and the conclusions are the same. The Morgan Stanley acquirer adviser variable does not
predict acquirer outperformance either as a same adviser or as any acquirer adviser. The
same adviser effect appears to be about roles, not actors, and is robust to sharper tests of
unobserved heterogeneity at the acquirer adviser level.
1.6 Selection Bias
Although M&A advisers are chosen through a competitive bidding process, the same adviser
role is not randomly assigned by nature, so there may be some selection bias in which
acquisitions receive the same adviser treatment (i.e., which IPO underwriters are chosen to
advise the acquirer). Up to this point the analysis maintains the assumption that competitive
capital markets drive the investment banking advisory market and that acquirer advisers
are unable to hold out for special deals or fees, or select only deals that they expect will
outperform. In fact, the descriptive statistics in Table 1.2b show that there is not a significant
difference in acquirer advisers fees between same and different adviser acquisitions, although
this variable is not complete. As well, Table 1.8 shows that these results are robust to
acquirer adviser FEs and Table 1.10 shows that there is nothing particularly special about
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same advisers in their other acquisitions, either collectively or singly as Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley. Regardless, this section addresses the possible treatment selection bias in
two ways. First with a two-stage treatment selection model that controls for selection on
unobservables and second with a genetic algorithm that matches same and different adviser
acquisitions on a host of covariates to control for selection on observables.
1.6.1 Treatment Selection Model
To correct for selection of same adviser status based on unobservable acquirer, target, and
deal characteristics, this subsection presents a treatment selection model similar to Campa
and Kedia (2002) and Greene (2002, page 705). Table 1.11 presents the results of the two-
stage treatment selection model. The same adviser selection process is difficult to model, but
the first order determinants are likely underwriter reputation, time from IPO to acquisition,
whether or not acquirer and target are in the same industry, and number of competing
bidders, along with 49-industry and announcement year FEs. Most of these variables have
more than one interpretation, but what matters is that the first-stage probit selection model
includes the observable determinants of same adviser status, with precise inferences being
less important.
To be clear, the same adviser selection model uses attributes of the target’s IPO un-
derwriter because it is the underwriter that is selected as the acquirer adviser, rather than
the acquirer adviser that is selected ex post as the underwriter. With respect to investment
bank reputation, it could be that high reputation investment banks are likely to be chosen
regardless of special information about the target via the IPO to acquisition channel. How-
ever, it could also be that high reputation banks are more likely to be retained following the
target’s IPO and not available to advise the acquirer due to the potential conflict of inter-
est. Ultimately, this is an empirical issue. There are two available proxies for investment
bank reputation. First is the Carter and Manaster (1990) underwriter rank as updated by
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Loughran and Ritter (2004), which has three interpretations in the same adviser selection
context. First, the bank’s reputation as an IPO underwriter may indicate how much insight
and information about the target the acquirer can expect to obtain by hiring the target
underwriter. Second, while this proxy is aimed directly at IPO underwriting reputation, it
should also contain general information about investment bank reputation, size, and skill.
Third, it could be that the target wishes to retain the services of a higher quality IPO un-
derwriter, making the investment bank unavailable to advise the acquirer. The second proxy
is annual deal count as an acquirer adviser (both public and private deals). Given that the
same adviser choice is complicated, these two variables control for the quality of the acquirer
in either role, as well any mechanical relation between deal volume and same adviser selec-
tion. To avoid simultaneity, both reputation proxies (i.e., underwriter rank and and annual
deal count as acquirer adviser) are lagged one year, although the results are qualitatively
similar if both variables are contemporaneous or if the underwriter rank variable is at IPO
rather than the year before acquisition.7 Because both underwriter rank and annual deal
count are ordinal rather than cardinal, the probit selection model in Table 1.11a replaces
them with a series of indicator variables. Each underwriter rank indicator variable spans
two rank points and each deal count indicator variable each 25 acquisitions.
With respect to the other same adviser determinants, the same industry indicator vari-
able controls for industry expertise. The number of competing bidders controls for the
competition for the underwriter’s expertise, as it is possible that more than one acquirer
wants to employ the target underwriter. Finally, the selection model also includes acquirer
49-industry and announcement year FEs to absorb as other heterogeneity over industries
and time, and clusters standard errors by 49-industry.
Table 1.11a presents the results of the first-stage probit selection model. Same adviser
7Contributing to this is that the Loughran and Ritter (2004) underwriter rank variable only slowly changes
over time and is only updated every several years.
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status is more likely as either underwriter reputation proxy increases. That is, the rank
indicator variable coefficients move from large and negative to positive as the IPO manager
moves from low to high underwriter rank, although the coefficient is only positive significant
for the [6, 8) rank bin, the [8, 10) rank bin is positive significant at just outside the 10% level.
The relation is stronger between same adviser selection and deal count as an acquisition
adviser. All three indicator variables are positive significant, although the three coefficients
are statistically indistinguishable. There are not many shades of gray with respect to annual
deal count as an acquirer adviser and the same adviser choice. It seems that any adviser that
is active in the IPO and acquisitions markets is an equally likely same adviser candidate.
The other deal characteristics are not significantly different from zero. Although this
selection model is not particularly insightful into the exact determinants of the same adviser
choice, it includes the observable determinants of the same adviser choice. The leftover
unobserved determinants of the same adviser choice are aggregated into the hazard/non-
hazard ratio, λ.
The treatment selection model in Table 1.11a generates λ according to equation (1.1) to
correct any possible treatment selection bias, where Xβ is from the same adviser selection
model, φ is the normal probability distribution function, and Φ is the normal cumulative
distribution function.
λ = 1same adviser
φ(Xβ)
Φ(Xβ)
+ (1− 1same adviser) −φ(Xβ)
1− Φ(Xβ) (1.1)
The second-stage of the treatment selection model in Table 1.11b includes λ from equation
(1.1) and because λ is estimated from the first-stage model (i.e., estimate λˆ rather than
true λ), standard errors in the second stage are block bootstrapped by 49-industry 500
times to obtain the correct inference (Wooldridge, 2002, page 526). In all cases the point
estimate of the same adviser coefficient is at least as large as the baseline point estimates
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in Table 1.4, but not statistically different. As well the statistical significance of the same
adviser coefficients is slightly weaker than in the baseline models in Table 1.4, with the five-
day acquirer CAR positive significant at the 5% level and the two- and three-day window
acquirer CARs significant at the 10% level. It is difficult to imagine a case where correcting
the selection bias increases the same adviser effect point estimates. However, in no case
is the point estimate for the λ coefficient significant at conventional levels indicating that
selection is not a concern for the same adviser effect. Despite having largely unique variables
in the first-stage probit model, it could still be that there is some weak collinearity between
λ and the same adviser indicator that leads to larger standard errors for both the same
adviser indicator variable and hazard/non-hazard ratio. In any case, these results suggest
that, consistent with competitive capital markets, selection bias does not explain the same
adviser effect.
A second approach to address concerns about non-random assignment of same adviser
treatment is a matching model that pairs same and different acquisitions on observable
covariates.
1.6.2 Matching Model
While the treatment selection model above controls for selection on unobservables, matching
on independent variables controls for selection on observables. Although selection of same
adviser status on unobservables is more likely, matching to control for selection on observables
is less sensitive to specification of the first-stage models (Sekhon, 2011) and the matching
model provides another robustness check. Because the sample data are small, it is feasible to
use a genetic algorithm that generates matches between the same and different adviser groups
that are matched on all independent variables. The genetic algorithm matching model used
here follows Sekhon (2011) to match on all the independent variables in Table 1.4, as well as
acquirer and target 49-industry and announcement year. The matching model requires exact
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matches for the indicator variables between the two groups, as well as the acquirer and target
49-industry and announcement year, but places no explicit restrictions on the remaining
continuous variables, such as common support or caliper. The algorithm begins with a
sample population of 1000 candidate matches and evolves the population each generation
until there is no improvement in the similarity along these 20 independent variables between
the same and different adviser groups for at least four consecutive generations. This approach
identifies the closest matching different adviser acquisition for each of the 54 same adviser
acquisitions that is balanced along all 20 covariates. The smallest p-value for the paired t-
tests between the same adviser acquisitions and their matched different adviser acquisitions
is 4.8% for acquirer book debt ratio (BDR), but the paired t-tests fail to reject that the two
groups are statistically different along the remaining 19 dimensions, which indicates that
the matched sample is balanced and very similar to the same adviser acquisitions along the
observable characteristics. Table 1.11b reports the paired t-tests for acquirer CARs between
the same adviser acquisitions and the matched different adviser acquisitions. For more on
matching with genetic algorithms see Sekhon (2011) and Diamond and Sekhon (2013).
Again, the results are consistent with the baseline regressions in Table 1.4 and all other
results in Tables 1.3 through 1.11, and the same adviser acquisitions continue to outperform
the different adviser acquisitions by about 4%. Note that some estimates are higher, but
given the standard errors it is not possible to reject that these point estimates are the same
as the baseline univariate and multivariate results in Tables 1.3 and 1.4. The results in
Table 1.12 match same adviser acquisition to only one different adviser acquisition, but
untabulated results that match up to four different adviser acquisitions with replacement
are qualitatively similar. Note that in general these models increase the same adviser effect
point estimate, as does the treatment selection model, rather than reduce it.
As before, the results suggest that selection bias does not present any significant iden-
tification threat to the same adviser effect. The same adviser acquisition outperformance
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relative to different adviser acquisitions is the same, with or without correction for selection
on unobservables or observables.
1.7 Extensions
The main result is that same adviser acquisitions outperform different adviser acquisitions
and the most likely channel for this outperformance is either acquisitions with greater synergy
and value creation (i.e., better acquisitions) or lower takeover premiums (i.e., better prices).
This section strengthens these results by directly examining takeover premiums, operating
performance, and valuation.
1.7.1 Takeover Premiums
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 show that target announcement day CARs are lower for same adviser
acquisitions than they are for different adviser acquisitions. Although these differences are
not statistically significant [with the exception of the t-test for the (-1, 0) target CAR, which
is significant at the 6.6% level] that the different is negative and stable suggests that same
adviser acquirers may pay lower takeover premiums. Rather than infer takeover premiums
from target CARs centered on the announcement date, this subsection uses more direct
measures of takeover premiums. The first is the deal value scaled by target market equity
value two months before the announcement and the second is the Schwert (2000) takeover
premium, which is a long-run CAR centered on the announcement date. Schwert (2000)
uses the sum of residuals from the single-factor market model from three months before
the announcement to six months after. To retain more observations this analysis limits the
takeover premium CAR to two months before and two months after the announcement date.
With the full nine-month CAR the conclusions are the same, but the sample is much reduced.
All four specifications limit the analysis to the 1,250 acquisitions with sufficient information
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to generate the takeover premiums over the four months centered on the announcement
date.8
Table 1.13 presents the results of the takeover premium analysis. Specifications (1) and
(2) use deal value scaled by target market equity and show that same adviser acquirers
pay lower takeover premiums. The mean deal value scaled by target market equity for
the subsample with complete premium data is 1.61, so the point estimates of the same
adviser coefficients of -0.359 and -0.222 are economically meaningful and consistent with the
target CAR results from earlier. These results suggest that same adviser acquirers receive a∣∣−0.222
1.61
∣∣ = 13.8% discount relative to the different adviser acquirer.
However the alternative takeover premium results are less conclusive. In specifications (3)
and (4) the same adviser coefficient point estimates are both negative, but not statistically
significant. The pricing analysis presented here continues to suggest that same adviser
acquirers pay lower takeover premiums, but this channel is likely a secondary concern relative
to achieving better acquisitions in terms of synergy and other forms of value creation.
1.7.2 Performance and Valuation
The abnormal return analysis for the target and combined acquirer-target portfolio in Tables
1.6 and 1.7 suggests that the market considers same adviser acquisitions to generate signifi-
cantly more value than their different adviser counterparts. This subsection follows Cai and
Sevilir (2012) and tests if these expectations are realized. Five-year changes in return on as-
sets proxy changes to operating performance and five-year changes in market-to-book proxy
changes in valuation. Both changes are industry-adjusted by removing the industry median
five-year change, where industry is the 49-industry for the acquirer. Table 1.14 presents these
results. The models for changes in ROA [specifications (1) and (2) in Table 1.14] provide
8This subsample preferentially drops different adviser acquisitions. Different adviser acquisitions decline
to 1201 from 1465 (decline of 18.0%) same adviser acquisitions decline to 49 from 54 (decline of 9.3%).
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no evidence of performance improvements in these firms. While the same adviser coefficient
point estimates are positive, they have p-values near 100%. There is no relation between
changes in operating performance and same adviser acquisitions.
The results for changes in valuation are even less convincing [specifications (3) and (4)
in Table 1.14 ], as they are not significant and have negative signs. These results are consis-
tent with Cai and Sevilir (2012), who also find little connection between their strong CAR
predictors and realized performance gains. A caveat is perhaps in order. These tests may be
too high a hurdle given that a lot can change in five years. Given that the market responds
so positively to these acquisition announcements at both the acquirer and combined level,
it is difficult to imagine that there are no realized gains, even though the crude, first order
analysis in this subsection points in that direction.
1.8 Conclusion
A sample of 1,519 all-public acquisitions from 1985 through 2010 shows that 54 have the
same adviser characteristic (i.e., the acquirer’s lead adviser is the same investment bank that
managed the target’s IPO). While this is a small fraction of all-public acquisitions during this
period, both the acquirers and targets in this sample are very similar to the broader sample
of all-public acquisitions along many observable dimensions. Despite the similarities between
the same adviser and different adviser acquisitions, the same adviser acquisitions deliver a
4% three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to the acquirer relative to the different
adviser case, all else equal. This result is robust and consistent with the hypothesis that
acquirer advisers involved in the target’s IPO bring special information to the acquisition
table that improves acquisition outcomes.
There are two channels through which the same adviser effect could occur. Relative to
the total sample of all-public acquisitions the same adviser acquisitions could either obtain
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better prices or higher quality acquisitions in terms of synergies. To be sure, these channels
are not mutually exclusive and it is entirely possible that same adviser acquirers outperform
through some combination of these two approaches. The results throughout indicate that
this is the case and that same adviser acquirers outperform through a combination of lower
acquisition prices and better synergies. With respect to deal pricing, along one of two deal
pricing metrics the same adviser acquirers pay 13.8% lower acquisition premiums than their
different adviser peers. Tests of long-term performance of same adviser acquisitions versus
different adviser acquisitions fail to find any long-term outperformance for same adviser
acquisitions, but long-term performance is difficult to gauge. Consistent with the better
acquisitions scenario, the CAR of the value-weighted portfolio of the target and the acquirer
is significantly positive and significantly higher than different adviser acquisitions.
These results are robust to a host of alternative specifications and alternative explana-
tions. Expanding the same adviser definition to include other advisers that participated in
both the IPO and acquisition does not alter the conclusion that this information channel
improves outcomes. The same adviser effect is also robust to unobserved heterogeneity at
the industry, acquirer adviser, and announcement year levels. Finally, the outperformance
and strength of the same adviser effect cannot be explained by a possible selection bias, as
the results are also robust to correction for selection on both observables and unobservables
with matching and treatment selection models, respectively.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics of frequency and timing of same adviser acquisitions. The
sample is U.S. all-public acquisitions over 1985–2010 with sufficient data for Table 1.2a
variables. IPO to acquisition is time from target’s IPO to acquisition in years. Same adviser
is one if acquirer lead adviser is same investment bank as target IPO lead manager.





[0,5] 760 35 795
(5,10] 369 13 382
(10,15] 207 6 213
(15,20] 75 0 75
(20,25] 33 0 33
(25,30] 18 0 18
(30,35] 2 0 2
(35,40] 1 0 1
Total 1465 54 1519
Chi-squared test p-value: 0.452





[1985,1990] 130 12 142
(1990,1995] 217 6 223
(1995,2000] 651 24 675
(2000,2005] 272 6 278
(2005,2010] 195 6 201
Total 1465 54 1519
Chi-squared test p-value: 0.016
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(c) Counts for same adviser acquisitions by acquirer adviser.
Count
AG Edwards & Sons Inc 1
Alex Brown & Sons Inc 4
Allen & Co Inc 2
Bear Stearns & Co Inc 1
Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc 2
Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc 1
Goldman Sachs & Co 16
Hambrecht & Quist Inc 1
JC Bradford & Co 1
JJB Hilliard WL Lyons Inc 1
JP Morgan & Co Inc 2
Lehman Brothers 2
Merrill Lynch Capital Markets 1
Morgan Stanley & Co 9
PaineWebber Inc 1
Prudential Securities Inc 1
Robertson Stephens & Co 1
Robinson-Humphrey Co 2
Salomon Brothers Inc 1
Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co 3
William Blair & Co 1
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics. The sample is U.S. all-public acquisitions over 1985–2010
with sufficient data for Table 1.2a variables. Same adviser is one if acquirer lead adviser is
same investment bank as target IPO lead manager. Overlap is number of investment banks
common to both target IPO managers and acquirer advisers. Overlap fraction is overlap
scaled by lesser of acquirer adviser or target IPO manager count. CARs are from market
model with daily returns and value-weighted index. Deal value is SDC Platinum’s “value of
transaction” in millions USD. IPO to acquisition is time from target’s IPO to acquisition in
years. Same industry is one if acquirer and target have same two-digit SIC code. All stock
(cash) is one if SDC Platinum’s “% of Stock” (“% of Cash”) variable is 100%. Relative
size is log of deal value to acquirer market equity [log(100 × Deal Value/ME (Acq))]. Total
assets is book value of total assets in millions USD. ME is closing price times common shares
outstanding in millions USD. ROA is operating income before depreciation scaled by book
value of total assets (ROA = OIBDP/AT). BDR is book value of long- and short-term debt
scaled by book value of total assets [BDR = (DLTT + DLC)/AT]. M/B is book value of total
assets minus book value of common equity plus market equity, scaled by total assets [M/B
= (AT - CEQ + ME)/AT]. Hostile (tender, merger of equals) is one for SDC Platinum’s
classification as hostile attitude (tender offer, merger of equals). Number of bidders is SDC
Platinum’s number of competing bidders. Acquirer and target fees are from SDC Platinum.
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(a) Descriptive statistics for pooled sample.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Same Adviser 1,519 0.036 0.185 0 0 1
Overlap 1,519 0.045 0.207 0 0 1
Overlap Fraction 1,519 0.036 0.178 0.000 0.000 1.000
(-1, 0) Acq CAR 1,519 −1.338 6.911 −34.508 −0.817 46.390
(-1, 1) Acq CAR 1,519 −1.813 9.032 −52.180 −1.117 49.072
(-2, 2) Acq CAR 1,519 −1.944 10.046 −62.400 −1.366 68.422
(-3, 3) Acq CAR 1,519 −2.103 10.807 −62.437 −1.733 48.479
Deal Value 1,519 1,079.825 3,318.724 0.840 249.779 43,711.600
IPO to Acquisition 1,519 6.597 5.588 0.241 4.658 35.326
Same Industry 1,519 0.611 0.488 0 1 1
All Stock 1,519 0.404 0.491 0 0 1
All Cash 1,519 0.305 0.460 0 0 1
Relative Size 1,519 2.757 1.705 −4.172 3.019 6.860
Total Assets (Acq) 1,519 12,860.790 66,973.910 2.630 1,070.043 1,494,037.000
Total Assets (Tgt) 1,519 1,114.786 7,397.391 1.210 177.561 196,446.000
Market Equity (Acq) 1,519 12,868.270 36,605.090 3.544 1,499.456 511,258.700
Market Equity (Tgt) 1,519 785.829 2,747.991 1.390 173.772 55,841.600
ROA (Acq) 1,519 0.115 0.166 −1.827 0.132 0.905
ROA (Tgt) 1,519 0.055 0.222 −2.811 0.101 1.070
BDR (Acq) 1,519 0.201 0.185 0.000 0.171 1.263
BDR (Tgt) 1,519 0.200 0.237 0.000 0.119 2.515
Q (Acq) 1,519 3.873 11.451 0.184 1.956 271.135
Q (Tgt) 1,519 2.261 2.772 0.266 1.506 46.047
Hostile 1,519 0.028 0.166 0 0 1
Tender Offer 1,519 0.246 0.431 0 0 1
Number of Bidders 1,519 1.082 0.316 1 1 3
Acquirer Fees/Deal Value 524 0.010 0.018 0.00001 0.006 0.306
Target Fees/Deal Value 1,001 0.010 0.013 0.00000 0.008 0.268
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(b) Descriptive statistics for sample split on same adviser status. Values are means by same adviser
status. The p-value is for the t-test of difference of means.
Variable Different Adviser Same Adviser p-value
Deal Value 1, 092.560 734.345 0.056
IPO to Acquisition 6.669 4.644 0.0001
Relative Size 2.773 2.337 0.054
Total Assets (Acq) 12, 573.070 20, 666.370 0.312
Total Assets (Tgt) 1, 039.345 3, 161.452 0.414
Market Equity (Acq) 12, 762.080 15, 749.240 0.638
Market Equity (Tgt) 793.602 574.957 0.087
ROA (Acq) 0.114 0.137 0.136
ROA (Tgt) 0.052 0.120 0.004
BDR (Acq) 0.201 0.213 0.626
BDR (Tgt) 0.201 0.165 0.228
M/B (Acq) 3.898 3.206 0.258
M/B (Tgt) 2.254 2.457 0.454
Number of Bidders 1.081 1.093 0.781
Acquirer Fees/Deal Value 0.010 0.010 0.987
Target Fees/Deal Value 0.011 0.007 0.0003
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Table 1.3: Univariate tests of same adviser acquisition performance for acquirer. The sam-
ple is U.S. all-public acquisitions over 1985–2010 with sufficient data for Table 1.2a vari-
ables. CARs are from market model with daily returns and value-weighted index. Same
adviser is one if acquirer lead adviser is same investment bank as target IPO lead manager.
(a) Values are means by same adviser status. The p-value is for the t-test of difference of means.
Variable Different Adviser Same Adviser p-value
(-1, 0) Acq CAR -1.453 1.778 0.003
(-1, 1) Acq CAR -1.946 1.796 0.003
(-2, 2) Acq CAR -2.087 1.934 0.001
(-3, 3) Acq CAR -2.225 1.207 0.009
(b) Values are medians by same adviser status. The p-value is for the Wilcoxon rank-sum test of
difference of distributions.
Variable Different Adviser Same Adviser p-value
(-1, 0) Acq CAR -0.894 0.551 0.001
(-1, 1) Acq CAR -1.177 0.516 0.004
(-2, 2) Acq CAR -1.381 0.654 0.005
(-3, 3) Acq CAR -1.764 0.776 0.029
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Table 1.4: Linear models of same adviser acquisition performance for acquirer. The sample is
U.S. all-public acquisitions over 1985–2010 with sufficient data for Table 1.2a variables. CARs
are from market model with daily returns and value-weighted index. Same adviser is one if
acquirer lead adviser is same investment bank as target IPO lead manager. IPO to acquisition
is time from target’s IPO to acquisition in years. Same industry is one if acquirer and target
have same two-digit SIC code. All stock (cash) is one if SDC Platinum’s “% of Stock”
(“% of Cash”) variable is 100%. Relative size is log of deal value to acquirer market equity
[log(100 × Deal Value/ME (Acq))]. Total assets is book value of total assets in millions
USD. ROA is operating income before depreciation scaled by book value of total assets
(ROA = OIBDP/AT). BDR is book value of long- and short-term debt scaled by book
value of total assets [BDR = (DLTT + DLC)/AT]. M/B is book value of total assets minus
book value of common equity plus market equity, scaled by total assets [M/B = (AT - CEQ
+ ME)/AT]. Hostile (tender, merger of equals) is one for SDC Platinum’s classification
as hostile attitude (tender offer, merger of equals). Number of bidders is SDC Platinum’s
number of competing bidders. All models include Fama and French (1997) 49-industry and
announcement year FEs, and cluster standard errors by 49-industry.
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Dependent variable:
(-1, 1) Acq CAR
(1) (2)
Same Adviser 3.952∗∗∗ 4.049∗∗∗
(1.123) (1.209)










log(Total Assets (Acq)) 0.133
(0.251)


















Merger of Equals 4.821∗∗
(2.216)
Number of Bidders −1.519∗∗
(0.691)
49-industry FEs Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes
Observations 1,519 1,519
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.077
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.5: Linear models of same adviser acquisition performance for acquirer with same
adviser overlap measures. The sample is U.S. all-public acquisitions over 1985–2010 with
sufficient data for Table 1.2a variables. CARs are from market model with daily returns and
value-weighted index. Overlap is number of investment banks common to both target IPO
managers and acquirer advisers. Overlap fraction is overlap scaled by lesser of acquirer adviser
or target IPO manager count. IPO to acquisition is time from target’s IPO to acquisition in
years. Same industry is one if acquirer and target have same two-digit SIC code. All stock
(cash) is one if SDC Platinum’s “% of Stock” (“% of Cash”) variable is 100%. Relative size is
log of deal value to acquirer market equity [log(100 × Deal Value/ME (Acq))]. Total assets
is book value of total assets in millions USD. ROA is operating income before depreciation
scaled by book value of total assets (ROA = OIBDP/AT). BDR is book value of long- and
short-term debt scaled by book value of total assets [BDR = (DLTT + DLC)/AT]. M/B is
book value of total assets minus book value of common equity plus market equity, scaled by
total assets [M/B = (AT - CEQ + ME)/AT]. Hostile (tender, merger of equals) is one for
SDC Platinum’s classification as hostile attitude (tender offer, merger of equals). Number
of bidders is SDC Platinum’s number of competing bidders. All models include Fama and
French (1997) 49-industry and announcement year FEs, and cluster standard errors by 49-
industry.
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Dependent variable:
(-1, 1) Acq CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overlap 2.977∗∗∗ 3.183∗∗∗
(1.029) (1.109)
Overlap Fraction 3.633∗∗∗ 3.843∗∗∗
(1.243) (1.315)
IPO to Acquisition 0.060 0.059
(0.055) (0.054)
Same Industry 0.062 0.083
(0.439) (0.438)
All Stock −0.822 −0.829
(0.529) (0.526)
All Cash 2.001∗∗∗ 1.996∗∗∗
(0.629) (0.624)
Relative Size −0.196 −0.189
(0.284) (0.284)
log(Total Assets (Acq)) 0.122 0.131
(0.251) (0.251)
log(Total Assets (Tgt)) −0.398 −0.404
(0.303) (0.303)
ROA (Acq) 0.348 0.347
(1.681) (1.685)
ROA (Tgt) −4.406∗ −4.410∗
(2.556) (2.541)
M/B (Acq) 2.056 2.016
(1.719) (1.725)
M/B (Tgt) −0.736 −0.676
(1.479) (1.481)
BDR (Acq) 0.006 0.006
(0.008) (0.008)




Tender Offer 1.192∗∗ 1.207∗∗
(0.515) (0.521)
Merger of Equals 4.875∗∗ 4.850∗∗
(2.231) (2.217)
Number of Bidders −1.505∗∗ −1.502∗∗
(0.689) (0.693)
49-industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,519 1,519 1,519 1,519
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.075 0.031 0.075
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.6: Univariate tests of same adviser acquisition performance for target and value-
weighted portfolio of acquirer and target. The sample is U.S. all-public acquisitions over
1985–2010 with sufficient data for Table 1.2a variables. CARs are from market model with
daily returns and value-weighted index. Comb is value-weighted portfolio of acquirer and
target. Same adviser is one if acquirer lead adviser is same investment bank as target IPO
lead manager.
(a) Values are means by same adviser status. The p-value is for the t-test of difference of means.
Variable Different Adviser Same Adviser p-value
(-1, 0) Tgt CAR 17.124 13.475 0.066
(-1, 1) Tgt CAR 21.582 19.710 0.431
(-2, 2) Tgt CAR 22.398 20.342 0.405
(-3, 3) Tgt CAR 23.203 20.073 0.199
(-1, 0) Comb CAR 1.028 3.495 0.012
(-1, 1) Comb CAR 1.169 4.436 0.006
(-2, 2) Comb CAR 1.170 4.621 0.002
(-3, 3) Comb CAR 1.175 3.993 0.020
(b) Values are medians by same adviser status. The p-value is for the Wilcoxon rank-sum test of
difference of distributions.
Variable Different Adviser Same Adviser p-value
(-1, 0) Tgt CAR 11.635 10.779 0.576
(-1, 1) Tgt CAR 17.943 16.523 0.808
(-2, 2) Tgt CAR 18.949 17.265 0.674
(-3, 3) Tgt CAR 19.755 18.651 0.516
(-1, 0) Comb CAR 0.595 1.706 0.005
(-1, 1) Comb CAR 0.809 2.217 0.007
(-2, 2) Comb CAR 0.985 2.640 0.007
(-3, 3) Comb CAR 0.856 2.227 0.050
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Table 1.7: Linear models of same adviser acquisition performance for target and value-
weighted portfolio of acquirer and target. The sample is U.S. all-public acquisitions over
1985–2010 with sufficient data for Table 1.2a variables. CARs are from market model with
daily returns and value-weighted index. Comb is value-weighted portfolio of acquirer and
target. Same adviser is one if acquirer lead adviser is same investment bank as target IPO
lead manager. IPO to acquisition is time from target’s IPO to acquisition in years. Same
industry is one if acquirer and target have same two-digit SIC code. All stock (cash) is one
if SDC Platinum’s “% of Stock” (“% of Cash”) variable is 100%. Relative size is log of deal
value to acquirer market equity [log(100 × Deal Value/ME (Acq))]. Total assets is book value
of total assets in millions USD. ROA is operating income before depreciation scaled by book
value of total assets (ROA = OIBDP/AT). BDR is book value of long- and short-term debt
scaled by book value of total assets [BDR = (DLTT + DLC)/AT]. M/B is book value of total
assets minus book value of common equity plus market equity, scaled by total assets [M/B
= (AT - CEQ + ME)/AT]. Hostile (tender, merger of equals) is one for SDC Platinum’s
classification as hostile attitude (tender offer, merger of equals). Number of bidders is SDC
Platinum’s number of competing bidders. All models include Fama and French (1997) 49-
industry and announcement year FEs, and cluster standard errors by 49-industry.
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Dependent variable:
(-1, 1) Tgt CAR (-1, 1) Comb CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Same Adviser −2.085 −2.341 3.352∗∗∗ 3.928∗∗∗
(2.241) (2.436) (1.125) (1.084)
IPO to Acquisition 0.0001 0.061
(0.138) (0.057)
Same Industry −0.452 0.185
(1.466) (0.432)
All Stock 0.116 −1.208∗∗∗
(1.755) (0.445)
All Cash 1.943 1.510∗∗
(1.769) (0.713)
Relative Size 1.038 0.964∗∗∗
(0.661) (0.312)
log(Total Assets (Acq)) 2.968∗∗∗ −0.016
(1.057) (0.253)
log(Total Assets (Tgt)) −3.299∗∗∗ −0.335
(0.959) (0.285)
ROA (Acq) 1.446 −1.183
(8.741) (2.189)
ROA (Tgt) 0.651 −2.159
(2.830) (2.085)
BDR (Acq) −4.748 2.142
(3.911) (1.474)
BDR (Tgt) −0.641 −1.304
(3.375) (1.172)
M/B (Acq) 0.149∗ 0.004
(0.077) (0.008)




Tender Offer 10.035∗∗∗ 1.909∗∗∗
(2.577) (0.421)
Merger of Equals −12.700∗∗∗ −0.499
(4.753) (2.530)
Number of Bidders −4.412∗∗ −1.643∗∗
(1.803) (0.701)
49-industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,519 1,519 1,519 1,519
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.115 0.028 0.081
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.8: Linear models of same adviser acquisition performance for acquirer with acquirer
adviser FEs to control for unobserved acquirer adviser heterogeneity. The sample is U.S.
all-public acquisitions over 1985–2010 with sufficient data for Table 1.2a variables. CARs
are from market model with daily returns and value-weighted index. Comb is value-weighted
portfolio of acquirer and target. Same adviser is one if acquirer lead adviser is same invest-
ment bank as target IPO lead manager. IPO to acquisition is time from target’s IPO to
acquisition in years. Same industry is one if acquirer and target have same two-digit SIC
code. All stock (cash) is one if SDC Platinum’s “% of Stock” (“% of Cash”) variable is
100%. Relative size is log of deal value to acquirer market equity [log(100 × Deal Value/ME
(Acq))]. Total assets is book value of total assets in millions USD. ROA is operating income
before depreciation scaled by book value of total assets (ROA = OIBDP/AT). BDR is book
value of long- and short-term debt scaled by book value of total assets [BDR = (DLTT +
DLC)/AT]. M/B is book value of total assets minus book value of common equity plus mar-
ket equity, scaled by total assets [M/B = (AT - CEQ + ME)/AT]. Hostile (tender, merger
of equals) is one for SDC Platinum’s classification as hostile attitude (tender offer, merger
of equals). Number of bidders is SDC Platinum’s number of competing bidders. All models
include acquirer adviser and announcement year FEs, and cluster standard errors by acquirer
adviser.
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Dependent variable:
(-1, 1) Acq CAR (-1, 1) Tgt CAR (-1, 1) Comb CAR
(1) (2) (3)
Same Adviser 2.720∗∗ −1.570 3.391∗∗∗
(1.378) (2.097) (1.198)
IPO to Acquisition 0.055 −0.059 0.059
(0.055) (0.154) (0.050)
Same Industry −0.460 0.248 −0.083
(0.477) (1.208) (0.417)
All Stock −1.018 1.047 −1.200
(0.818) (1.724) (0.779)
All Cash 1.867∗∗ 1.736 1.301∗
(0.857) (2.097) (0.672)
Relative Size −0.085 0.993 0.978∗∗∗
(0.404) (0.889) (0.328)
log(Total Assets (Acq)) 0.075 2.681∗∗∗ −0.036
(0.362) (0.886) (0.301)
log(Total Assets (Tgt)) −0.108 −3.063∗∗∗ −0.016
(0.445) (1.100) (0.350)
ROA (Acq) 1.941 0.403 −0.439
(3.485) (5.206) (2.834)
ROA (Tgt) −5.017∗∗ −3.844 −3.686∗∗
(2.373) (5.651) (1.875)
BDR (Acq) 3.659∗ −8.303∗ 2.742∗
(2.006) (4.634) (1.653)
BDR (Tgt) 0.414 −0.910 −0.322
(1.536) (3.034) (1.401)
M/B (Acq) −0.001 0.139 −0.006
(0.042) (0.096) (0.038)
M/B (Tgt) 0.028 −1.057∗∗ 0.068
(0.250) (0.532) (0.239)
Hostile −1.074 8.619∗∗ 2.031
(1.271) (3.836) (1.484)
Tender 1.119∗ 10.676∗∗∗ 1.893∗∗∗
(0.590) (1.900) (0.533)
Merger of Equals 2.516 −9.991 −2.450
(3.197) (6.216) (3.806)
Number of Bidders −1.312 −3.880∗∗ −1.678∗∗
(0.823) (1.891) (0.779)
Underwriter FEs Yes Yes Yes
Acquirer Adviser FEs Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,519 1,519 1,519
Adjusted R2 0.119 0.122 0.158
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.9: Linear models of same adviser acquisition performance for acquirer by sub-
periods. The sample is U.S. all-public acquisitions over 1985–2010 with sufficient data for
Table 1.2a variables. CARs are from market model with daily returns and value-weighted
index. Same adviser is one if acquirer lead adviser is same investment bank as target IPO
lead manager. IPO to acquisition is time from target’s IPO to acquisition in years. Same
industry is one if acquirer and target have same two-digit SIC code. All stock (cash) is one
if SDC Platinum’s “% of Stock” (“% of Cash”) variable is 100%. Relative size is log of deal
value to acquirer market equity [log(100 × Deal Value/ME (Acq))]. Total assets is book
value of total assets in millions USD. ROA is operating income before depreciation scaled by
book value of total assets (ROA = OIBDP/AT). BDR is book value of long- and short-term
debt scaled by book value of total assets [BDR = (DLTT + DLC)/AT]. M/B is book value
of total assets minus book value of common equity plus market equity, scaled by total assets
[M/B = (AT - CEQ + ME)/AT]. Hostile (tender, merger of equals) is one for SDC Plat-
inum’s classification as hostile attitude (tender offer, merger of equals). Number of bidders is
SDC Platinum’s number of competing bidders. All models include Fama and French (1997)
49-industry and announcement year FEs, and cluster standard errors by 49-industry.
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Dependent variable:
(-1, 1) Acq CAR 1985–1998 (-1, 1) Acq CAR 1999–2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Same Adviser 1.570∗∗∗ 2.075∗∗∗ 8.696∗∗∗ 8.183∗∗∗
(0.561) (0.737) (2.914) (2.760)
IPO to Acquisition 0.073 0.049
(0.060) (0.074)
Same Industry −0.676 0.452
(0.580) (0.794)
All Stock −0.922 −0.637
(0.673) (0.835)
All Cash 0.506 3.226∗∗∗
(0.568) (1.025)
Relative Size −0.027 −0.425
(0.313) (0.476)
log(Total Assets (Acq)) 0.286 −0.031
(0.359) (0.442)
log(Total Assets (Tgt)) −0.505 −0.481
(0.385) (0.528)
ROA (Acq) 0.878 0.690
(4.296) (2.710)
ROA (Tgt) −1.918∗ −6.756
(1.163) (4.172)
BDR (Acq) −3.049 6.968∗∗∗
(2.124) (2.433)
BDR (Tgt) −0.418 −1.397
(1.346) (1.901)
M/B (Acq) −0.068 −0.001
(0.067) (0.010)




Tender Offer 0.318 2.045∗∗
(0.561) (0.995)
Merger of Equals 6.247∗∗ 4.710
(2.547) (3.383)
Number of Bidders −1.720 −1.416
(1.352) (0.993)
49-industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 790 790 729 729
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.060 0.026 0.104
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.10: Linear models to address alternative explanations for same adviser acquisition
performance for acquirer. The sample is U.S. all-public acquisitions over 1985–2010 with
sufficient data for Table 1.2a variables. CARs are from market model with daily returns and
value-weighted index. Same adviser is one if acquirer lead adviser is same investment bank
as target IPO lead manager. Same adviser anywhere is one if acquirer adviser is same adviser
anywhere in sample. Goldman Sachs (Morgan Stanley) is one if the acquirer lead adviser is
Goldman Sachs (Morgan Stanley). IPO to acquisition is time from target’s IPO to acquisition
in years. Same industry is one if acquirer and target have same two-digit SIC code. All stock
(cash) is one if SDC Platinum’s “% of Stock” (“% of Cash”) variable is 100%. Relative size is
log of deal value to acquirer market equity [log(100 × Deal Value/ME (Acq))]. Total assets
is book value of total assets in millions USD. ROA is operating income before depreciation
scaled by book value of total assets (ROA = OIBDP/AT). BDR is book value of long- and
short-term debt scaled by book value of total assets [BDR = (DLTT + DLC)/AT]. M/B is
book value of total assets minus book value of common equity plus market equity, scaled by
total assets [M/B = (AT - CEQ + ME)/AT]. Hostile (tender, merger of equals) is one for
SDC Platinum’s classification as hostile attitude (tender offer, merger of equals). Number
of bidders is SDC Platinum’s number of competing bidders. All models include Fama and
French (1997) 49-industry and announcement year FEs, and cluster standard errors by 49-
industry.
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Dependent variable:
(-1, 1) Acq CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Same Adviser 4.049∗∗∗ 3.683∗∗∗ 4.218∗∗∗ 3.534∗∗∗
(1.209) (1.170) (1.507) (1.176)
Same Adviser Anywhere 0.668
(0.442)
Same Adviser × Goldman Sachs −0.915
(2.398)






IPO to Acquisition 0.060 0.062 0.059 0.059
(0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.053)
Same Industry 0.091 0.079 0.088 0.070
(0.439) (0.437) (0.443) (0.443)
All Stock −0.823 −0.828 −0.828 −0.808
(0.527) (0.527) (0.532) (0.541)
All Cash 1.994∗∗∗ 2.054∗∗∗ 1.995∗∗∗ 2.016∗∗∗
(0.626) (0.634) (0.627) (0.623)
Relative Size −0.178 −0.192 −0.175 −0.186
(0.283) (0.280) (0.284) (0.290)
log(Total Assets (Acq)) 0.133 0.114 0.125 0.120
(0.251) (0.251) (0.250) (0.262)
log(Total Assets (Tgt)) −0.407 −0.430 −0.409 −0.396
(0.301) (0.299) (0.303) (0.309)
ROA (Acq) 0.372 0.313 0.368 0.351
(1.686) (1.701) (1.705) (1.692)
ROA (Tgt) −4.400∗ −4.461∗ −4.448∗ −4.393∗
(2.559) (2.523) (2.564) (2.578)
BDR (Acq) 2.011 2.030 2.056 2.005
(1.701) (1.731) (1.719) (1.681)
BDR (Tgt) −0.614 −0.648 −0.608 −0.584
(1.491) (1.485) (1.476) (1.502)
M/B (Acq) 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
M/B (Tgt) −0.014 −0.020 −0.020 −0.012
(0.263) (0.264) (0.264) (0.256)
Hostile −0.930 −0.931 −0.889 −0.895
(1.311) (1.309) (1.345) (1.355)
Tender Offer 1.224∗∗ 1.176∗∗ 1.226∗∗ 1.223∗∗
(0.525) (0.534) (0.524) (0.529)
Merger of Equals 4.821∗∗ 4.856∗∗ 4.811∗∗ 4.829∗∗
(2.216) (2.191) (2.221) (2.223)
Number of Bidders −1.519∗∗ −1.487∗∗ −1.514∗∗ −1.525∗∗
(0.691) (0.681) (0.683) (0.693)
49-industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,519 1,519 1,519 1,519
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.077 0.075 0.076
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.11: Treatment selection models of same adviser acquisition performance for ac-
quirer. The sample is U.S. all-public acquisitions over 1985–2010 with sufficient data for
Table 1.2a variables. Same adviser is one if acquirer lead adviser is same investment bank
as target IPO lead manager. Underwriter reputation rank is target IPO underwriter reputa-
tion rank (Loughran and Ritter, 2004) in year before acquisition announcement. Deals/year
is number of acquisitions (public or private) that target IPO underwriter leads as acquirer
adviser in year before acquisition announcement. IPO to acquisition is time from target’s
IPO to acquisition in years. Same industry is one if acquirer and target have same two-
digit SIC code. Number of bidders is SDC Platinum’s number of competing bidders. CARs
are from market model with daily returns and value-weighted index. Same adviser is one
if acquirer lead adviser is same investment bank as target IPO lead manager. λ is hazard
ratio (non-hazard ratio for different adviser) from equation (1.1) using probit same adviser
selection model in Table 1.11a. All stock (cash) is one if SDC Platinum’s “% of Stock”
(“% of Cash”) variable is 100%. Relative size is log of deal value to acquirer market equity
[log(100 × Deal Value/ME (Acq))]. Total assets is book value of total assets in millions
USD. ROA is operating income before depreciation scaled by book value of total assets
(ROA = OIBDP/AT). BDR is book value of long- and short-term debt scaled by book value
of total assets [BDR = (DLTT + DLC)/AT]. M/B is book value of total assets minus book
value of common equity plus market equity, scaled by total assets [M/B = (AT - CEQ +
ME)/AT]. Hostile (tender, merger of equals) is one for SDC Platinum’s classification as hos-
tile attitude (tender offer, merger of equals). All models include Fama and French (1997)
49-industry and announcement year FEs, and cluster standard errors by 49-industry.
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(a) Probit selection model for same adviser status.
Dependent variable:
Same Adviser
Underwriter Reputation [0, 2) −3.695
(1,217.384)
Underwriter Reputation [2, 4) −3.950
(452.006)
Underwriter Reputation [4, 6) 0.045
(0.556)
Underwriter Reputation [6, 8) 0.841∗∗
(0.365)
Underwriter Reputation [8, 10) 0.523
(0.331)
Deals/Year [25, 50) 0.744∗∗∗
(0.228)
Deals/Year [50, 75) 0.989∗∗∗
(0.252)
Deals/Year [75, 100) 0.878∗
(0.485)










Akaike Inf. Crit. 497.993
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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(b) Linear treatment models of same adviser acquisition performance for acquirer with hazard/non-
hazard ratio (λ) to control for treatment selection. Standard errors are block bootstrapped by Fama
and French (1997) 49-industry 500 times.
Dependent variable:
(-1, 0) Acq CAR (-1, 1) Acq CAR (-2, 2) Acq CAR
(1) (2) (3)
Same Adviser 4.106∗ 5.391∗ 7.830∗∗
(2.450) (3.140) (3.559)
λ −0.486 −0.735 −2.131
(1.113) (1.599) (1.768)
IPO to Acquisition 0.009 0.063 0.032
(0.040) (0.059) (0.050)
Same Industry 0.076 0.105 0.391
(0.425) (0.445) (0.595)
All Stock −0.302 −0.830 −0.506
(0.412) (0.536) (0.614)
All Cash 1.470∗∗∗ 1.994∗∗∗ 1.608∗∗
(0.483) (0.656) (0.699)
Relative Size −0.078 −0.181 −0.526
(0.245) (0.341) (0.324)
log(Total Assets (Acq)) 0.171 0.133 −0.021
(0.235) (0.313) (0.301)
log(Total Assets (Tgt)) −0.574∗∗ −0.419 −0.133
(0.237) (0.357) (0.344)
ROA (Acq) −0.519 0.354 −2.565
(0.865) (1.664) (2.460)
ROA (Tgt) −1.703 −4.410∗ −2.830
(1.212) (2.616) (2.699)
BDR (Acq) 1.089 2.017 3.470
(1.080) (1.764) (2.256)
BDR (Tgt) 0.007 −0.603 −1.233
(1.029) (1.621) (1.720)
M/B (Acq) −0.007 0.006 0.005
(0.063) (0.093) (0.076)
M/B (Tgt) −0.109 −0.014 −0.146
(0.204) (0.270) (0.262)
Hostile −0.641 −0.932 −0.684
(0.981) (1.285) (1.666)
Tender Offer 0.429 1.217∗∗ 1.582∗∗
(0.341) (0.529) (0.702)
Merger of Equals 2.220 4.827∗∗ 2.483
(2.028) (2.174) (2.422)
Number of Bidders −0.869∗ −1.519∗∗ −1.395∗
(0.527) (0.693) (0.721)
49-industry FEs Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,519 1,519 1,519
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.076 0.056
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.13: Takeover premium models for same adviser acquisitions. The sample is U.S. all-
public acquisitions over 1985–2010 with sufficient data for Table 1.2a variables. Value/ME
(Tgt) is deal value scaled by target market equity two months prior to announce-
ment. Takeover Premium is sum of target abnormal returns over +/- 42 trading days centered
on acquisition announcement from market model with daily returns and value-weighted in-
dex. Same adviser is one if acquirer lead adviser is same investment bank as target IPO lead
manager. IPO to acquisition is time from target’s IPO to acquisition in years. Same industry
is one if acquirer and target have same two-digit SIC code. All stock (cash) is one if SDC
Platinum’s “% of Stock” (“% of Cash”) variable is 100%. Relative size is log of deal value to
acquirer market equity [log(100 × Deal Value/ME (Acq))]. Total assets is book value of total
assets in millions USD. ROA is operating income before depreciation scaled by book value of
total assets (ROA = OIBDP/AT). BDR is book value of long- and short-term debt scaled by
book value of total assets [BDR = (DLTT + DLC)/AT]. M/B is book value of total assets
minus book value of common equity plus market equity, scaled by total assets [M/B = (AT -
CEQ + ME)/AT]. Hostile (tender, merger of equals) is one for SDC Platinum’s classification
as hostile attitude (tender offer, merger of equals). Number of bidders is SDC Platinum’s
number of competing bidders. All models include Fama and French (1997) 49-industry and
announcement year FEs, and cluster standard errors by 49-industry.
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Dependent variable:
Deal Value/ME (Tgt) Takeover Premium
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Same Adviser −0.359∗∗ −0.222∗∗ −0.159 −1.501
(0.151) (0.112) (5.032) (5.230)
IPO to Acquisition 0.004 −0.285
(0.006) (0.206)
Same Industry 0.077 −2.414
(0.092) (2.698)
All Stock −0.228∗∗∗ −0.914
(0.082) (2.159)
All Cash −0.278∗∗∗ 6.771∗
(0.084) (3.997)
Relative Size 0.403∗∗∗ 4.473∗∗∗
(0.067) (1.678)
log(Total Assets (Acq)) 0.344∗∗∗ 5.953∗∗∗
(0.059) (1.928)
log(Total Assets (Tgt)) −0.361∗∗∗ −5.924∗∗
(0.058) (2.310)
ROA (Acq) 0.324 3.071
(0.198) (12.688)
ROA (Tgt) −0.245 −7.693
(0.177) (11.769)
BDR (Acq) −0.627∗∗∗ −15.521∗∗
(0.209) (6.546)
BDR (Tgt) 0.966∗∗∗ 7.299
(0.270) (8.329)
M/B (Acq) 0.016∗∗∗ 0.199∗
(0.005) (0.112)




Tender Offer 0.301 4.930
(0.233) (4.710)
Merger of Equals −0.090 −21.782∗
(0.154) (11.108)
Number of Bidders 0.104 −1.165
(0.152) (3.939)
49-industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.215 −0.0003 0.103
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.14: Performance and valuation improvement models for same adviser acquisi-
tions. The sample is U.S. all-public acquisitions over 1985–2010 with sufficient data for
Table 1.2a variables. ROA (M/B) change is 5-year change in ROA (M/B), industry-adjusted
by removing Fama and French (1997) 49-industry median. Same adviser is one if acquirer
lead adviser is same investment bank as target IPO lead manager. IPO to acquisition is
time from target’s IPO to acquisition in years. Same industry is one if acquirer and tar-
get have same two-digit SIC code. All stock (cash) is one if SDC Platinum’s “% of Stock”
(“% of Cash”) variable is 100%. Relative size is log of deal value to acquirer market equity
[log(100 × Deal Value/ME (Acq))]. Total assets is book value of total assets in millions
USD. ROA is operating income before depreciation scaled by book value of total assets
(ROA = OIBDP/AT). BDR is book value of long- and short-term debt scaled by book
value of total assets [BDR = (DLTT + DLC)/AT]. M/B is book value of total assets mi-
nus book value of common equity plus market equity, scaled by total assets [M/B = (AT -
CEQ + ME)/AT]. Hostile (tender, merger of equals) is one for SDC Platinum’s classification
as hostile attitude (tender offer, merger of equals). Number of bidders is SDC Platinum’s
number of competing bidders. All models include Fama and French (1997) 49-industry and
announcement year FEs, and cluster standard errors by 49-industry.
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Dependent variable:
ROA Change M/B Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Same Adviser 0.001 0.004 −0.385 −0.313
(0.015) (0.013) (0.387) (0.439)
IPO to Acquisition 0.0001 −0.005
(0.001) (0.006)
Same Industry 0.005 0.060
(0.013) (0.163)
All Stock 0.011 0.266
(0.010) (0.175)
All Cash −0.005 −0.285
(0.007) (0.205)
Relative Size 0.001 −0.168
(0.004) (0.125)
log(Total Assets (Acq)) 0.005 −0.083
(0.005) (0.217)
log(Total Assets (Tgt)) −0.011∗∗∗ −0.135
(0.004) (0.107)
ROA (Acq) −0.023 1.503∗
(0.087) (0.842)
ROA (Tgt) −0.012 1.480
(0.029) (1.373)
BDR (Acq) 0.053 1.243
(0.037) (0.860)
BDR (Tgt) −0.020 −0.238
(0.018) (0.431)
M/B (Acq) 0.002∗∗ 0.023
(0.001) (0.019)




Tender Offer 0.002 0.212
(0.007) (0.282)
Merger of Equals −0.013 −0.216
(0.026) (0.763)
Number of Bidders 0.008 −0.631
(0.012) (0.402)
49-industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,118 1,118 1,118 1,118
Adjusted R2 −0.022 −0.014 0.032 0.045
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Chapter 2
Do investors follow directors?
2.1 Introduction
Fama and Jensen (1983) propose that the corporate board safeguards shareholders’ interests
and plays the critical role of advising and monitoring management. Several prior studies
show that a change in board membership, on average, leads to better firm performance and
valuation (Coles et al., 2008, among others), because investors value the improvements it can
bring (Masulis and Mobbs, 2011, 2014). However there is little evidence on whether board
changes affect institutional investors’ investment decisions. Given that firms are opaque and
complex, both in terms of what should be done (advisory skills) and what should not be
done (monitoring skills), and that directors have valuable human capital that can improve
outcomes, then a natural question is if investors explicitly invest in directors’ human capital
to any degree. Rather than look at the relation between boards and valuations, or between
changes in directors and corporate value, this chapter focuses on a more direct channel –
the impact of a change in directors on institutional ownership. Specifically, do institutional
investors follow directors to new firms? And if they do, do they make larger initial invest-
ments in these new firms? The key benefit of this approach is that it alleviates endogeneity
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concerns between changes in key executives and corporate performance and value.
It is well known that firms can be opaque and it is difficult to discern what goes on
in board meetings and investors place immense faith in their leaders’ judgment. Warren
Buffet had the following wisdom, with respect to selecting managers, at the 1996 Berkshire
Hathaway shareholder meeting.
We think a .350 hitter will continue to be one; we don’t believe the .127 hitter
who says, hey I’m different because I’ve got a new bat. In business, those are
often the managements who say they’ve hired consultants. Once we see ability,
we like to see how they treat their shareholders.
Additional evidence from statements by other large investors and board members suggests
that investors value and may invest in known and trusted managers as well as the firm’s
assets. Whether the mechanism is certification of the firm by a trusted director, or improved
advising and monitoring, it could be that the arrival of a familiar, trusted director results in
larger initial investments in the firm by institutional investors.
To that end, this chapter examines the relations between funds, firms, and directors, and
finds that institutional investors make larger initial investments in firms with new directors
whom the fund has an existing relation from previous investments elsewhere. In a sample of
more than five million fund-firm-director-year observations across 2,226 unique funds, 2,150
unique firms, and 18,085 unique directors over 1997–2005, funds make 5% to 30% larger initial
investments when their new investment is coincident with a director with whom they have
a previous relation, relative to other new institutional investors with no previous relation.
The size of the follower effect depends on model specification and level of aggregation, but
it is robust to a variety of fixed effect (FE) specifications to control unobserved fund, firm,
and director traits, standard error clustering and data aggregation to control for within
group correlation, and both treatment selection and matching models to control for possible
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selection bias in the decision to follow.
The results here indicate that institutional investors’ decisions to make larger initial
investments in firms with trusted and followed directors are made sensibly with respect to
both past director and firm performance. Followed directors have higher past industry-
adjusted performance in terms of both return on assets (ROA) and market-to-book (M/B).
The receiving firms of followed directors have underperformed relative to industry medians
although in a complete specification this underperformance is not statistically different from
zero. Additional analysis reveals that firms with followed directors do not improve firm
performance in the one- to two-year period following the appointment, although more time
is likely necessary to reject the null hypothesis of no improvement. As well, there could be
non-performance reasons for institutional investors to follow directors that are not yet clear.
The belief that institutional investors might follow some directors, but not others, is
grounded in the work of Masulis and Mobbs (2011) who find that not all directors are
created equal and some directors create more shareholder value than others. Given that
directors have incentives to consider their own market value, it could be the case that some
funds more highly value some director human capital and follow them to new firms.
Given that different directors play different roles on the board, it could be that the
follower effect differs in the cross-section by the role of the director. For example, outside
directors tend to monitor senior management and advise the CEO, while inside directors tend
to create and execute strategy and provide valuable inside information to external directors
(Jensen, 1993). These different roles suggest that the follower effect may differ in the cross-
section based on whether the follower directors are insiders or outsiders. With respect to
monitoring, advice, and strategy formulation, the impact of these contributions should also
differ in the cross-section with weak governance firms benefiting the most from external
directors and weak performing firms benefiting the most from internal directors, which is
consistent with Coles et al. (2008). However neither of these seem to be the case and the
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follower effect is strong across all director classifications and titles (marginally stronger for
employee directors) and strengths of firm-level governance.
This chapter’s key findings contribute to the literature on corporate boards and gover-
nance in two ways. First, investors that follow known or trusted directors make larger initial
investments in these new firms. It seems that followed directors move from high performance
and valuation firms to low performance and valuation firms and bring with them investors
that make larger initial investments in the new firm (5% to 30% larger, depending on the
specification and level of aggregation). Second, the followed directors do not seem to be able
to influence significant improvements in the receiving firms’ performance or valuation, at
least in the one or two years after arrival. This non-finding is puzzling, but it could be that
there are other, non-performance and non-valuation reasons for following a known director,
or that two years is too short a horizon to cause any real changes at the new firm. In sum, the
results here show that institutional investors prefer to invest with trusted directors, possibly
for reasons beyond performance.
This chapter proceed as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes the related literature on boards,
investors, and corporate performance. Section 2.3 discusses data and Subsection 2.3.2 dis-
cusses the follower variable, in particular. Section 2.4 presents the main results. Section 2.5
presents a host of robustness checks, including robustness to a matching model in Subsection
2.5.2 and a treatment selection model in Subsection 2.5.3. Section 2.6 presents extensions
on why investors may choose to follow. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
How institutional investors allocate capital, particularly with respect to executive changes,
has not received much attention in the literature. But there are several literatures that lay the
groundwork by showing why boards of directors matter, actual changes and improvements
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made by boards, how the market values the potential for these changes, and how at the
international level institutional investor flows relate to changes in firm-level governance (one
salient outcome of boards of directors).
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) discuss broadly the organization of the firm and
address the relation between the board of directors and the firm. Fama and Jensen (1983)
propose that “[e]ffective separation of top-level decision management and control means that
outside directors have incentives to carry out their tasks and not collude with managers to
expropriate residual claimants” because “there is substantial devaluation of human capital
when internal control breaks down.” This sets up a theme that runs throughout the litera-
ture on boards of directors: firms value the advising and monitoring that directors provide
and the quality of their oversight determines the value of directors’ human capital. Much
of the literature works within this relation and either shows the effects of board monitoring
on corporate actions and corporate value (e.g., setting executive compensation or defending
against hostile takeovers) or the market for directors. Rather than focus on this relation in-
side the firm, this chapter explores how this relation relates to institutional investor decisions
outside the firm.
Coles et al. (2008) discuss the role of boards, caution against one-size-fits-all board reg-
ulation, and find that the relation between firm value (using market-to-book as a proxy for
value) and board size is U-shaped. Further, the sources of this variation are the needs of
the firm. Keeping with Fama and Jensen (1983) they find that large, complex firms need
large boards with many outsiders to advise and monitor the various dimensions of the firm
so that for large firms market-to-book increases in board size. They also find that small,
research-intensive firms require small boards with a larger fraction of insiders to formulate
strategy and move nimbly.
Masulis and Mobbs (2011) assess whether all non-CEO internal directors are created equal
and argue that the external labor market provides an informative way to identify both skill
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and incentives for internal directors. An external directorship differentiates internal directors
in several ways that improve firm performance, through both advising and monitoring. First,
the external labor market recognition is a sign of their skill; second, these directors have inside
knowledge that makes them a credible threat to the CEO; third, the external labor market
aligns their incentives with the shareholders by tying their reputation to firm performance;
and fourth, because these directors are more visible and have outside prospects, they are less
likely to be influenced by the CEO, which is a common complaint leveled at inside directors.
Masulis and Mobbs (2011) refer to internal directors with external director positions as
“certified internal directors” and find that certified internal directors are associated with
better decision making. The analysis in this chapter differs from Masulis and Mobbs (2011)
in that rather than look at director appointments, and whether they are internal or external,
it looks directly at the market response to director appointments through the simple and
crude metric of new investments in firms that appoint trusted and known directors relative
to new investments in firms that don’t.
In a follow-up paper, Masulis and Mobbs (2014) investigate director reputation incen-
tives and how independent directors allocate time across multiple external directorships.
That independent directors have several directorships is perceived as a positive signal about
their skill and ability, but it also can spread their attention and reduce their monitoring
ability, which is cited as a key contribution of external directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Masulis and Mobbs (2014) report that directors in their sample attend more meetings at
their prestigious directorships, and at these prestigious firms the directors take on more
time-consuming audit roles that improve their visibility and reputation. These directors
also hold onto their prestigious directorships more strongly, even when firm performance is
relatively poor. Further, they find that as the fraction of independent directors that hold
the firm in high regard (i.e., dedicate more time to the directorship) increases, so too does
firm operating performance and value. In short, their study offers some novel insight on
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how directors build and maintain reputation. This chapter’s approach differs from Masulis
and Mobbs (2014)’s approach in that it abstracts away from any incentives to build and
maintain reputation, but instead look at one clearly observable outcome of reputation and
trust, namely being followed to new directorships.
To the extent that the board of directors is a primary governance mechanism through
rule-making and monitoring, Aggarwal et al. (2011) relate institutional investors and gov-
ernance. Aggarwal et al. (2011), abstract away from board members, but focus on one key
outcome of board decisions: changes to firm-level governance. Using a panel of 23 countries
and and a firm-level governance proxy for 34,070 firm-years they find that firm-level gov-
ernance is positively related to international institutional investment and that institutional
ownership leads governance changes, rather than vice versa. Although not directly related
to the literature on corporate boards, this study shows a strong channel between institu-
tional investors and governance changes. Given that boards of directors are probably the
first layer of corporate governance in the U.S., it stands to reason that U.S. institutional
investors would prefer investments in firms with familiar or known executives, especially if
these executives have delivered outstanding performance at other firms.
In all, these literatures suggest that director capital is valuable for good reasons and this
value may affect institutional investor decisions.
2.3 Data
This section discusses the data sources, how to generate the follower variable, data require-
ments, and descriptive statistics for the baseline data and several subsamples and levels of
data aggregation.
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2.3.1 Data Sources
Data from Risk Metrics (RM), Thomson Reuters 13F (13F), CRSP-Compustat Merged
(CCM), Bebchuk et al. (2009)’s entrenchment index, and Fama and French (1997) industry
classifications generates a data set with 5,163,715 fund-firm-director-year observations with
2,226 funds, 2,150 firms, and 18,085 directors across 9 years spanning from 1997 through
2005. In all cases the director data from RM are the limiting data, so the data discussion
begins there. RM provides director characteristics for S&P-1500 firms and links them to
firms’ annual meetings. RM data begin in 1996, but RM changed their data collection pro-
cess after 2006 so that variables are not directly comparable before and after.1 To avoid data
comparability issues the analysis here uses only 1996–2006 RM data. RM provides director
name and firm, as well as classification [employee (E), independent (I), or linked (L)]. A
linked director is an independent director, but from an affiliated firm (e.g., a subsidiary or
supplier). For employee directors RM also provides the director’s title, such as chief exec-
utive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), or chairman. The baseline sample drops
observations that do not uniquely identify firm-director-year observations.2 One prior year is
necessary to determine if a fund follows a director, and one subsequent year to determine if
a fund will follow a director, which drops the first and last years in the sample and limits the
analysis to 1997–2005. Subsection 2.3.3 discusses data requirements and screens in greater
detail.
13F data provide quarterly filings from institutional investors on ownership stakes in
public firms in excess of $200,000. These 13F data provide institutional ownership (IO) in
each firm at the family of funds level as quarter closing price times reported share holdings.
The analysis throughout this chapter is at the family of funds level rather than at the
individual fund level. With respect to the decisions of individual fund managers, using
1For more on these changes see http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ds/riskmetrics/index.
cfm.
2This only drops a handful of observations (12).
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an aggregated measure is a noisy proxy, but this should make it more difficult to find a
relation between new funds and new directors. Clearly, individual fund level analysis would
be preferable and allow sharper tests, but these data are not available. For brevity this
chapter refers to a “family of funds” as a “fund” throughout.
Total institutional ownership in each firm (IO Total) is the sum of IO across all funds
each firm-quarter over the sample period. Likewise, assets under management for each fund
(AUM) is the sum of IO across all firms each fund-quarter. That is, IO is a fund-firm-quarter
observation, IO Total is a firm-quarter observation, and AUM is a fund-quarter observation.
13F data also provide firm market equity (ME) as quarter closing price times total shares
outstanding. All four values are in millions of U.S. Dollars. To focus on economically
significant investment decisions, the baseline sample drops fund-firm-year observations with
IO less than $10 million before merging with RM director data. This is an arbitrary IO
threshold, but the results throughout are qualitatively similar with $1 and $50 million IO
thresholds.3 It is worth emphasizing that 13F data are aggregated before the sample drops
any observations so that IO, IO Total, and AUM are determined on the entire universe of
13F data rather than a subset of 13F data that matches RM or Bebchuk et al. (2009) data.
CCM data provide firm fundamentals on an annual basis and two firm performance mea-
sures. The operating performance proxy is return on assets (ROA), which is operating income
before depreciation scaled by total assets (ROA = OIBDP/AT), and the valuation proxy is
market-to-book (M/B), which is book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus
market value of equity scaled by total assets [M/B = (AT - SEQ + PRCC F*CSHO)/AT].
Both ROA and M/B are industry-adjusted by subtracting the 49-industry median each year
on the entire CCM universe rather than the subset that survives the data merging process.
3The marginal impact of the follower decision is larger the higher the IO threshold, likely because it limits
the analysis to larger firms. A lower threshold results in a much larger data set because of the multiplicative
relation between funds, firms, directors, and years. In any case, even if there is no IO screen or threshold,
the 13F data have an unavoidable and equally arbitrary IO threshold of $200,000.
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This does not impact the conclusions here, but subtracting the 49-industry median market-
to-book ratio results in industry-adjusted market-to-book ratios that are greater than zero
due to valuation differences between the S&P-1500 (RM data) and the CCM universe.
The Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index (E index) measures firm-level governance.
The E index falls between zero and six (inclusive) and increases in the level of managerial
entrenchment. Bebchuk et al. (2009) provide these data over 1990–2006, but with one- or
two-year gaps. The missing values are filled with the previous non-missing value, but non-
missing values are never carried forward more than two years. This procedure is common in
the literature, as both the E index and the Gompers et al. (2003) G index slowly vary over
time within each firm, if at all.
These four data sources are merged as follows. The RM board data are annual and
the 13F holdings data are quarterly, so these data are merged on the quarter of the annual
meeting.4 This approach is simple and transparent, but a reasonable alternative approach
would be to determine the rolling means of quarterly 13F data, then merge these to the
annual RM data on the quarter of the annual meeting. However, the purpose of this study
is to identify new fund investments and smoothing these data makes crossing any given IO
threshold more difficult and provides a less clear interpretation of the results.5 To the extent
that these quarterly data are noisy without smoothing, the raw data approach makes it more
difficult to find a relation between new funds and new directors. The CCM data are merged
with the annual meeting data (i.e., RM and 13F) on the associated fiscal year, as is the E
index. This yields an unbalanced panel at the fund-firm-director-year level. For a firm with
d directors in a given year there will be d observations for each fund that invests in the firm.
4In a handful of cases there are two board meetings in one year in RM and the sample drops the second
meeting. However, results are robust to dropping these firm-years altogether.
5For example, to cross a $10 million rolling mean threshold a fund could either invest $40 million in the
most recent quarter, $20 in the most recent two quarters, or $10 in each of the most recent four quarters.
Further, a fund that exits its investment in the firm the most recent quarter could still appear as an
institutional investor if the ownership in previous quarters were large enough.
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Further, for a firm with IO from f funds in a given year, there will be f observations for
each director in the firm. So for each firm-year there will be f × d observations. Fund, firm,
and director data will differ for each observation, but the observations are not independent.
Throughout standard errors are clustered and data aggregated at the fund, firm, and director
levels to address concerns that results here are due to within fund or within firm correlation.
2.3.2 Followers
To identify if a fund follows a director, “follower” is an indicator variable that is one if the
fund follows the director to the new (or receiving or follower) firm from a relation with the
same director at a different firm the previous year. There are no other restrictions on whether
the fund or director remains at the firm(s) where they had the relation the previous year.
With fund-firm-director-year observations, for each observation there are three relations
between the three participants: fund-firm, firm-director, and director-fund. Each of these
relations can be either new (i.e., there was no relation between the two participants the
previous year) or not new (i.e., there was at least one relation the previous year). A follower
is a fund-firm-director-year observation that is a new fund-firm pair, a new firm-director
pair, and not a new director-fund pair. Algebraically a follower is:
1follower = 1new fund−firm × 1new firm−director × (1− 1new director−fund). (2.1)
In plain language, a follower is a fund investing in a firm for the first time, where the
director is on the firm’s board of directors for the first time, and the fund invested in one of
the director’s other firms the previous year.
The choice of a one-year lapse to identify new relations is arbitrary, but maximizes the
sample size and reduces the 1996–2006 RM data to 1997–2005. Each one-year addition to
the lapse to identify new relations reduces the sample size by two years (i.e., one additional
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year at the beginning to identify followers and one additional year at the end to identify
next year’s followers) and a two-year lapse reduces the sample size by nominally 22%, from
seven to nine years.
The choice of a lapse period must balance follower false positives and false negatives. For
example, follower false positives occur when one or more of the three relations is incorrectly
flagged. That is, a fund-firm relation is wrongly flagged as new, a firm-director is wrongly
flagged as new, and/or a director-fund is wrongly not flagged as new. For a given relation
false new relations are decreasing in lapse period. As the lapse period increases, it becomes
more difficult for data errors to lead to wrongly flagged new relations. Likewise, as the lapse
period increases, it becomes easier for real relations with short breaks to not be flagged as
new (i.e., false negatives). Recall that followers are new fund-firm, new firm-director, and
not new director-fund relations, so the net effect on follower errors of increasing or decreasing
the lapse period is not obvious and is an empirical issue. In any case, the results throughout
this chapter are robust to using either one- or two-year lapses to identify new relations.
2.3.3 Data Requirements
Because followers are new fund-firm and firm-director relations where the director-fund rela-
tion is not new, the results of any analysis could be sensitive to falsely flagging old (i.e., not
new) relations as new relations. As well as dropping the first and last year in the combined
sample to identify followers (i.e., restricting the sample to 1997–2005), the sample also drops
the first year that any fund, firm, or director appears in the merged sample. This prevents
any mechanical relation between followers and the left edge of the sample, down to the in-
dividual fund, firm, and director level. The first years for funds, firms, and directors are
determined prior to dropping 1996 and 2006 (and independently of flagging new fund-firm,
firm-director, and director-fund pairs). Without this restriction 1997 would mechanically
drop out of the sample, as 1997 would become the new first year for every fund, firm, and
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director. In any case, the results throughout are qualitatively similar with and without the
restriction to drop the first years for each fund, firm, and director.
2.3.4 Descriptive Statistics
The baseline data are fund-firm-director-year observations across all IO of at least $10 mil-
lion, but the results throughout are robust to sub-sampling and aggregating the data at
several levels to reduce concerns about unobserved fund, firm, and director characteristics,
overweighting large firms, and within group correlation (i.e., observations are not indepen-
dent within funds, firms, and directors). Table 2.1 presents several panels of descriptive
statistics across several subsets and levels of aggregation, beginning with Table 2.1a, which
presents pooled descriptive statistics at the fund-firm-director-year level. These descriptive
statistics are similar to descriptive statistics from the recent board of directors literature
(Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Coles et al., 2008; Masulis and Mobbs, 2011, 2014, among oth-
ers). It is worth noting that these descriptive statistics have an upward bias from the natural
sample of RM S&P-1500 firms because larger firms tend to have both larger boards of direc-
tors (Coles et al., 2008) and more institutional investors, which has a multiplicative effect on
the number of fund-firm-director-year observations. As well, the IO threshold of $10 million
preferentially removes smaller firms from the sample. Regardless, these descriptive statistics
are consistent with Masulis and Mobbs (2014), who use the same RM sample. Board size
(i.e., directors per firm) is consistent with Masulis and Mobbs (2014) who identify a mean
board size of 9.40 directors (their Panel A in Table 2) per firm that varies between 10.73 and
9.09 depending on subsample (their Panel B in Table 2), which is similar to but smaller than
11.9 directors per firm in the data here. As well, they identify a mean of 1.74 directorships
(i.e., firms per director) for independent directors (their Table 1), which is similar to 2.03
directorships across all directors in the data here. Elsewhere the descriptive statistics here
are higher and right skewed, consistent with preferential selection of large firms and fund-
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firm-director-year observations with a minimum IO screen of $10 million. On average, firms
in the sample have 534 fund investors and funds invest in 1418 firms. It isn’t obvious if large
funds are more or less likely to follow. While large funds have a larger portfolio of directors
with existing relations that they could follow by chance rather than choice, they also have
a larger portfolio of firms with existing relations in which they can’t make new investments.
Thus, this is again an empirical issue. Fund and year FEs, as well as fund-year FEs, are
employed throughout to control for unobserved heterogeneity and the decision to follow.
Further, robustness checks include a treatment selection model (Campa and Kedia, 2002;
Greene, 2002) and a matching model to correct for possible selection bias in the decision to
follow.6
Table 2.1a shows that at the fund-firm-director-year level about 31.4% of investments are
new to the firm, suggesting there is quite a bit of IO turnover. Only 6.03% of directors are
new to the firm, which seems low, but given that the nominal board tenure is 7 years (Coles
et al., 2008; Masulis and Mobbs, 2014) the mean of the new firm-director indicator variable
should be approximately 15%, and dropping the first observation for each fund, firm, and
director should further reduce this value. Finally, in this sample 29.8% of directors are new
to funds each year. Note that this can be larger than 6.03% for new firm-director pairs
because a director-fund pair can be new through either new investments or new director
appointment.
The independent variables also include Fich and Shivdasani (2006)’s measures of direc-
tor activity, which are busy director and busy board. These are relevant information for
6As well, in untabulated results, the conclusions here are robust to a host of alternative specifications
to control for unobserved characteristics. All alternative specifications provide qualitatively similar results
and conclusions. These alternative specifications to control for unobserved characteristics of the decision to
follow include high dimension FE models with either fund, firm, and year FEs, or fund, director, and year
FEs. However, adding the second high dimension FE (either firm or director FE) removes the ability to
two-way cluster standard errors. Untabulated results also include fund-firm and year FEs, and fund-director
and year FEs, however these models identify off within fund-firm and fund-director variation. In any case,
these results are qualitatively similar to the ones tabulated and presented here.
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whether a director at a new firm could add value as well as the probability that a fund could
mechanically follow a director to a new firm, rather than through a conscious choice. Here
the busy variable definitions mirror Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and a busy director is an
external director that sits on at least three boards in the same year and a busy board is a
board of directors that has at least half busy external directors. Table 2.1a provides pooled
descriptive statistics at the fund-firm-director-year level for S&P-1500 rather than S&P-500
as in Fich and Shivdasani (2006), so the lower busy director of 25.8% rather than Fich and
Shivdasani (2006)’s 52.26% is not surprising. It is reasonable to expect that directors on
smaller firms are less likely to be well-connected. However, the fraction of firms with busy
boards is similar at 22.8%, even slightly higher than Fich and Shivdasani (2006)’s 21.42%
due to the higher weighting on larger firms in the sample here, which are more likely to have
busy directors and boards.
With respect to the follower variable, Table 2.1a shows that 0.513% of fund-firm-director-
years are followers. Note that this is similar to a naive estimate of 0.314 × 0.0603 × (1 −
0.298) = 1.33% (i.e., assuming that the three pairs are independent so that the expected
value mean of the three occurring together is the product of the mean of each in isolation).
The “will follow” variable is an indicator variable that is one for fund-firm-director-year
observations where the fund follows the director to a new firm next year. Given that the
average director sits on more than one board it isn’t surprising that will follow is larger than
follower, at 2.04%.7 Subsection 2.5.3 presents a follower selection model to better understand
the trade-off between fund, firm, and director characteristics in the likelihood that a firm
follows a director to a new firm.
With respect to fund and firm size, the mean fund AUM and firm ME are $49,838 million
7Mechanically the number of will follows must be at least as large as next year’s number of followers.
But given that these are mean values, which are counts normalized by population each year, there isn’t a
requirement that the mean of will follow is at least as large as the mean of follower, although in most cases
it will be.
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and $47,077 million, respectively, with mean fund investment (i.e., IO) of $102 million. All
three measures have right skew and median values that are lower at $13,787 million, $14,099
million, and $28.9 million, respectively. Mean IO Total is $26,928 million, which scaled by
ME is $26,928/$47,077 = 57.20%, which is similar to the nominal mean IO fraction of 60%
reported elsewhere for the S&P-1500 sample (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). Finally, on
average, the investment in each firm investment is 1.02% of a fund’s AUM, although the
fraction varies from slightly greater than zero to exactly one. This indicates that the fund
sizes run the gamut from small, with one reportable holding, to so large that a given holding
is irrelevant to the fund’s overall portfolio. Given that some positions are very small, once
concern could be that either index funds (i.e, explicit or closet indexers) or large families
of funds (e.g., Fidelity Investments) drive the results here. Indexers are not a concern for
the identification strategy here for three reasons, the first two of which also apply to large
families of funds. First, fund FE and fund-year FEs throughout require that the follower
effect is identified using within fund or within fund-year variation. Second, index funds
don’t frequently enter or leave investment positions in firms and the initial appearance for
any fund or firm drops from the sample. Third, in the event that the first two aspects of the
identification strategy and data requirements fail, index inclusion should not be associated
with either new directors or followed directors.
As noted at the onset, the analysis here examines funds’ initial investments in firms,
as the focus is on the relation between known and trusted director movements and new
investments. That is, the tabulated analysis going forward is based only on new fund-firm
pairs (i.e., funds’ initial investments in firms). After the first year the fund invests in the
firm, it isn’t clear how to interpret follower status, especially more than a few years after
the fund’s initial investment in the firm. However, in untabulated results, including the
entire panel rather than just new fund-firm pairs does not change the conclusion that funds
make larger investments in the cross-section whenever they follow a director to a new firm,
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whether it is the first year they invest or any subsequent year. As such, Table 2.1b presents
the descriptive statistics, again at the fund-firm-director-year level, but in the subsample of
observations in which the fund invests in the firm for the first time (i.e., new fund-firm pairs).
The new fund-firm requirement imposes no restriction on fund or firm age, only that the
fund did not have an investment in the firm over the $10 million IO threshold in the previous
year. Because the screens drop 1996 from the sample after determining new fund-firm pairs
(and new firm-director and new director-fund pairs), there is no mechanical creation of new
pairs of any combination of fund, firm, and director by the left edge of the sample. The
descriptive statistics in the first four rows of 2.1b are not qualitatively different from those
in Table 2.1a. This subsample of new fund-firm pairs is 31.4% of the size of the unconditional
sample, but has nominally the same number of directors per firm (11.3, down from 11.9 for
the full sample) and firms per director (1.94, down from 2.03 for the full sample). Likewise
for the fund-firm descriptive statistics, which are all consistent with a reduction in fund and
firm size in this subsample of new fund-firm pairs. However, the fund-firm-director relations
are different by construction because the new fund-firm relation is hard-wired. The mean
of the new fund-firm indicator variable is one by construction, and the mean of the new
firm-director indicator variables is 7.96%, up from 6.03% in the full sample, although this
increase is not mechanical. The mean of the new director-fund relation dummy increases to
88.1%, up from 29.8% in the full sample. Including only new fund-firm relations increases
the chances that a given fund-director relation will be new.
The definition of the follower variable requires new fund-firm, new firm-director, and not
new director-firm relations. Although new relations for all three pairs become more likely,
because not new director-firm relations become less likely the net effect on the proportion of
followers is relatively small and it increases to 1.63%, up from 0.513% in the full sample. Note
that this is mechanical because followers require a new fund-firm relation, so by definition
there are no followers in the dropped observations (i.e., 0.513%/31.4% = 1.63%). With
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respect to AUM, IO, and ME, all three decrease in the new fund-firm subsample. AUM falls
to $29,293 million from $49,838, possibly because large funds will find it more difficult to
begin a new fund-firm relation in a given year in the set of RM firms. The same logic could
apply to ME, which falls to $32,036 million from $47,077 million, because it is more difficult
to make new investments in larger firms (say, again, Dow-Jones firms). These two effects
could explain lower means for both IO and IO Total, which fall to $36.9 million from $102
million and to $18,995 million from $26,928 million.
To address concerns that the results could be due to within fund or within firm correlation,
later analysis uses data at the fund-firm-year level, so the fund-firm-director-year level data
in the new fund-firm pairs subsample is collapsed to the fund-firm-year level by removing the
director dimension. Table 2.1c presents the new fund-firm subsample collapsed to the fund-
firm-year level. In this context it is difficult to interpret director-level variables, such as busy
director or number of firms per director, so rather than choosing an arbitrary aggregation
function for director characteristics (e.g., mean, median, maximum, or minimum) the fund-
firm-year level analysis drops director-specific characteristics altogether and makes a fund-
firm-year observation a follower if the fund followed any director to the firm this year. Table
2.1c presents descriptive statistics for this fund-firm-year aggregation in the subsample of
observations with new fund-firm relations. That is, Table 2.1c contains the same fund-firm-
years as Table 2.1b, but with the director dimension removed. Throughout, the descriptive
statistics are nominally similar to the previous two tables. Removing the director dimension
further reduces the upward bias by removing the director weighting, which could be nominally
16 for large firms or 8 for small firms (Coles et al., 2008). Because a fund-firm-year is a
follower if a fund follows any director to the firm that year, the mean of the follower indicator
variable increases to 10.2% from 1.63%, consistent with a mean of about ten directors per
firm. Note that this aggregation reduces all the firm-specific variables (e.g., IO, IO Total,
ME, and Total Assets), as expected, by reducing the weight on large firms with above average
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numbers of directors.
Given that following requires a new firm-director relation, an alternative subsample could
require both new fund-firm and new firm-director relations. This leaves the director-fund
relation as the only difference between followers and non-followers in this subsample. Table
2.1d presents descriptive statistics at the fund-firm-year level for the subsample of obser-
vations with both new fund investment and at least one new director (i.e., new fund-firm
pairs and at least one new firm-director pair). The descriptive statistics are similar to those
in Table 2.1c (i.e., fund-firm-year observations with new fund-firm pairs), but because large
firms with larger boards are more likely to have a new director any given year, the direc-
tors/firm, ME, and follower statistics all rise. This is a reasonable alternative view of how
to measure the relation between funds, firms, and directors, and Section 2.5 shows that the
results are robust to this new fund-firm and new firm-director subsample. These several
subsamples and levels of aggregation show that there are several ways to view the relation
between funds, firms, and directors and the results here are robust these several alternative
subsample definitions.
Given that the follower relation may differ depending on the director’s role, Table 2.1e
returns to the fund-firm-director-year level in the full, baseline sample (i.e., no restriction
on fund-firm, firm-director, or director fund relations) and splits the sample on the direc-
tor’s classification (i.e., employee, independent, or linked) and title (i.e., CEO, Chairman,
or other). Because this requires director characteristics, 2.1e uses the full baseline data at
the fund-firm-director-year. The sample composition between followers and non-followers
are qualitatively similar, with sensible deviations. For example, with respect the board af-
filiation, the non-follower sample is 18.1% employee, 68.2% independent, and 13.6% linked
(i.e., independent, but employed by a firm with some supply chain or subsidiary relation).
The follower subset differs slightly, with a smaller weighting on employee at 7.6%, a larger
weighting on independent at 81.5%, and a smaller weighting on linked at 10.9%. These are
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consistent with expectations given that independent directors are likely to have more direc-
torships and thus more likely to be followed (Masulis and Mobbs, 2011). From a univariate
perspective, independent directors are more likely to be followed. Moving to job title, 25.8%
of non-followed directors are CEOs, while 29.3% of followed directors are CEOs. Likewise
for Chairmen, which are 25.1% of the non-followed sample, but 26.7% of the followed sam-
ple. That is, followed directors are slightly more likely to have greater influence on their
firms. Combining these two results, it seems that followed directors are more likely to both
be independent and have senior titles, which is consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983)
and the importance of board advisory and monitoring roles. Nevertheless, this result is also
consistent with a possible selection bias that empirical tests address with either FEs (at the
fund, firm, and fund-year levels) to control for unobserved heterogeneity or more explicitly
with a matching model in Section 2.5.2 and a treatment selection model in Section 2.5.3.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Univariate Results
The most basic test of whether or not investors follow directors is to compare IO of followers
to IO of other first time institutional investors. If this year is the first year an institutional
investor invests in the firm, does it invest more in the firm if it followed a director it had
a relation with through a previous investment? Table 2.2 presents means and medians (in
parentheses), along with p-values for t, chi-squared median, and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests at
two levels of aggregation. Table 2.2a presents these tests at the fund-firm-director-year level
for the subsample of new fund-firm relations (i.e., data from Table 2.1b), while Table 2.2b
presents these tests at the fund-firm-year level for the subsample of new fund-firm relations
(i.e., data from Table 2.1c). Looking first at univariate tests at the fund-firm-director-year
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level in Table 2.2a, in both levels and logs the followers make much larger initial investments
than non-followers. Column (1) shows that in levels followers invest 94.26 − 35.93 = 59.33
million USD more than non-follower new investors. Given the right skew, particularly in the
fund-firm-director-level data in Table 2.1b, column (2) repeats the analysis in natural logs of
IO and finds similar results, although the difference of the geometric means is much smaller
at exp(3.546) − exp(3.099) = 12.50 million USD. But given that funds vary greatly in size,
it could be that the relevant metric of followers are investment as a fraction of the fund’s
portfolio. Column (3) repeats the t-test with log(IO/AUM) and finds the opposite result
with exp(−6.399) − exp(−5.828) = −0.128%. All three of these differences are significant
at better than the 0.01% level. Followers invest more in absolute dollar terms, but less
as a fraction of their overall portfolios, so subsequent tests must control for portfolio size.
Table 2.2a also report medians in parentheses and the table footer includes p-values for the
chi-squared and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. Both of these non-parametric tests support the
t-test of means and that these univariate results are not driven by statistical outliers. The
low p-values, even with a large sample, suggest that there may be within fund or within
firm correlation to correct. Untabulated results repeat these t-tests and block bootstrap the
standard errors on funds to correct for within fund correlation and find qualitatively similar
statistical significance levels.
The univariate tests, even the untabulated block bootstrap t-tests, do not correct for
within-firm correlation or firms overweighted due to large boards and more directors within
each fund-firm-year group. As a first step to address this in univariate tests the director
dimension is collapsed and a fund-firm-year observation is a follower if the fund followed
any director to the firm that year. Table 2.2b presents the same univariate tests at the
fund-firm-year level in the subsample with new fund-firm pairs (i.e., data from Table 2.1c)
and finds qualitatively similar results to Table 2.2a, which suggests that the univariate
results at the fund-firm-director-year level are not driven by within firm correlation or unique
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characteristics of the fund-firm-director-year data arrangement. A comparison of Table 2.2a
and Table 2.2b, shows that this aggregation reduces the upward bias from firms overweighted
by large boards and every value in Table 2.2b is smaller than its counterpart in Table
2.2a. Again, untabulated t-tests with block bootstrap standard errors on funds provide
qualitatively similar results. Univariate tests at the fund-firm-year level provide the same
conclusions as those at the fund-firm-director-year level, however the small p-values indicate
that multivariate analysis may need to more explicitly address fund and firm size, level of
data aggregation, and error term structure.
2.4.2 Multivariate Analysis
The univariate results show that funds that follow directors with whom they’ve invested
in the past make larger initial investments in the firms receiving the followed director (i.e.,
follower firms). However, that the log(IO/AUM) differences are negative in the univariate
tests suggests that the result could be driven by the size of the fund or other unique attributes
of followers at the fund-level, rather than following, per se. As well, the low p-values for
univariate results suggest that there may be within group correlation that requires attention.
This subsection provides multivariate models that address these concerns and finds that the
follower effect persists.
Table 2.3 repeats the log(IO) tests of Table 2.2a at the fund-firm-director-year level in
the new fund-firm subsample with different combinations of fund and firm control variables.
Specifications (1) and (2) include fund and year FEs and specifications (3) and (4) include
fund-year FEs. All specifications two-way cluster standard errors by fund and firm to address
concerns about within group correlation. The fund FEs correct for time-invariant fund
characteristics that affect the decision to follow and identify the model using within fund
variation. The year FEs control for any common trend, which is necessary given that the
sample spans the dot com period. Results throughout are consistent in both levels and
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natural logs of IO, so for clarity multivariate tests provide only results in log(IO).
Specification (1) in Table 2.3 tests log(IO) and the results are consistent with the univari-
ate results in column (2) of Table 2.2a and suggests that the geometric mean of the IO for the
follower group is 33.4% larger than for the non-follower group [i.e., exp(0.295)− 1 = 34.3%].
The positive coefficients on log(ME) and log(AUM) are consistent with expectations that
the size of the initial investment in the new firm is increasing in both firm size and fund
size. As well, the positive significant coefficient on log(AUM) is consistent with the ex-
pectations that larger funds make larger investments. Testing these models in natural logs
rather than levels reduces the impact of outliers and reduces the magnitude of the point
estimates, but these results are qualitatively similar to untabulated regressions run in levels
of IO and log(IO/AUM).8 Specification (2) repeats specification (1) with additional controls
for fund and firm attributes, but provides the same conclusion that followers make larger
initial investments. It could be that aggregate institutional investment (IO Total) is more
important than firm size (ME) in determining initial investments. This could occur through
either prudent man investor standards that require funds to invest more in certain types of
firms or liquidity concerns. Consistent with this hypothesis the coefficient on log(IO Total) is
positive, suggesting that funds make larger initial investments in firms that are more popular
with other institutional investors, but this does not change the coefficient on the follower in-
dicator variable. Adding log(IO total) as an independent variable in specification (2) makes
the coefficient on log(ME) negative, but not different from zero at conventional significance
levels, suggesting that aggregate institutional ownership is more important than firm size in
determining the size of the initial investment. Looking next at firm performance and valu-
ation, within a given fund, neither firm operating performance (ROA) nor valuation (M/B)
are related to the initial investment. However, the initial investment size slowly increases in
8Note that because these regressions are natural log transforms it isn’t necessary to include log(IO/AUM)
as a dependent variable, which yields similar coefficients on follower and log(ME), but a negative coefficient
on log(AUM).
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both Beta and 12-month cumulative return. These two results indicate that across all new
investments, funds have a slight preference for higher systematic risk firms and firms whose
stocks have performed well recently. However, controlling for fund attributes with AUM and
fund FEs, and controlling for firm attributes such as size (ME), liquidity (IO Total), real
performance (ROA), valuation (M/B), and recent market performance (Beta and 12-month
cumulative return) does not change the size of the follower effect. The follower coefficient is
statistically unchanged by adding these additional independent variables and still suggests
that follower initial investments are larger than non-follower initial investments.
Specifications (1) and (2) use fund and year FEs to control for unobserved characteristics
at the fund level. This avoids endogeneity concerns if the unobserved fund heterogeneity
is time-invariant over 1996–2006. However it could be that unobserved fund characteristics
that drive the follower decision are not time invariant. If this is the case, then there is an
omitted variable that is correlated with the follower variable, which makes specifications (1)
and (2) inconsistent. One solution that allows time-varying unobserved characteristics at the
fund level is to use fund-year FEs rather than fund and year FEs. Specifications (3) and (4)
in Table 2.3 repeat the analysis from specifications (1) and (2), but with fund-year FEs, and
the results are statistically identical along all eight variables between specifications (2) and
(4). That the coefficients do not change from specifications (1)–(2) to (3)–(4) indicates that
time-varying heterogeneity at the fund level is not a concern for the identification strategy.9
The results at the fund-firm-director-year level in Table 2.3 suggest the follower funds
make initial investments in new firms that are about 30% larger than initial investments from
non-followers. This result is statistically significant at the 0.1% level, economically meaning-
9Again, in untabulated results, these results are robust to a host of alternative specifications to control
for unobserved characteristics. All provide qualitatively similar results and conclusions. These alternatives
include high dimension FE models with fund, firm, and year FEs or fund, director, and year FEs. However,
adding the second high dimension FE (either firm or director FE) removes the ability to two-way cluster
standard errors. Untabulated results also include fund-firm and year FEs, and fund-director and year FEs,
however these models identify off within fund-firm and fund-director variation. In any case, these results are
qualitatively similar.
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ful, and addresses concerns about outliers and unobserved heterogeneity at the fund, year,
and fund-year levels, as well as clusters standard errors by fund and firm. However, it could
still be that overweighting large firms with more directors drives these results. Clustering
standard errors by fund and firm corrects for within fund and within firm correlation, but
not the over-weighting of firms with more directors. A simpler and more naive approach
that addresses both concerns is to collapse the director dimension and label a fund-firm-year
observation a follower if the fund followed any director to the firm that year.10 Table 2.4
presents the same specifications as Table 2.3 (i.e., fund and year or fund-year FEs and stan-
dard errors clustered by fund and firm), but at the fund-firm-year level in the subsample of
new fund-firm pairs.
The results throughout Table 2.4 are qualitatively the same as Table 2.3, although the
follower effect is smaller. Collapsing the director dimension removes the upward bias in the
sample and reduces the size of the follower effect so that follower funds make 13.4% larger
initial investments than non-followers (i.e., exp(0.126)−1 = 13.4%) in specification (1). The
point estimate of the follower coefficient in the fund-firm-year subsample is about one half
of the fund-firm-director-year sample coefficient, indicating that the over-weighting of large
firms with more directors in the fund-firm-director-year sample drives some of the size of
the follower effect. But at the fund-firm-year level the follower effect is still economically
meaningful and statistically significant at the 1% level. Specification (2) in Table 2.4 adds
back the same fund- and firm-level control variables as specification (2) in Table 2.3, but again
the follower effect persists at the same economic and statistical significance. Again, log(IO
Total) has more positive explanatory power than log(ME), firm performance and valuation
do not appear to affect the initial investment size, although initial investment is increasing
in firm Beta and 12-month cumulative return. It could be that time-varying unobserved
10In untabulated results the results at the fund-firm-director-year level are robust to weighting by the
inverse of the number of directors per fund.
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fund heterogeneity explain some of the follower effect in the fund-firm-year subsample, but
specifications (3) and (4) replace fund and year FEs with fund-year FEs and show that this
is not the case. All of the coefficients in specifications (3) and (4) are statistically the same as
their counterparts in specifications (1) and (2), which again suggests that the identification
here is cross-sectional and that the follower effect is not due to unobserved fund, year, or
fund-year heterogeneity.
2.5 Robustness
The results in the previous section are robust to several specifications and levels of aggre-
gation. Section 2.4 shows the main result of a follower effect of about 15%–30% that is not
driven by either characteristics at the fund or firm level, or unobserved heterogeneity at the
fund, year, or fund-year level, that is robust to within fund or within firm correlation in the
investment decision, and that is not an artifact of weighting by directors. Nevertheless, it
could still be case that these results are due to either a comparison to the wrong counter-
factual or a possible selection bias on either observables or unobservables at the fund, firm,
and director level. Note that the fund and fund-year FEs already control for selection at
the fund level on observables and unobservables, but these robustness checks must also rule
out selection on observables and unobservables at the firm and director level. The following
three subsections address these three concerns.
2.5.1 Sharper Comparison Between Followers and Non-Followers
The tests up to this point focus on new fund-firm pairs. That is, the primary comparison
is across all new fund investments in firms without conditions on the firm. An alternative
condition could require both new fund-firm and new firm-director relations, so that the
counterfactual new investments also have new directors. In this alternative subsample the
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only difference between followers and non-followers is that non-followers have new directors
with whom the new fund does not have a prior relation, rather than either no new directors
or only new directors with whom the new fund does not have a previous relation. This
alternative subsample presents a sharper contrast between followers and non-followers, as
the only difference is the relation at the director-fund level. Although two-way clustering
by fund and firm corrects for within fund and firm correlation and allows for analysis at the
fund-firm-director-year level, the analysis here again collapses to the fund-firm-year level by
removing the director dimension because Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show that the fund-firm-year
level of analysis provides more conservative estimates of the follower effect. Recall that
Table 2.1d presents the descriptive statistics for this new fund-firm and new fund-director
subsample and that this subsample has a slight upward bias relative to the sample of new
fund-firm pairs (Table 2.1c) because large firms with more directors are more likely have new
directors and make it into this subsample.
Table 2.5 tests new fund IO at the fund-firm-year level in the subsample of new fund-
firm and new firm-director relations. The results in Table 2.5 are qualitatively similar to
the previous results at the fund-firm-year level in Table 2.4. Again, the specifications in
Table 2.5 mirror those in Table 2.4 so that specifications (1) and (2) include fund and
year FEs, and specifications (3) and (4) include fund-year FEs. The point estimates of the
follower coefficients in Table 2.5 are about one half the point estimates in Table 2.4 and the
difference is statistically significant. This indicates that some portion of the follower effect in
Table 2.4 is due to counterfactual choice. The inference from all other independent variables
remains unchanged. Fund initial investment is increasing in both fund and firm size, although
aggregate institutional ownership has more positive explanatory power than firm size. Firm
performance (ROA), valuation (M/B), and recent market performance (Beta and 12-month
cumulative return) have little impact on initial investment, although in specification (4) with
fund-year FEs both M/B and 12-month return are positive and significant at the 5% level.
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Across all four specifications in Table 2.5 the coefficient on the follower indicator variable
is stable and suggests a conservative estimate of the follower effect of about 6.78% [i.e.,
exp(0.0656) − 1 = 0.0678 in specification (2)] larger initial investments in this subsample
with an upper estimate of 9.33% [i.e., exp(0.0892)−1 = 0.0933 in specifications (3) and (4)].
Again, the follower effect is robust to a host of specifications, levels of data aggregation,
and counterfactual choices, and indicates that funds invest more in new firms when they have
a prior relation with a new director at the firm. Although aggregating to the fund-firm-year
level and conditioning on new fund-firm and new firm-director reduces the follower effect
to nominally 6.78% to 9.33%, this effect is still economically meaningful.11 The next two
subsections address concerns about a possible selection bias in the follower choice.
2.5.2 Matching Model
The analysis so far assumes that the follower choice is either a time invariant or time-
varying (at the year level) fund characteristic. Again, in untabulated results the follower
effect is also robust to being a time-invariant characteristic at several different levels.12 A
plausible alternative is that the follower choice is not strictly a decision at the fund and year
or fund-year level, and is a decision that must be explicitly modeled to correct a possible
selection bias. Two additional models address selection bias concerns. First, this subsection
models the follower selection bias as a selection on observables with a subsample matched
on minimum Mahalanobis distance, which can be thought of as the number of standard
deviations in multidimensional space between the pair of observations (here a follower and
11In this case requiring a fund to have new director induces a selection bias. Untabulated results with a
Heckman (1979) selection model to gauge the impact of this possible selection bias and find that, while there
is a selection bias, it is small and slightly reduces in the follower coefficient, but not meaningfully (i.e., in
the selection bias corrected results the follower effect is larger, but not meaningfully so). Subsections 2.5.2
and 2.5.3 discuss different types of selection models in greater detail. In all cases the follower effect is robust
to possible selection bias
12In untabulated results the follower effect is robust to fund, firm, and year FEs, fund, director, and year
FE, fund-firm and year FEs, or director-fund and year FEs.
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matched non-follower). Second, the next subsection models the follower selection bias as a
selection on unobservables with a treatment selection model, as in Campa and Kedia (2002)
or Greene (2002, page 705).
The model that matches followers and non-follower on observables, matches directly on
the minimum Mahalanobis distance between independent variables rather than generating a
propensity score model, which can be less robust to model misspecification (Sekhon, 2011).
The comparisons are between initial investments by the same fund in the same year where
one firm is followed and the other is non-followed. The non-followed firm is the closest
match to the followed firm along size, total institutional ownership, operating performance,
valuation, and recent market performance [i.e., log(ME), log(IO total), ROA, M/B, Beta,
and 12-month cumulative returns]. The maximum allowed Mahalanobis distance (d) is 0.5,
which is equivalent to one half of a standard deviation in a multidimensional space along
each of these matching variables. This d ≤ 0.5 constraint provides balance on each of these
matching dimensions, with minimum p-values of 13% and 16% for the t-tests of log(ME) and
log(IO Total), respectively. All other p-values are much larger. The results are qualitatively
similar and statistically identical with d ≤ 0.25. The tabulated results use only one match,
but results are qualitatively similar with between one and four matches. To be clear, the
d ≤ 0.5 constraint is required only to achieve balance on the covariates, as the basic results
of larger initial investments for follower relative to non-followers appears in the unmatched
results in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
Table 2.6 mirrors the four specifications in Table 2.4, which is also at the fund-firm-
year level, but Table 2.6 is in the matched subsample of new fund-firm pairs to control for
selection on observables. Regardless of fund and year FEs [specifications (1) and (2)] or
fund-year FEs [specifications (3) and (4)] all results are qualitatively similar to results in
Table 2.4 for the unmatched subsample of new fund-firm pairs. In the matched subsample
the follower effect on new investments is still economically meaningful at about 14.6% larger
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initial investments from followers relative to non-followers [i.e., exp(0.136)− 1 = 14.6% from
the fund-year FE model with full controls in specification (4)]. The remaining coefficients
are statistically different between the matched and unmatched subsamples, but are not
qualitatively different. Note that requiring an exact match on fund and year and limiting to
one match with Mahalanobis distance d ≤ 0.5 constrains the matched subsample to about
10% of the new fund-firm subsample at the fund-firm-year level. Although there may still be
a selection bias in the follower choice, if the selection bias is through selection on observables,
then the bias is not economically meaningful or statistically significant.13
2.5.3 Treatment Selection Model
The matching model in Subsection 2.5.2 assumes that follower selection is on observable
characteristics at the fund and firm level. This may not be the case. In fact, under the
hypothesis that funds follow directors to new firms based on their character and judgment,
these are almost certainly not observable characteristics in terms of RM, 13F, or CCM data.
If follower selection is on unobservables that are at the fund-level and time-invariant or
invariant within a fund-year, then there is no need to model this treatment selection, as the
fund and year FEs or fund-year FEs account for this selection bias. However, if follower
selection is on unobservables at the fund, firm, or director level then this treatment selection
must be explicitly modeled. This subsection presents a treatment selection model similar to
Campa and Kedia (2002) or Greene (2002, page 705).
This treatment selection model is a two-stage model. The first-stage explicitly models
the treatment selection process, where treatment is follower status, and the second-stage
models the effects of the follower treatment and uses λ, the hazard ratio for followers and
13Here the matched sample is at the fund-firm-year level in the universe of new fund-firm relations. In
untabulated results the economic and statistical significance of these tests are qualitatively the same if
matches are instead made at the fund-firm-year level in the universe of both new fund-firm and new firm-
director relations.
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non-hazard ratio for non-followers, to control for the treatment selection. Because fund-
firm-director-years that receive the treatment (i.e., followers) may have otherwise had higher
initial investment, they would have a larger error term that is correlated with the independent
variables in the second-stage model. If this error-term is not included in the model, then the
second-stage model is inconsistent. The two-stage treatment selection model derives from
Heckman (1979) and treats the selection bias as an omitted variable problem where λ is
the omitted error term that is correlated with the independent variables. Following Greene
(2002, page 705), equation (2.2) presents the formula for λ, where Xβ is from the first-stage
probit model of follower status, φ is is the normal probability distribution function, and Φ




+ (1− 1follower) −φ(Xβ)
1− Φ(Xβ) (2.2)
With this treatment selection model the first-stage probit model of follower status includes
variables at the fund, firm, director, and year levels that explicitly determine the follower
decision, while the second-stage includes variables at the fund, firm, director, and year levels
that affect the investment decision. Finally, because λ from equation (2.2) above is actually
an estimate λˆ rather than the true λ, the second-stage model follows Wooldridge (2002,
page 526) and block bootstraps standard errors on funds 500 times. This accounts for the λˆ
estimation and also corrects for within fund correlation of initial investment decisions.
Table 2.7a presents the results of the first-stage probit model with fund, firm, and director
characteristics. The first column in this table presents coefficient point estimates and the
second column presents marginal effects. This probit model clusters standard errors at the
fund level, although λ estimation depends on coefficient point estimates rather than standard
errors. The fund-level follower determinants include the number of firms in which the fund
invests. The positive significant coefficient on the number of funds per firm indicates that
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even though funds with large portfolios may find it more difficult to to find new investments,
their large portfolio of related directors dominates and makes them more likely to follow.14
The firm-level follower determinants include performance and valuation measures, such
as lagged ROA and M/B, as well as variables that would make following mechanically more
likely, such as number of directors at the firm and an indicator for busy board (Fich and
Shivdasani, 2006). Again, ROA and M/B are industry-adjusted by subtracting the 49-
industry median each year. The coefficient on lagged firm ROA is strongly negative and
consistent with the notion that trusted and known directors are more likely to be followed
to underperforming firms. As ROA increases relative to peer firms, following becomes less
likely at that firm. The coefficient on lagged M/B is positive, which runs counter to the
notion that followers are expected to improve valuation, but at lower economic and statistical
significance. As for the mechanical follower variables, number of directors at the firm and
busy board, both are positive significant.
Finally, the director-level follower determinants include performance and valuation mea-
sures, such as lagged mean ROA and M/B across their directorships, classification measures
for the directorship at the new firm, such as employee (E), independent (I), and linked (L),
and title. As well the director-level variables include the number of boards they serve and a
busy director indicator to control for mechanical follower relations. At the director-level the
results are consistent with the firm-level. The higher the mean ROA across the director’s
firms last year, the more likely the director is to be part of a follower relation. Again, the
results are inconsistent for the lagged mean M/B, but the coefficient on lagged mean M/B is
much smaller in terms of both economic and statistical significance than is the lagged mean
ROA coefficient.15 Finally, consistent with Table 2.1e, independent directors are more likely
14There is a reasonable argument to include other fund size attributes, such as log(AUM). However, this
should affect fund initial size investment, not the decision to follow once the selection model control for the
number of firms in the fund’s portfolio.
15There could be some slight collinearity between the lagged mean director and lagged firm performance
and valuation measures, particularly in the case of non-followers that only ever serve one firm. However, for
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to be followed and employee directors are less likely to be followed, although in the case
where the new employee director is the CEO the probability of following increases.
The pseudo-R2 for the follower selection model is just above 10%, which seems reasonable
given the idiosyncrasies of the investment and following decision. In any case, the treatment
selection model is about unobserved characteristics, so that the first-stage model doesn’t
achieve perfect prediction of follower status does not invalidate this statistical approach. In
fact, with the perfect prediction model there is no need for a treatment selection model the
perfect predictors can be included in the main (i.e., second-stage) regression to correct the
selection bias.
Table 2.7b presents four specifications of the second-stage model that mirror the specifi-
cations in Table 2.3, which is also at the fund-firm-director-year level in the subsample of new
fund-firm relations (i.e., because the first-stage follower model includes director attributes
it is at the fund-firm-director-year level, so the second-stage model must be at the same
level). First note that across all four specifications (the first two with fund and year FEs,
the last two with fund-year FEs), the follower coefficient point estimates are larger than the
Table 2.3 models without treatment selection bias correction, which is consistent with an
increase in several of the matching model’s increased point estimates in Table 2.6 relative
to Table 2.4. This suggests that both approaches reduce some selection bias that leads to
otherwise underestimating the size of the follower effect. An alternative explanation is that
despite attempts to model the following and investment decisions as two distinct steps and
unique variables in each model, there is near collinearity between follower and λ. This is
plausible, however if this were the case then there should be larger standard errors on both
follower and λ, rather than the precise estimates that Table 2.7b presents. In any case, the
follower indicator variable coefficients in Table 2.7 are not statistically different from their
followers there is no collinearity because followers by definition did not serve the firm last year. Further, if
there were strong collinearity, then there should be much larger standard errors and these coefficients should
not be significant.
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counterparts in the conventional models in Table 2.3. Note that the inferences from all other
independent variables are qualitatively that same as in Table 2.3 and elsewhere throughout
this chapter.
The two-stage treatment selection models in Table 2.7 (as well as the matched models in
Table 2.6) suggests that the follower effect is positive significant at an economically meaning-
ful level and is robust to correction for treatment selection bias. Further, if anything, failure
to correct for selection on unobservables leads to underestimation of the follower effect.16
2.6 Extensions
2.6.1 Characteristics of Followed Directors
Funds follow directors to new firms and when they do they make larger initial investments
in these new firms. That funds follow and make large initial investments suggests that
they expect some reward to following. To better understand this decision this subsection
investigates the past and future performance of both directors and firms around the new
investment decision, where performance is both operating performance (ROA) and valuation
(M/B) at both the director and firm level. If funds rationally follow directors, then funds
should follow them from firms where the director outperforms to new firms where the followed
director would provide some value, and within some reasonable horizon the followed directors
should improve the new firm’s performance. The first-stage of the treatment selection model
in Table 2.7a hints at these results, particularly the ROA results for firms and directors, which
have the highest marginal effects by an order of magnitude [column (2)]. This subsection
tests them formally.
16Yet another alternative selection model is one that takes into account the censored aspect of 13F data
on long equity positions. That is, funds can’t invest less than zero in these firms. From this perspective the
missing fund-firm-year observations are not “missing”, but are investments of zero dollars. In untabulated
results a Tobit model at the fund-firm-year level in the subsample with new fund-firm relations with missing
fund-firm-year observations as zero provides qualitatively similar results as the linear models in Table 2.1c.
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Table 2.8 presents univariate tests of lagged director and receiving firm performance, and
three-year changes to receiving firm performance. These univariate tests are at the fund-
firm-director-year level in the subsample of both fund-firm and firm-director relations are
new. Because these univariate tests compare new directors’ past performance and new firms’
past and future performance, they are in the subsample that includes both new fund-firm
and new firm-director combinations. Without imposing the new firm-director relation it isn’t
clear how to interpret lagged mean director performance, as this lagged performance would
include the current firm. Column (1) compares lagged mean ROA for new directors between
followers and non-followers, where the mean is the mean across all firms the director serves.
Because this sample includes only new fund-firm and new firm-director pairs, both followers
and non-followers appear at new firms this year and the only difference is that followers had
a previous relation with the fund in the new fund-firm pair that is coincident with their
arrival. Since more than half of directors serve on more than one board, lagged director
ROA is aggregated by taking the mean of industry-adjusted ROA across the director’s firms.
The previous year followed directors had higher mean operating performance, with a mean
industry-adjusted ROA that is 0.0613− 0.0452 = 1.61% higher than non-followed directors.
This difference is statistically significant with a p-value less than 0.01%. Although these
data are right-skewed and the medians are lower than the means, this result remains in
the medians comparison, as well as the rank-sum test. For the median difference the point
estimate is qualitatively similar, but smaller, at 0.0379 − 0.0272 = 1.07%. The directors
that funds follow have better industry-adjusted operating performance, but is the opposite
true of the firms to where funds follow these directors? Column (2) repeats this test and
compares lagged industry-adjusted operating performance between follower and non-follower
firms (i.e., between firms that receive a followed director and those that receive a non-followed
director). That is, here the comparison is of firms with new directors where one group
will be part of a follower relation next year and the other group won’t. Here the results
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have the opposite sign as column (1) and the firms that receive follower directors have
worse industry-adjusted operating performance than the non-follower firms. The difference
is economically significant at 0.0509 − 0.0673 = −1.64% and, again, the result appears in
the median comparison and rank-sum test. The next question is whether or not the followed
director improves the industry-adjusted operating performance at the new firm. This appears
to be weakly the case. Column (3) tests industry-adjusted three-year change in operating
performance centered on the new director’s first year and indicates that follower firms do
not improve mean operating performance, although the decline in ROA with followers is less
negative than the decline for non-followers (i.e., -0.130% instead of -0.277%). In medians both
three-year changes are positive and the follower change is slightly larger (i.e., 0.144% versus
0.113%), but the advantage is not enough to push follower operating performance beyond
non-followers within one year after arrival. A longer-term comparison may be necessary,
although untabulated results with the five-year changes in operating performance centered
on the year of the new firm-director relation provide the same conclusions. The result in
column (3) is the same in one- or two-year future levels rather than in changes.
Even if one or two years is too soon for new directors to repair an ailing firm’s oper-
ating performance, it could be that the market anticipates performance improvements that
changes in operating performance over time do not capture. Columns (4)–(6) repeat columns
(1)–(3), but with valuation (M/B) rather than operating performance (ROA). Column (4)
compares lagged mean industry-adjusted valuation for follower directors versus non-follower
directors and finds results similar to (1). The follower directors come from firms with higher
industry-adjusted market-to-book ratios and the difference is both statistically significant
and economically material in all three univariate tests (e.g., 0.627 − 0.498 = 0.129 for the
mean comparison). Next, looking at the firm side of new firm-director relations, column
(5) indicates that the receiving firms to which funds follow directors have lower industry-
adjusted valuations than the non-follower firms and that the difference, whether is means
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or medians, is statistically and economically significant (e.g., 0.697 − 0.848 = −0.151 for
the mean comparison). Finally, column (6) compares three-year changes in market-to-book
ratios and finds that, again, followed directors weakly improve their new firms. The follower
change in valuation is less negative than the non-follower valuation change, and is economi-
cally material in means and medians and statistically significant in all three tests. However,
this relative improvement is still not enough to elevate follower M/B beyond non-follower
M/B in the three-year horizon. Again, the results in column (6) hold in both five-year
changes and one- or two-year future levels.
All statistical tests in Table 2.8 are significant at better than the 1% level [with the
exception of the chi-squared median test for the change in operating performance in column
(3)], but contributing to the small standard errors and high statistical significance is that
these univariate tests don’t consider within fund or firm correlation or unobserved hetero-
geneity at the fund or year levels. In untabulated results the means t-tests are robust to
block bootstraps by funds to correct for within fund correlation, but for completeness Table
2.9 repeats this analysis in a regression setting to address these concerns.
Table 2.9 presents regression specifications that parallel Table 2.8, but includes fund
and year FEs and two-way clusters standard errors by fund and firm to address concerns
about unobserved heterogeneity at the fund level and within fund and firm correlation in
these observations. The point estimates in Table 2.9 are similar to those from the univariate
test in Table 2.8, but the statistical significance only remains for the lagged mean director
operating performance and valuation in specifications (1) and (4). These results suggest
that within fund and firm correlation gives an inflated sense of the precision of the point
estimates in the univariate tests in Table 2.8. In untabulated results these tests are robust
to five-year changes in both operating performance (ROA) and valuation (M/B).
In all, the univariate and multivariate tests in this subsection suggest that followed di-
rectors outperform at their previous firms, both in terms of operating and market-based
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performance. But, the evidence is weak that the follower directors enhance the performance,
either ROA or M/B, of the receiving firm. This could be partly due to a short panel. How-
ever, the valuation analysis does not require a long panel as the valuation metric M/B should
incorporate the market’s expectations about future performance with the new directors.
2.6.2 Classification and Title
Throughout this chapter the motivation for the follower effect has been that some funds have
faith and confidence in some directors and that when these trusted directors arrive at new
firms these funds make larger initial investments in the receiving firm relative to other new
funds without a prior relation with the director. Fama and Jensen (1983) present that the
two key roles for directors are advising and monitoring. Keeping with this idea, it could be
that the follower effect varies based on the need for advising and monitoring. This subsec-
tion provides sub-group analysis by director classification and firm-level governance, which
indicate the capacity for advising and monitoring, and the need for monitoring, respectively.
Table 2.10 presents this analysis in two panels.
Table 2.10a examines director classification sub-groups and splits the fund-firm-director-
year subsample of new fund-firm pairs based on director classification (E for employee di-
rector, I for independent director, and L for linked director). A fund-firm-year level analysis
would provide more conservative estimates of the follower effect versus a fund-firm-director-
year level analysis (i.e., Table 2.4 versus Table 2.3), but splitting on director classification
requires maintaining the director dimension rather than collapsing it. The follower coefficient
point estimate is larger for employee directors than it is for independent directors, although
even with large t-statistics the coefficient difference is not significant at conventional levels.
However, that the employee director follower coefficient point estimate is larger is interest-
ing and consistent with the Fama and Jensen (1983) advising role for directors. To better
understand this relation specifications (4) and (5) divide employee directors into CEOs and
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non-CEOs and repeat this regression. Surprisingly, the non-CEO point estimate is greater
than the CEO point estimate at the 10% level. In all it is difficult to extract much from this
analysis with respect to the relative importance of advising and monitoring. However, the
consistency of the follower effect in the cross section suggests that the follower effect is not
driven strictly by mass movements following CEO turnovers or strategic partnerships that
provide linked board members.
If director classification and title relate to the capacity to advise and monitor, then the
Bebchuk et al. (2009) E index pertains to the need for monitoring. Table 2.10b compares
the follower effect in high and low entrenchment firms (i.e., high and low E index firm). The
median E index is 3, so Table 2.10b divides the sample there (i.e., E < 3 and E ≥ 3). Whether
the follower investment premium is positive, negative, or zero in each of the samples is an
empirical issue. It could be that investors discount the relevance of the past performance (or
whatever unobservable led them to follow the director) when moving to a poor governance
firm, but it could also be that the marginal value of a given quality of director is higher when
the firm-level of governance is lower. Table 2.10b repeats the main analysis at the fund-firm-
director-year level in the subsample of new fund-firm relations and includes the full set of
independent variables, fund and year FEs, and two-way clusters standard errors at the fund
and firm levels (i.e., models similar to specification (2) in Table 2.3, but divides the sample
into high and low entrenchment). Table 2.10b shows that the follower effect point estimate
is larger when firm governance is better (i.e., lower entrenchment index with E < 3), but
the difference between high and low governance firms is neither statistically significant nor
economically meaningful.
2.6.3 New Investments or Moved Investments
The results throughout this chapter (particularly in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, which are the baseline
models at the fund-firm-director-year and fund-firm-year levels, respectively) indicate that
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when funds follow a director, they make meaningfully larger initial investments relative to
firms that didn’t follow the director (i.e., 15% to 30% larger in these baseline models). But
this baseline analysis ignores the following fund’s investments elsewhere with the followed
director. That is, so far the analysis here only investigates the new investment size, not
the aggregate or total investment size for the follower fund-director pair. But given a new
directorship for the followed director, does the fund increase its aggregate investment in or
exposure to the director? Or is aggregate investment unrelated to the follower decision?
That is, do they reduce some ownership exposure to this director elsewhere?
To answer this question this subsection aggregates the data to the fund-director-year
level starting from the full sample without condition on fund, firm, or director relations.
The fund-director-year aggregation removes the firm dimension by summing firm IO and
ME over all firms in the fund-director pair. The first sum is the total investment the fund
makes in the director across all the firms at which the fund and director have a relation each
year. The second sum is the combined ME that the fund and director have in common.
These new variables are “IO (fund-director)” and “ME (fund-director)”. Note that because
this analysis examines funds’ aggregate exposure to every director, there are no conditions
on fund, firm, or director relations.
Table 2.11 presents these results and shows that funds use following as an opportunity
to increase their exposure to attractive management. All four specifications use natural
log transforms to correct for outliers and correct within fund and director correlation with
two-way cluster standard errors by fund and director (recall there is no firm dimension
in this fund-director-year level aggregated data). Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 2.11
include fund and year FEs, while specifications (3) and (4) include fund-director and year
FEs. The fund and year FEs specifications show that within each fund the follower relation
is related to a rise in the aggregate investment with the director. The fund-director and
year FEs specifications show that even within each fund-director relationship the follower
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relation is related with a rise in the aggregate investment with the director. This relation
holds in both the cross section within firm and in the time series within each fund-director
relation. Regardless of the specification these results indicate that on average funds use new
directorships for trusted directors as a chance to increase their investment in known and
trusted management. Note that because this subsample collapses the firm dimension and
considers a fund-director-year a follower if the fund followed the director to any firm that
calendar year, these tests can’t show exactly how funds’ exposures to the followed directors
change, only that their exposures increase in the aggregate. These results suggest that
institutional investors use new directorships for favored directors as a chance to increase
their exposure to the director.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter shows that funds follow known directors to new firms and that when they do,
the funds’ initial investments in the receiving firms are statistically and economically larger
than the non-follower case. Consistent with anecdotal evidence from investors and managers,
funds appear to invest in management in addition to businesses and assets. The size of this
effect varies depending on the level of aggregation and regression specification, but varies
anywhere between 5% and 30%, depending on the level of aggregation and specification.
While the follower effect point estimate varies with the level of aggregation, its statistical
significance is persistent. Increasing the amount of aggregation tends to decrease the size of
the follower effect, but even at the highest level of aggregation (to the fund-firm-year level
in the subsample of new fund-firm and new firm-director observations) the follower effect is
economically sizable with more than 5% larger initial investments for followers relative to
non-followers.
The source of the follower effect isn’t entirely clear and the positive relation between
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follower and initial investment exists for all types of new directors, but is marginally larger
for employee directors relative to independent directors, whether they are linked or not.
These results suggest that the dominant effect is an advising or direct management effect
rather than strictly a monitoring effect, given that employee directors are said to have much
larger roles in the day-to-day operation and monitoring of the firm than even the most
engaged independent director. This result suggests that the effect may come mainly from
new CEOs, however this isn’t the case. Splitting the employee director sample based on
whether the director is CEO, chairman, both, or neither, reveals that the effect is equally
strong.
In a study of this type, the results are open to alternative interpretations and shortcom-
ings. To reduce these concerns, the robustness checks include selection models that correct
for selection on both observables and unobservables, to which the follower effect is robust.
As well, the treatment selection model suggests that the motivation to follow may be all-star
directors that outperform at their previous firm and are expected to turn around their new
under-performing firms. It is the case that followed directors outperform the previous year
in both industry-adjusted operating performance (ROA) and industry-adjusted market val-
uation (M/B) relative to the non-followed directors, and that the new firms at best do not
outperform the previous year in either operating performance or market valuation. Further,
it isn’t the case that the followed directors are able to significantly improve the receiving
firms, as the changes and levels in receiving firm operating performance and valuation con-
tinues to be no better than non-followed firms.
Finally, when funds follow directors to new firms these funds increase their aggregate
investment in the director, suggesting that funds use additional directorships as a chance to
increase their exposure to trusted directors.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics at several levels of aggregation in several subsamples. Ob-
servations in the baseline sample are at fund-firm-director-year level. The baseline sample is
observations that match between Risk Metrics, Thomson Reuters 13F, and CRSP-Compustat
Merged data over 1997–2005. Risk Metrics board data are available over 1996–2006, but the
sample omits the first and last year to determine follower and will follow status. N direc-
tors/firm is number of directors at firm that year. N firms/director is number of firms a
director serves that year. N funds/firm is number of funds with reportable holdings in firm
that year. N firms/fund is number of reportable holdings fund has that year. New firm-
director is one if director serves firm this year but not previous year. New fund-firm is one
if fund has ownership above $10 million in firm’s annual meeting quarter but not previous
year. New director-fund is one if fund has IO over $10 million in any of director’s firms this
year, but not previous year. Busy director is one if an external director sits on three or more
boards in a given calendar year. Busy board is one if more than half of a firm’s independent
directors are busy (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Follower is one if fund-firm-director-year ob-
servation is (2) new fund-firm pair, (1) new firm-director pair, and (3) not new director-fund
pair. Will follow is one if fund-director pair are followers next year. Assets under manage-
ment (AUM) is sum of all IO from fund that year in millions USD. Market equity (ME)
is shares outstanding times quarter closing price for firm’s annual meeting quarter in mil-
lions USD. Total Assets is book value of total assets. Return on assets (ROA) is operating
income before depreciation scaled by total assets (OIBDP/AT). Market-to-book (M/B) is
total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by total assets
[(AT + CSHO*PRCC F - SEQ)/AT]. ROA and M/B are industry-adjusted by subtracting
Fama and French (1997) 49-industry median each year. Beta is CAPM beta from three years
of monthly data and value-weighted CRSP index. Ret is trailing 12-month cumulative re-
turn. Institutional ownership (IO) is number of shares from fund’s 13F times quarter closing
price for firm’s annual meeting quarter. IO Total is sum of all IO in firm that year in millions
USD. E index is entrenchment index from Bebchuk et al. (2009) (E ∈ [0, 6]).
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Table 2.2: Univariate tests of IO by follower status. The baseline sample is observations that
match between Risk Metrics, Thomson Reuters 13F, and CRSP-Compustat Merged data over
1997–2005. Risk Metrics board data are available over 1996–2006, but the sample omits the
first and last year to determine follower and will follow status. Institutional ownership (IO)
is number of shares from fund’s 13F times quarter closing price for firm’s annual meeting
quarter. Follower is one if fund-firm-director-year observation is (2) new fund-firm pair, (1)
new firm-director pair, and (3) not new director-fund pair.




Non-follower 35.93 3.099 -5.828
(17.31) (2.851) (-5.699)
Follower 94.26 3.546 -6.399
(25.07) (3.222) (-6.366)
Observations 1622029 1622029 1622029
p-value of t-test <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
p-value of Chi-sq test <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
p-value of Wilcoxon test <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
mean coefficients; p50 in parentheses
(b) Means and medians of IO by follower status at fund-firm-year level in subsample of new fund-
firm relations. The fund-firm-year level analysis removes the director dimension and a fund-firm-year
observation is a follower if the fund follows any director to the firm that year.
(1) (2) (3)
IO log(IO) log(IO/AUM)
Non-follower 33.02 3.070 -5.884
(17.05) (2.836) (-5.757)
Follower 61.64 3.337 -6.478
(20.95) (3.042) (-6.489)
Observations 165267 165267 165267
p-value of t-test <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
p-value of Chi-sq test <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
p-value of Wilcoxon test <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
mean coefficients; p50 in parentheses
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Table 2.3: Panel models of IO at fund-firm-director-year level in subsample of new fund-firm
relations. The baseline sample is observations that match between Risk Metrics, Thomson
Reuters 13F, and CRSP-Compustat Merged data over 1997–2005. Risk Metrics board data
are available over 1996–2006, but the sample omits the first and last year to determine
follower and will follow status. Institutional ownership (IO) is number of shares from fund’s
13F times quarter closing price for firm’s annual meeting quarter. Follower is one if fund-
firm-director-year observation is (2) new fund-firm pair, (1) new firm-director pair, and (3)
not new director-fund pair. Market equity (ME) is shares outstanding times quarter closing
price for firm’s annual meeting quarter in millions USD. Assets under management (AUM) is
sum of all IO from fund that year in millions USD. IO Total is sum of all IO in firm that year
in millions USD. Return on assets (ROA) is operating income before depreciation scaled by
total assets (OIBDP/AT). Market-to-book (M/B) is total assets plus market value of equity
minus book value of equity scaled by total assets [(AT + CSHO*PRCC F - SEQ)/AT]. ROA
and M/B are industry-adjusted by subtracting Fama and French (1997) 49-industry median
each year. Beta is CAPM beta from three years of monthly data and value-weighted CRSP
index. Ret is trailing 12-month cumulative return. Models include fixed effects (FEs) as
indicated in the table footer. Standard errors are two-way clustered by fund and firm.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(IO) log(IO) log(IO) log(IO)
Follower 0.295∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗
(5.56) (5.47) (5.79) (5.72)
log(ME) 0.180∗∗∗ -0.0240 0.185∗∗∗ -0.0201
(17.98) (-1.54) (18.23) (-1.28)
log(AUM) 0.359∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
(21.92) (21.83) (10.50) (9.98)






CAPM Beta 0.0109∗ 0.0104∗
(2.25) (2.13)
Ret (12m) 0.0285∗∗∗ 0.0369∗∗∗
(4.84) (6.32)
Observations 1622029 1622029 1622029 1622029
Adj R-squared 0.147 0.153 0.121 0.129
Fund FE Yes Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No No
Fund-year FE No No Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.4: Panel models of IO at fund-firm-year level in subsample of new fund-firm rela-
tions. The fund-firm-year level analysis removes the director dimension and a fund-firm-year
observation is a follower if the fund follows any director to the firm that year. The base-
line sample is observations that match between Risk Metrics, Thomson Reuters 13F, and
CRSP-Compustat Merged data over 1997–2005. Risk Metrics board data are available over
1996–2006, but the sample omits the first and last year to determine follower and will fol-
low status. Institutional ownership (IO) is number of shares from fund’s 13F times quarter
closing price for firm’s annual meeting quarter. Follower is one if fund-firm-director-year
observation is (2) new fund-firm pair, (1) new firm-director pair, and (3) not new director-
fund pair. Market equity (ME) is shares outstanding times quarter closing price for firm’s
annual meeting quarter in millions USD. Assets under management (AUM) is sum of all
IO from fund that year in millions USD. IO Total is sum of all IO in firm that year in
millions USD. Return on assets (ROA) is operating income before depreciation scaled by
total assets (OIBDP/AT). Market-to-book (M/B) is total assets plus market value of equity
minus book value of equity scaled by total assets [(AT + CSHO*PRCC F - SEQ)/AT]. ROA
and M/B are industry-adjusted by subtracting Fama and French (1997) 49-industry median
each year. Beta is CAPM beta from three years of monthly data and value-weighted CRSP
index. Ret is trailing 12-month cumulative return. Models include fixed effects (FEs) as
indicated in the table footer. Standard errors are two-way clustered by fund and firm.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(IO) log(IO) log(IO) log(IO)
Follower 0.126∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(5.11) (5.14) (5.82) (5.91)
log(ME) 0.180∗∗∗ -0.0198 0.186∗∗∗ -0.0152
(18.32) (-1.28) (18.52) (-0.98)
log(AUM) 0.350∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗
(22.09) (21.92) (11.30) (10.50)






CAPM Beta 0.0108∗ 0.0106∗
(2.32) (2.29)
Ret (12m) 0.0303∗∗∗ 0.0373∗∗∗
(5.70) (6.96)
Observations 165111 165111 163848 163848
Adj R-squared 0.142 0.149 0.0859 0.0944
Fund FE Yes Yes No No
Fund-year FE No No Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes No No
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.5: Panel models of IO at fund-firm-year level in subsample of new fund-firm and
new firm-director relations. The fund-firm-year level analysis removes the director dimension
and a fund-firm-year observation is a follower if the fund follows any director to the firm
that year. The baseline sample is observations that match between Risk Metrics, Thomson
Reuters 13F, and CRSP-Compustat Merged data over 1997–2005. Risk Metrics board data
are available over 1996–2006, but the sample omits the first and last year to determine
follower and will follow status. Institutional ownership (IO) is number of shares from fund’s
13F times quarter closing price for firm’s annual meeting quarter. Follower is one if fund-
firm-director-year observation is (2) new fund-firm pair, (1) new firm-director pair, and (3)
not new director-fund pair. Market equity (ME) is shares outstanding times quarter closing
price for firm’s annual meeting quarter in millions USD. Assets under management (AUM) is
sum of all IO from fund that year in millions USD. IO Total is sum of all IO in firm that year
in millions USD. Return on assets (ROA) is operating income before depreciation scaled by
total assets (OIBDP/AT). Market-to-book (M/B) is total assets plus market value of equity
minus book value of equity scaled by total assets [(AT + CSHO*PRCC F - SEQ)/AT]. ROA
and M/B are industry-adjusted by subtracting Fama and French (1997) 49-industry median
each year. Beta is CAPM beta from three years of monthly data and value-weighted CRSP
index. Ret is trailing 12-month cumulative return. Models include fixed effects (FEs) as
indicated in the table footer. Standard errors are two-way clustered by fund and firm.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(IO) log(IO) log(IO) log(IO)
Follower 0.0668∗∗∗ 0.0656∗∗∗ 0.0892∗∗∗ 0.0892∗∗∗
(4.03) (3.95) (5.94) (5.99)
log(ME) 0.207∗∗∗ -0.0150 0.220∗∗∗ -0.00730
(12.81) (-0.49) (12.71) (-0.23)
log(AUM) 0.378∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗
(20.05) (20.17) (6.61) (6.28)






CAPM Beta 0.00874 0.00495
(0.94) (0.53)
Ret (12m) 0.0157 0.0282∗
(1.53) (2.57)
Observations 59712 59712 58096 58096
Adj R-squared 0.142 0.148 0.0518 0.0597
Fund FE Yes Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No No
Fund-year FE No No Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.6: Within fund-year matched sample panel models of IO at fund-firm-year level in
subsample of new fund-firm relations. The fund-firm-year level analysis removes the director
dimension and a fund-firm-year observation is a follower if the fund follows any director to
the firm that year. The baseline sample is observations that match between Risk Metrics,
Thomson Reuters 13F, and CRSP-Compustat Merged data over 1997–2005. Risk Metrics
board data are available over 1996–2006, but the sample omits the first and last year to
determine follower and will follow status. Matching is on Mahalanobis distance between fol-
lowers and closest non-follower within same fund-year on the following variables: log(ME),
log(IO Total), ROA, M/B, Beta, and trailing 12-month cumulative return. Mahalanobis dis-
tance must not exceed one half (d ≤ 0.5). Institutional ownership (IO) is number of shares
from fund’s 13F times quarter closing price for firm’s annual meeting quarter. Follower is one
if fund-firm-director-year observation is (2) new fund-firm pair, (1) new firm-director pair,
and (3) not new director-fund pair. Market equity (ME) is shares outstanding times quarter
closing price for firm’s annual meeting quarter in millions USD. Assets under management
(AUM) is sum of all IO from fund that year in millions USD. IO Total is sum of all IO in
firm that year in millions USD. Return on assets (ROA) is operating income before depreci-
ation scaled by total assets (OIBDP/AT). Market-to-book (M/B) is total assets plus market
value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by total assets [(AT + CSHO*PRCC F
- SEQ)/AT]. ROA and M/B are industry-adjusted by subtracting Fama and French (1997)
49-industry median each year. Beta is CAPM beta from three years of monthly data and
value-weighted CRSP index. Ret is trailing 12-month cumulative return. Models include
fixed effects (FEs) as indicated in the table footer. Standard errors are two-way clustered by
fund and firm.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(IO) log(IO) log(IO) log(IO)
Follower 0.143∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(7.08) (7.07) (7.03) (7.06)
log(ME) 0.353∗∗∗ -0.0195 0.390∗∗∗ 0.0415
(10.27) (-0.32) (9.62) (0.60)
log(AUM) 0.480∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗ 0.473∗∗
(12.30) (12.48) (2.83) (2.84)






CAPM Beta 0.0324 0.0311
(1.68) (1.60)
Ret (12m) -0.0260 -0.0274
(-0.96) (-0.90)
Observations 19538 19538 18318 18318
Adj R-squared 0.224 0.236 0.156 0.167
Fund FE Yes Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No No
Fund-year FE No No Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.7: Two-stage treatment selection model at fund-firm-director-year level in subsam-
ple of new fund-firm relations. The baseline sample is observations that match between Risk
Metrics, Thomson Reuters 13F, and CRSP-Compustat Merged data over 1997–2005. Risk
Metrics board data are available over 1996–2006, but the sample omits the first and last
year to determine follower and will follow status. Follower is one if fund-firm-director-year
observation is (2) new fund-firm pair, (1) new firm-director pair, and (3) not new director-
fund pair. Assets under management (AUM) is sum of all IO from fund that year in millions
USD. Market equity (ME) is shares outstanding times quarter closing price for firm’s annual
meeting quarter in millions USD. Return on assets (ROA) is operating income before depreci-
ation scaled by total assets (OIBDP/AT). Market-to-book (M/B) is total assets plus market
value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by total assets [(AT + CSHO*PRCC F -
SEQ)/AT]. ROA and M/B are industry-adjusted by subtracting Fama and French (1997) 49-
industry median each year. “L.Mean” is lagged mean performance across director’s firms. N
firms/fund is number of reportable holdings fund has that year. N directors/firm is number
of directors at firm that year. Busy director is one if an external director sits on three or more
boards in a given calendar year. Busy board is one if more than half of a firm’s independent
directors are busy (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Title is one if director has listed title. Clas-
sification is director classification from Risk Metrics (E is employee, I is independent, L is
linked).
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N firms/fund 0.000183∗∗∗ 0.00000682∗∗∗
(16.96) (13.56)
Firm:
N directors/firm 0.00645∗ 0.000240∗
(2.48) (2.48)







N firms/director 0.167∗∗∗ 0.00623∗∗∗
(38.38) (24.74)
Busy director 0.223∗∗∗ 0.00832∗∗∗
(23.89) (20.67)
L.Mean ROA 1.040∗∗∗ 0.0387∗∗∗
(13.81) (13.76)
L.Mean M/B -0.0262∗∗∗ -0.000974∗∗∗
(-4.05) (-4.05)
Employment title - CEO 0.151∗∗∗ 0.00562∗∗∗
(19.57) (18.46)








Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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(b) Second-stage treatment model that controls for treatment selection bias. Lambda (λ) is
hazard/non-hazard ratio from Equation (2.2). Models include fixed effects (FEs) as indicated in
the table footer. Standard errors are block bootstrapped by funds 500 times.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(IO) log(IO) log(IO) log(IO)
Follower 0.724∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗
(3.35) (3.26) (4.01) (3.98)
λ -0.175∗ -0.163∗ -0.215∗∗ -0.207∗∗
(-2.37) (-2.27) (-3.08) (-3.05)
log(ME) 0.174∗∗∗ -0.0244 0.178∗∗∗ -0.0216
(19.13) (-1.73) (19.62) (-1.54)
log(AUM) 0.356∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(21.64) (21.56) (10.96) (10.54)






CAPM Beta 0.0126∗∗ 0.0126∗∗
(2.83) (2.84)
Ret (12m) 0.0312∗∗∗ 0.0399∗∗∗
(5.53) (7.10)
Observations 1579447 1579447 1579434 1579434
Adj R-squared 0.144 0.151 0.117 0.125
Fund FE Yes Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No No
Fund-year FE No No Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.10: Panel models of IO by splits on director classification and firm-level governance at
fund-firm-director-year level in subsample of new fund-firm relations. The baseline sample is
observations that match between Risk Metrics, Thomson Reuters 13F, and CRSP-Compustat
Merged data over 1997–2005. Risk Metrics board data are available over 1996–2006, but the
sample omits the first and last year to determine follower and will follow status. Institu-
tional ownership (IO) is number of shares from fund’s 13F times quarter closing price for
firm’s annual meeting quarter. Classification is director classification from Risk Metrics (E
is employee, I is independent, L is linked). E index is entrenchment index from Bebchuk
et al. (2009) (E ∈ [0, 6]). Follower is one if fund-firm-director-year observation is (2) new
fund-firm pair, (1) new firm-director pair, and (3) not new director-fund pair. Market equity
(ME) is shares outstanding times quarter closing price for firm’s annual meeting quarter in
millions USD. Assets under management (AUM) is sum of all IO from fund that year in
millions USD. Return on assets (ROA) is operating income before depreciation scaled by
total assets (OIBDP/AT). Market-to-book (M/B) is total assets plus market value of equity
minus book value of equity scaled by total assets [(AT + CSHO*PRCC F - SEQ)/AT]. ROA
and M/B are industry-adjusted by subtracting Fama and French (1997) 49-industry median
each year. Beta is CAPM beta from three years of monthly data and value-weighted CRSP
index. Ret is trailing 12-month cumulative return. Models include fixed effects (FEs) as
indicated in the table footer. Standard errors are two-way clustered by fund and firm.
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(a) Panel models of IO at fund-firm-director-year level in subsample of new fund-firm relations by
director classification and title. Classification is director classification from Risk Metrics (E is
employee, I is independent, L is linked).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
E I L CEO non-CEO
Follower 0.432∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗
(4.58) (4.71) (3.69) (3.02) (4.42)
log(ME) -0.0121 -0.0328∗ -0.00453 -0.0168 -0.00616
(-0.68) (-2.03) (-0.26) (-1.02) (-0.30)
log(AUM) 0.354∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗
(21.46) (21.73) (20.39) (22.16) (19.99)
log(IO total) 0.204∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗
(11.60) (12.08) (10.01) (12.24) (9.78)
ROA -0.0779 -0.0677 -0.00633 -0.0712 -0.0962
(-1.80) (-1.60) (-0.16) (-1.68) (-1.84)
M/B 0.00441 0.00140 0.00154 0.00314 0.00593
(1.61) (0.51) (0.50) (1.30) (1.59)
CAPM Beta 0.00869 0.0105∗ 0.0142∗ 0.0114∗ 0.00476
(1.44) (2.20) (2.11) (2.33) (0.56)
Ret (12m) 0.0257∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗ 0.0270∗∗∗ 0.0292∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗
(4.08) (4.86) (4.31) (5.14) (2.80)
Observations 300267 1095806 225766 154395 145668
Adj R-squared 0.153 0.153 0.145 0.146 0.151
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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(b) Panel models of IO at fund-firm-director-year level in subsample of new fund-firm relations by
firm-level governance. E index is entrenchment index from Bebchuk et al. (2009) (E ∈ [0, 6]). The
fund-firm-year level analysis removes the director dimension and a fund-firm-year observation is a
follower if the fund follows any director to the firm that year.
(1) (2)













CAPM Beta 0.00791 0.0149∗
(1.23) (2.47)
Ret (12m) 0.0241∗∗∗ 0.0345∗∗∗
(3.61) (3.94)
Observations 766978 855051
Adjusted R2 0.162 0.145
Fund FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































What matters more in international
payout? Country or firm?
3.1 Introduction
Many international corporate governance studies begin with some variation of the opening
paragraph of Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to cor-
porations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. How do the
suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profits to them? How do
they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply or invest it
in bad projects? How do suppliers of finance control managers?
However, very little of this literature connects the primary mechanisms through which in-
vestors ultimately receive a return on their investment: dividends and share repurchases.
The primary objective of this chapter is to answer this question and thereby connect the
literatures on country-level governance, payout decisions, and the outcomes of firm-level
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governance changes. This chapter presents a battery of tests to determine if firm-level gover-
nance, using Aggarwal et al. (2011)’s Gov41 measure, affects payout decisions by evaluating
both dividend and repurchase payout ratios and both dividend and repurchase initiation
decisions for 1,828 firms incorporated in 20 countries from 2004 through 2008.1
The relation between firm-level governance and observable outcomes relevant to share-
holders is interesting for several reasons. There is a sizable literature that investigates the
impact of country-level governance, including La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000) and Djankov
et al. (2008). The consensus of this literature is that some countries afford investors stronger
legal protection than others and that this protection results in greater financial development,
less expropriation of shareholder wealth, and greater return of capital to investors through
dividends. Given that a firm may find it difficult to change its country of incorporation,
what options are available to this firm to increase its commitment to not expropriate mi-
nority shareholders and return capital? Likewise, given a country’s legal structure, what
can minority shareholders do to achieve the same end (i.e., guarantee a return on capital
without expropriation)? It is possible that firm-level governance may help achieve this,
even in countries with low levels of shareholder protection. However, Doidge et al. (2007)
show that firm-level characteristics matter little relative to country-level in low legal regimes
and only relate to firm ratings and value once a minimum threshold is met for country-
level shareholder protection. Aggarwal et al. (2010) show complementarity between firm-
and country-level governance, and that higher country-level governance makes it optimal
to invest in higher firm-level governance. They find that in a matched sample of U.S. and
international firms that firm value is decreasing in the firm-level governance gap relative to
the benchmark U.S. firm. It could be that there are observable outcomes that contribute
1A longer panel would be preferable, but these are the years for which the Aggarwal et al. (2011) measure
is available, and is sufficient for Aggarwal et al. (2010) to find a relation between firm-level governance and
valuations and for Aggarwal et al. (2011) to find a relation between firm-level governance and international
institutional investments.
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to this valuation gap. Aggarwal et al. (2011) show that foreign institutional investors in
general, and U.S. institutional investors in particular, demand improvements in firm-level
governance shortly after investing in foreign firms. They suggest that this relation is causal
and that foreign institutional investors lead firm-level governance changes and not vice versa.
In all, the literature calls for a better understanding of the observable outcomes of firm-level
governance conditional on the country-level legal environment. The focus here is on the re-
lation between firm-level governance and payout decisions and how this relation varies with
country-level governance.
The key question here is whether firm- or country-level corporate governance matters
more when it comes to corporate payout policy. To that end, this chapter begins with a
sample of 23,029 large public companies in 21 countries over 2004 through 2008. Given that
70.0% of firms in the sample with complete data are incorporated in the U.S., the U.S. firms
are omitted from the main analysis and the focus is on non-U.S. firms. This prevents a sample
dominated by U.S. firms. In untabulated results the U.S. results are similar to the high legal
sample [i.e., common law legal origin or top tercile of the La Porta et al. (2000) anti-self-
dealing index]. The U.S. sample differs from the rest of world sample in that, consistent
with Fama and French (2001), the median firm does not pay dividends, although many more
return capital through repurchases (Skinner, 2008; Von Eije and Megginson, 2008). As such,
the strongest relation in the U.S. is for repurchases and firm-level governance.2 Table 3.1
includes U.S. firm summary statistics for comparison, but the focus here is on the relation
between firm- and country-level governance and payout decisions outside the U.S., which
provides sufficient variation.
Panel regressions across 1,828 firms from 20 countries (again, the U.S. is omitted in
statistical tests) confirm that dividend payout ratios are positively related to country-level
2Further, given the possible endogeneity between payout and firm-level governance choices, it is necessary
to use an instrumental variable (IV) identification strategy. In the U.S. the cross-section each industry-year
is much larger, which weakens an IV that relies on within country-industry-year variation.
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legal investor protection, which La Porta et al. (2000) document. As well, there is a similar
relation between dividend payout ratios and firm-level governance, which is not surprising
given Aggarwal et al. (2010, 2011). In fact, the economic magnitude of firm-level governance
is similar to that of the country-level governance. This relation is not strictly mechanical, as
the correlation between the anti-self-dealing index and Gov41 is only 20%. However, with
both country- and firm-level governance ratings in the model there is no relation between
dividend payout ratios the and firm-level governance measure. In a pooled sample with
country- and firm-level governance measures country-level governance dominates and firm-
level is neither economically meaningful nor statistically significant. This finding supports
the belief that country-level governance dwarfs the importance of firm-level governance when
it comes to corporate payout decisions, consistent with Doidge et al. (2007).
However, this does not imply that firm-level governance does not affect payout decisions.
Further analysis reveals an interesting subtlety in the relation between country- and firm-
level governance after dividing the sample into weak and strong shareholder rights subsets,
whether it be along naive measures such as legal origin or sophisticated measures like the
Djankov et al. (2008) anti-self-dealing index. Going forward, this chapter splits the analy-
sis into the internal and external margins of the payout decision, and both dividends and
repurchases. The “internal margin” refers to the firm’s choice of how much to pay out this
period, while the “external margin” refers to the choice of whether or not to pay out at all.
To be sure, given the rise of repurchases in the U.S. and rest of world (Skinner, 2008; Von
Eije and Megginson, 2008), there is also a third choice or margin of how to pay out capital,
through dividends or through repurchases. This chapter investigates all three choices.
The results indicate a positive and significant relation between dividend payout ratios
and firm-level governance for firms in low legal regimes. This relation does not consistently
extend to repurchases in low legal regimes, but the positive relation does extend to aggregate
or total payout ratios. These results suggest that in low legal regimes increasing firm-level
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governance increases shareholder rights and facilitates return of capital. These results are
robust to an IV approach to correct endogeneity between the simultaneous choice of payout
and firm-level governance. These results are also robust to different definitions of payout
ratios (i.e., scaling payout by net income, total assets, sales, and operating cash flows),
alternative specifications to address the truncated or binary nature of payout decisions, and
alternative definitions of firm- and country-level governance.
That improved firm-level governance relates to economically meaningful increases in divi-
dend and total payout ratios in low legal regimes is consistent with the La Porta et al. (2000)
outcome model. However the results reverse in high legal regimes. In high legal regimes im-
proved firm-level governance relates to economically meaningful and statistically significant
decreases in both dividend and total payout ratios, but a positive significant relation between
firm-level governance and repurchases. However, the repurchase increase is about one half
the size of the dividend decrease so that total payout does not increase. It could be that,
consistent with Skinner (2008), because repurchases are intermittent and lumpy rather than
consistent and smooth like dividends, single-year observations can’t identify the relation be-
tween firm-level governance and repurchases. In the data this repurchase lumpiness would
add noise and weaken the relation between repurchases and firm-level governance. Skinner
(2008) addresses this problem by collapsing his data into two-year bins, which smooths the
noise in repurchase activity. In this short panel of five years (i.e., 2004–2008) this approach
isn’t feasible. In any case, these results in high legal regimes are consistent with a more
nuanced La Porta et al. (2000) outcome model in which further increasing firm-level gover-
nance facilitates a substitution from dividends to repurchases, which are more flexible for
the firm, particularly in the presence of investment opportunities, and tax-advantaged for
the shareholder in terms of the timing of taxable events (and frequently in terms of marginal
tax rates). In scenarios with strong shareholder rights repurchases are a better scenario
for shareholders given the advantages of repurchases over dividends (DeAngelo et al., 2008;
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Skinner, 2008).
With respect to payout ratios, the results are clear. In strong legal settings, improve-
ments to firm-level governance result in decreases in dividends and total payout, with some
possible increase in repurchases, which is consistent with a substitution from dividends to
repurchases. In weak legal settings improvements in firm-level governance result in increases
in both dividends and total payout, without a consistent impact on repurchases. Both are
consistent with the La Porta et al. (2000) outcome model and an improved return of capital
to shareholders. Although the specifics of the results on the internal margin (i.e., payout ra-
tios) differ between high and low legal environments, in both regimes the results of increases
in firm-level governance are consistent with less expropriation and greater return of capital.
While the results on the internal margin (i.e., payout ratios) are clear and strong, the
results on the external margin (i.e., the dividend and repurchase initiation) are less clear,
which is surprising given that the payout initiation decision is likely better understood than
payout levels. In weak legal regimes the relation between firm-level governance and dividend
initiation is negative, but not economically large. Although somewhat inconsistent with the
external margin results, this suggests that with improved firm-level governance firms are
able to postpone the return of capital through dividends or repurchases, which is optimal if
the firm has profitable growth opportunities. However, it is difficult to place much weight
in this finding given the small size of the relation. The same negative relation exists for
repurchases in weak legal regimes. In high legal regimes, the relation between dividend status
and firm-level governance has the same negative significant relation with a similar economic
size, again consistent with the notion that increasing shareholder rights facilitates a delay
in dividend initiation. Given the near permanence of the dividend decision this finding in
both a low and high legal regimes is not surprising. However, in the high legal regimes
the relation between firm-level governance and repurchases is positive, but not significant at
conventional levels in all specifications. This lends further support for the outcome model
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with substitution from rigid dividends to flexible repurchases. As with the internal margin
results, these results are robust to several specifications including IV approaches, alternative
specifications, alternative definitions of low and high legal environments, and alternative
definitions of firm-level governance.
As an extension to this analysis of the internal and external margins of the payout deci-
sion, Section 3.6 investigates the relative importance of an alternative firm-level governance
proxy: the service of a U.S. director on the board of a non-U.S. firm. This provides a re-
lated but unique firm-level governance measure to better understand the impact of firm-
and country-level governance on payout policy. The presence of a U.S. director on the cor-
porate board offers some attractive features and a more direct proxy on de jure firm-level
governance. With a U.S. director indicator variable as the firm-level governance measure
the results are consistent with the Gov41 findings in previous sections. Further, this relation
is not strictly mechanical, as the correlation between Gov41 and the U.S. director indicator
variable is low in both levels and changes. The U.S. director variable has the added benefit
of allowing “out of sample” tests, as the variable is available about 650% more firm-years
(i.e., 44,460 versus 6,901). In low legal regimes the U.S. director indicator variable is re-
lated to increases in dividend, repurchase, and total payout ratios. In high legal regimes
the U.S. director indicator variable is related to decreased payout in dividends and total,
with a positive significant impact on repurchases. Finally, these results are the same with
respect to the external margin and U.S. directors have delay dividend initiation in both high
and low legal regimes, which is consistent with initiation being a less reversible decision than
adjustments to payout ratios, but significantly increase the probability of repurchases in high
legal regimes. As with Gov41, the choice of a U.S. director and choice of payout ratios is
endogenous and results are robust to using an IV approach.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related literature and Sec-
tion 3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4 provides the key results with respect to dividend and
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repurchase ratios, and dividend and repurchase initiations and omissions. Section 3.5 pro-
vides robustness checks and Section 3.6 discusses the presence of a U.S. director as another
proxy for firm-level governance. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
This chapter connects three literatures that address (1) the impact of country-level gover-
nance on corporate decisions, (2) the determinants of firm payout policy across countries,
and (3) the relation between country- and firm-level governance. It adds to these extant
literatures by focusing on the impact of firm-level governance on payout decisions in a cross-
country setting.
The first literature focuses on country-level governance. La Porta et al. (1998) begin this
literature and La Porta et al. (2000) take the first look at the relation between country-level
governance, investment opportunities, and dividend payout ratios, and propose two compet-
ing hypotheses on the relation between dividend payout and investment opportunities across
countries. Under their “outcome” hypothesis, dividends are the result or outcome of good
governance and payout is higher in strong governance regimes because this is where share-
holders’ rights are strong enough that shareholders can force management to return capital.
The outcome model also predicts that payout will decrease in investment opportunities in
strong governance regimes because owners will forgo return of capital today to facilitate
investment, confident that they will be able to force payout as investment opportunities
decrease. Under their alternative “substitute” hypothesis, dividends are an adaptation that
compensates or substitutes for poor governance and dividend payout ratios are higher in
poor governance regimes. The substitute model also predicts an ambiguous relation between
growth prospects and dividend payout because of the tension between (1) the need to return
capital to investors to initially raise capital and (2) the need retain capital to invest in growth
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opportunities.
La Porta et al. (2000) find support for their outcome model and observe higher dividend
payout ratios in strong governance regimes. As well, they find that dividend payout ratios
decrease in investment opportunities in strong governance regimes, but are unrelated to
investment opportunities in weak governance regimes. Given that they find no relation
between investment opportunities and dividend payout in weak governance regimes, it could
be that firm-level governance explains some portion of the unexplained variation in payout
ratios in weak governance regimes, or in both regimes. As well, the impact of firm-level
governance could vary significantly across country-level governance regimes.
While La Porta et al. (2000) provide the key finding on the relation between country-level
governance and dividend payout ratio, Pinkowitz et al. (2006) investigate the relation be-
tween dividends and firm valuation conditional on country-level governance. Pinkowitz et al.
(2006) use Fama and French (1998) valuation regressions to determine the marginal value of
cash and dividends in countries around the world. They hypothesize that because minority
shareholders fear expropriation from majority shareholders, minority shareholders value cash
less and dividends more in poor legal regimes. They find support for both hypotheses. This
chapter adds to this literature by focusing on how shareholders use additional rights at the
firm-level to influence payout policy, which affects both cash holding and dividends.
The second set of studies focuses on dividend and repurchase determinants in the U.S.
and around the world. Where La Porta et al. (2000) focus on dividend payout ratios across
country-level governance regimes, Fama and French (2001) investigate the attributes of firms
that pay dividends to answer the fundamental question of who pays dividends (i.e., what are
their fundamental characteristics). Their objective is to better understand the large decline
in dividend payers in the U.S. from 66.5% in the late 1970s to 20.8% in the late 1990s. They
conclude that large, profitable firms are more likely to pay dividends and that firms with
better investment opportunities are less likely to pay dividends. This framework helps them
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identify two sources of the decline in dividends. First, there was a decline in the fraction of
firms that are likely to pay dividends. That is, there are fewer large, profitable firms with
low investment opportunities. Second, there was a decline in the propensity of any given
firm to initiate dividends. That is, regardless of their characteristics (or controlling for their
characteristics), U.S. firms have become less likely to initiate dividends. They conclude that
both of these mechanisms are equally responsible for the decline in dividend payment over
time.
DeAngelo et al. (2006) build upon the Fama and French (2001) propensity to pay div-
idends model and propose the life-cycle theory of dividends. The life-cycle theory is that
young firms have large investment opportunities but little capital, so retention dominates
distribution. As firms mature their investment opportunities decrease and their cumulative
profits increase, so they distribute excess capital as dividends. DeAngelo et al. (2006) proxy
firm life-cycle with the ratio of retained earnings to total equity, which is the ratio of earned
to total equity. Firms with low retained earnings relative to total equity will be reliant
on external capital to fund investment opportunities and are less likely to pay dividends.
Likewise, firms with high retained earnings relative to total equity have large accumulated
profits and are largely self-financing, which makes them ideal candidates to pay dividends.
Empirically, DeAngelo et al. (2006) find strong support for their life-cycle theory of divi-
dends and find that it exaggerates the Fama and French (2001) “disappearing dividends”
trend. DeAngelo et al. (2006) sort on life-cycle measures and find that over time there’s no
change in the propensity to pay dividends for negative retained earnings firms (i.e., young,
unprofitable firms), who are very unlikely to pay dividends in any case and can’t become
less likely to pay dividends. The largest reduction in dividend initiation comes from high
retained earnings firms who fail to initiate and for these likely dividend initiation candidates
the propensity to reduce payout is twice what Fama and French (2001) document.
Skinner (2008) complements this literature by documenting a substitution from dividends
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to share repurchases in U.S. firms. The author begins by identifying three groups of payers:
firms that both pay dividends and make regular repurchases, firms that make regular repur-
chases, and firms that make occasional repurchases. He finds that firms that, in the U.S.,
firms that only pay dividends are increasingly rare and that repurchases are increasingly
used in place of dividends, even in firms that pay dividends. The increasing popularity of
share repurchases allows firms to delay dividend initiation and explains a large fraction of
the declining propensity to pay dividends that Fama and French (2001) and DeAngelo et al.
(2006) document. Skinner (2008) proposes that share repurchases are substitutes for divi-
dends and have become the predominant payout mechanism, with even the major dividend
payers returning large amounts of capital via repurchases.
These three papers provide the framework for two major international studies. Denis
and Osobov (2008) extend Fama and French (2001) and DeAngelo et al. (2006) to six major
economies (U.S., U.K., Canada, France, German, and Japan) and find that firms from these
countries also exhibit a declining propensity to pay dividends. Von Eije and Megginson
(2008) use a larger sample of 15 countries (European Union members over 1989–2005) and
focus on the evolving nature of repurchases relative to dividends. Their major contribution
beyond Denis and Osobov (2008) is to test Skinner (2008) in a large, international data
set. They find that international share repurchases follow the U.S. trend with a ten-year
lag. Although both of these papers are the first large-scale cross-country application of the
propensity to pay models, they do not address the impact of firm-level governance on payout
choice in the cross-section of countries. This chapter extends this literature with a wider of
panel of 20 countries and weighs the impact of firm-level governance on both the internal
and external margins of payout policy.
The third literature looks to firm-level governance largely as an outcome, rather than
a cause. Aggarwal et al. (2010) look at the amount of firm-level governance around the
world relative to matched U.S. firms. They find that there is complementarity between
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country- and firm-level governance around the world and posit that world firms, particularly
those outside of Canada and the U.K., under-invest in firm-level governance because given
their country-level governance the costs exceed the benefits. Aggarwal et al. (2011) connect
international institutional investment flows and firm-level governance changes. They study
institutional investment in 23 countries over 2003–2008 and conclude that changes in institu-
tional ownership positively affect changes in firm-level governance, but not vice versa. That
is, foreign institutional investors, particularly those from strong shareholder rights regimes
such as the U.S., are effective in promoting corporate governance improvements outside the
U.S. at the firm-level and that institutional investors motivate the improvement, rather than
the improvement attracts institutional investors. They connect these firm-level governance
changes to observable outcomes and events, like CEO turnover and valuation gains. Their
key governance measure is Gov41, which Section 3.3 covers in more detail. Gov41 is the lin-
ear combination of 41 governance measures across four governance areas. These four areas
are board, audit, anti-takeover provisions, and compensation and ownership. Board mea-
sures characteristics of the board of directors such as board independence, composition of
committees, size, transparency, and how the board conducts its work. Audit measures inde-
pendence of the audit committee and the role of auditors. Anti-takeover provisions measure
dual-class structure, role of shareholders, poison pills, and blank check preferred. Finally,
compensation and ownership measures executive and director compensation on issues related
to options, stock ownership and loans, and how compensation is set and monitored. Some
measures may matter more than others, but linear combinations of binary governance at-
tributes have a foundation in the literature (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009). In
any case, any noise in these measures make it more difficult to find relations with ownership
and outcomes. To the extent that de facto governance measures are noisy and potentially
misleading, a more de jure measure of appointment of U.S. director provides validation in
Section 3.6. Aggarwal et al. (2011)’s findings emphasize the demand for firm-level gover-
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nance, which suggests that there must be some additional benefits to firm-level governance
and that variation in firm-level governance might explain some portion of the variation in
payout and payout initiation that La Porta et al. (2000) are unable to explain.
Using the underlying data for Gov41 and several other international firm-level governance
measures, Doidge et al. (2007) show that country matters more than firm characteristics in
determining firm-level ratings in weak governance regimes. Conversely, in strong governance
regimes firm characteristics explain a larger fraction of variation in firm-level ratings. They
propose that the value of firm-level investor protection is lower when country-level corporate
governance is weaker, because firm-level governance is more costly when the country-level
framework is weak and less beneficial when the country’s capital markets are less developed,
which causes firms to invest less in their own corporate governance. As a result, in weak
governance regimes firm characteristics explain very little of the assigned governance score
once country-level governance measures (or country fixed effects) are included. These re-
sults suggest that firm financial policies, such as payout choice, firm-level governance could
potentially have different marginal effects based on the level of legal investor protection
provided at the country level. This chapter contributes here by determining if important,
observable outcomes change as firm-level governance changes, and if this response varies with
country-level governance.
In short, there’s a need to examine firm-level governance [of Aggarwal et al. (2011)] in
the context of the country-level governance [of La Porta et al. (2000) and Djankov et al.
(2008)] to determine if firm-level governance impacts additional financial decisions, such as
payout policy, and if this impact varies with country-level [as in Doidge et al. (2007)].
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3.3 Data
The main data are Worldscope annual data and follow the data methods of Denis and Osobov
(2008) and Von Eije and Megginson (2008) to generate firm fundamentals. The country-level
governance data are from Djankov et al. (2008) and the firm-level governance data are from
Aggarwal et al. (2011). In all cases the Aggarwal et al. (2011) firm-level governance measure
(Gov41) is the least complete data and limits the analysis to major firms incorporated in the
largest economies over 2004–2008. The robustness checks in Section 3.6 relax this limitation
with Bureau Van Dyck (BVD) data on board composition and use U.S. directors as a novel
proxy of firm-level governance.
3.3.1 Firm-Level Governance Data
In all cases the Aggarwal et al. (2011) firm-level governance measure is the least complete
data, so the data discussion begins with Gov41. Gov41 is the sum of 41 indicator variables
for various governance attributes divided by 41, then multiplied by 100, so that Gov41
∈ [0, 100]. RiskMetrics is the source of the Gov41 components, but Aggarwal et al. (2011)
provides the consolidated data.3 RiskMetrics covers U.S. firms that are members of any of
the following indices: Standard & Poors’ (S&P) 500; S&P Small Cap 600; and Russell 3000.
RiskMetrics also covers non-U.S. firms that are members of the following major stock indexes:
MSCI Europe, Australasia, and Far East Index (MSCI EAFE), which covers 1,000 stocks
in 21 developed countries outside North America; FTSE All Share Index, which consists of
FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and FTSE SmallCap indices; FTSE AllWorldDeveloped index, which
consists of the largest firms in developed markets; and S&P/TSX index of the Toronto Stock
Exchange. Gov41 includes 41 firm-level governance attributes that are common to both U.S.
and non-U.S. firms and fall into one of four subcategories: 24 attributes under board (e.g.,
3http://faculty.msb.edu/aggarwal/Gov.xls
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board independence, composition, size, transparency), three attributes under audit (e.g.,
audit committee independence), six attributes under Anti-takeover provisions (e.g., dual-
class structure and poison pills), and eight attributes under compensation and ownership
(e.g., executive and director compensation). RiskMetrics sets each of these 41 indicator
variables to one if the firm exceeds some minimum level and zero otherwise. Gov41 is the
average of these indicators variables each firm-year, scaled to fall between 0 and 100. Unlike
the Djankov et al. (2008) revised anti-director and anti-self-dealing indices, Gov41 has both
cross-sectional (within country) and time series (within firm) variation. While the simple
average of 41 indicator variables seems sufficiently arbitrary, the use of additive governance
measures is not uncommon in the governance literature (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk
et al., 2009). See Aggarwal et al. (2010, 2011) for more on Gov41 and the RiskMetrics data
that comprise it.
Aggarwal et al. (2011) provide 34,707 firm-year observations of Gov41 over 2004–2008
which match to 26,353 firm-year observations from Worldscope. This is not ideal, but there
does not appear to be any systematic bias in randomly unmatched firm years that would
induce a relation between within country (or within firm) Gov41 variation and payout pol-
icy variation. Aggarwal et al. (2011) document that Gov41 differs between country, with
country averages as high as 50% in the U.S. and Canada, but as low as 10% in Italy and
Spain. Given that La Porta et al. (2000) report a positive relation between country-level
governance and dividend payout ratios, it seems that this could weaken any finding of a
relation between Gov41 and dividend payout ratios. However, analysis here controls for
country-level governance and the identification strategy uses firm random effects (REs) to
absorb unobserved firm-level heterogeneity and year fixed effects (FEs) to absorb unobserved
year-level heterogeneity.
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3.3.2 Firm-Level Fundamental Data
Worldscope data from 2003–2008 provide firm fundamental variables for sample firms from
2004–2008 (one previous year is necessary for every firm-year observation to generate total
assets and sales growth rates). The main dependent variable is dividend payout ratio D/Y,
where dividends D is Worldscope’s “Common Dividends Cash” and net income available to
common shareholders Y is Worldscope’s “Net Income Before Extraordinary Items”. Robust-
ness checks include several other denominators: total assets A is “Total Assets”, operating
cash flows CF is “Funds From Operations” minus “Discontinued Operations”, if available,
and sales S is “Net Sales or Revenues”. Skinner (2008) shows that share repurchases com-
prise an increasingly large share of payout in the U.S. and Von Eije and Megginson (2008)
show the same trend around the world with a ten year lag. Following Von Eije and Meg-
ginson (2008) share repurchases R are “Common/Preferred Purchased, Retired, Converted,
Redeemed”. Total payout T is the sum of cash dividends D and repurchases R. Finally, a
firm is a dividend payer for a given firm-year if cash dividends D is positive and a repurchaser
if share repurchases R is positive.
In addition to Gov41, the independent variables include the Fama and French (2001)
and DeAngelo et al. (2006) payout predictors. Denis and Osobov (2008) and Von Eije and
Megginson (2008) show that these variables relate to dividend and repurchase decisions
around the world. Fama and French (2001) propose that the main determinants of the
decision to pay dividends are profitability, growth opportunities, and size, and DeAngelo
et al. (2006) add the ratio of earned to contributed capital (i.e., the ratio of retained earnings
to common equity). Following Denis and Osobov (2008), the profitability proxies are both
return on assets (E/A) and return on equity (Y/BE). Return on assets E/A is “Earnings
Before Interest” divided by “Total Assets”, where “Earnings Before Interest” is “Net Income
After Preferred Dividends” plus “Interest Expense on Debt”, if available. Return on equity
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Y/BE is “Net Income Before Extraordinary Items” divided by the book value of equity
BE, where the book value of equity is “Common Equity” plus “Non-equity Reserves”, if
available. The descriptive statistics include E/A and Y/BE for completeness, but neither
is in the payout ratio analysis (external margin) because D/Y is already relative to net
income. This avoids a mechanically negative relation between earnings in the numerator
of an independent variable with earnings in the denominator of the dependent payout ratio
variables. The external margin analysis includes profitability E/A in all models. The growth
opportunities proxy is the ratio of firm market value to book value (V/A is “Total Assets”
minus “Common Equity” plus “Market Capitalization” divided by “Total Assets”) and total
asset growth rate (dA/A is change in “Total Assets” divided by this period’s “Total Assets”).
The descriptive statistics in Table 3.2 include V/A in for completeness, but following La Porta
et al. (2000), V/A is not included as an independent variable for two reasons. First, although
all specifications control for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm-level, using dA/A instead
of V/A avoids the valuation interpretation of V/A and any differences in valuation metrics
across countries. Second, there is possible endogeneity between valuations and payout ratios.
In any case, the results are qualitatively similar with V/A in place of asset growth rates
(dA/A). The size proxy is the size percentile within each country-year based on “Total
Assets” in the larger country-year (i.e., prior to sub-setting based on data availability),
which avoids currency conversion issues and is likely the best size metric within country.
Finally, the earned-contributed capital ratio RE/BE is the ratio of “Retained Earnings” to
“Book Equity”. This is also known as the life-cycle measure (DeAngelo et al., 2006).
Because Gov41 limits the analysis to the largest firms in each market, there are only mod-
est additional data requirements. Over 2004–2008 there are 205,747 firm-years in Worldscope
without regard to country or specific variables. Limiting the analysis to countries with Gov41
data further limits the analysis to 146,800 firm-years. Dropping firm-years without Gov41 is
the most significant data limitation and reduces the sample to 26,353 firm-years. Requiring
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the main set of variables (D/Y, R/Y, T/Y, Y/BE, E/A, V/A, dA/A, size, and RE/BE)
further reduces the sample by 1,212 to 25,141 firm-years. All ratios are trimmed at 1% in
each tail by country, which leaves a final sample of 23,029 firm-years. Table 3.1 provides the
number of complete observations by country-year. The U.S. has an outsize influence on the
sample and comprises 16,128 of 23,029 firm-years. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 include U.S. data for
completeness and comparison, but subsequent analysis omits the U.S. data. In untabulated
results the U.S. results are qualitatively similar to other common law countries.
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics for the key payout and predictor variables by
legal origin, country, and firm-level governance quantile (i.e., above and below median Gov41
within each country-year). Each country-year, the firm-years that are above the country-
year median Gov41 are “High Gov41” firm-years and the remainder are “Low Gov41”. The
values in Table 3.2 are the time-series means of the medians within each country-year-Gov41
bin. Table 3.2a reports these values for Common Law legal origin countries and Table 3.2b
reports these values for Civil Law legal origin countries. Following La Porta et al. (2000), this
is no further differentiation between the several different Civil Law origins. Instead “Civil
Law” is the remainder of countries without “English” legal origins. Robustness checks in
Section 3.5 show that the results are qualitatively similar with the anti-self-dealing index
(Djankov et al., 2008) as the country-level governance index. There doesn’t appear to be
any strong relation between firm characteristics between high and low firm-level governance
firms within each country, although high firm-level governance firms tend to have higher
profitability. However, median D/Y is positive in all countries, except for the U.S., and
median R/Y is zero or low single digits in all but a handful of countries.
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3.4 Results
The research questions here pertain to the relation between country- and firm-level gov-
ernance on payout decisions. La Porta et al. (2000) relate country-level governance and
dividend payout ratios, but the dividend decision has two steps, and three including the
decision between dividends and repurchases. First the firm must decide to initiate payout,
second whether to payout dividends or repurchases, and third the division of earnings be-
tween payout and retention. On the external margin firm-level governance could relate to
the decision to initiate or omit dividends, and on the internal margin firm-level governance
could relate to the dividend payout ratio D/Y or repurchase payout ratio R/Y. Because La
Porta et al. (2000) show a strong relation between country-level governance and dividend
payout ratios, Subsection 3.4.1 begins by assessing the impact of firm-level governance on
the internal margin. Later, Subsection 3.4.2 assesses the impact of firm-level governance on
the external margin.
3.4.1 Internal Margin
La Porta et al. (2000) report evidence favoring the “outcome” model where dividends are
the result of strong governance rather than a “substitute” for formal shareholder rights at
the country-level. In fact, they find that in weak governance countries payout ratios are
not related to growth opportunities and in strong governance countries payout ratios are
decreasing in growth opportunities. It could be that within these poor governance countries
firm-level attributes explain some portion of the dividend payout decision. This chapter
tests this by looking at the relation between firm-level governance Gov41 and dividend,
repurchase, and total payout ratios.
La Porta et al. (2000) propose that, conditioning on country-level governance, the primary
determinant on the retain-payout decision is the firm’s growth opportunities, which they
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proxy with the 3-, 4-, and 5-year growth in sales. Instead, following Denis and Osobov
(2008), the growth opportunities proxy here is total asset growth dA/A, although results
are qualitatively similar with sales growth dS/S as the growth opportunities measure. The
dividend literature shows that profitability is an important determinant of the dividend
decision in the external margin, but these internal margin models omit E/A and Y/BE to
avoid a mechanical relation with the dependent variable, which already conditions on net
income Y. To avoid currency issues and to correct for size differences between countries, the
firm size proxy is the firm’s size percentile based on total assets within each country-year.
Finally, DeAngelo et al. (2006) show that life-cycle does matter, even after controlling for
growth opportunities, profitability, and firm size. Denis and Osobov (2008) find support for
the positive relation between retained earnings and dividends in their international sample
so all models include the earned-contributed capital ratio RE/BE.4
As a first step to understanding the relation between dividend payout and firm- and
country-level governance, Table 3.3 provides dividend payout ratio models with the div-
idend predictors and combinations of firm- and country-level governance measures. The
country-level governance measures include both legal origin (i.e., common versus civil law)
and Djankov et al. (2008)’s anti-self-dealing index. Consistent with the literature (La Porta
et al., 2000; Von Eije and Megginson, 2008, among others) all models include firm REs and
untabulated tests fail to reject the null of no systematic difference between fixed and random
effects regressions, so firm RE and year FE models are the best choice.5 As well, throughout
standard errors are robust and clustered by firm to correct within firm correlation in payout
decisions.
Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 3.3 include a common law indicator and Djankov
4Von Eije and Megginson (2008) find stronger support for age as a life-cycle measure over retained
earnings, but in this sample RE/BE is positive significant where expected.
5Because the key variables are heteroskedastic and correlated within firm, a test of over-identifying re-
strictions is more correct than the Hausman test, which is only valid with homoskedastic, i.i.d. error terms.
See Wooldridge (2002, pages 290–291) and Schaffer and Stillman (2010) for details.
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et al. (2008)’s anti-self-dealing index, respectively, to control for country-level governance.
These results are consistent with La Porta et al. (2000) and show that dividend payout
ratios are increasing in country-level governance and decreasing in growth opportunities
dA/A. The coefficient on the common law indicator is about twice the coefficient on the
anti-self-dealing index, but this isn’t surprising given that the anti-self-dealing index lies
between zero and one with mean and standard deviation about one half that of the common
law indicator. In these specifications the life-cycle and size measures are not statistically
significant, but this is not surprising and these should be stronger predictors on the external
margin (i.e., the initiate or omit decision) and may change little within firm over this short
panel. Specification (3) replaces the country-level governance measures with the Gov41
firm-level measure and reports similar results. The coefficient is two orders of magnitude
smaller than the country-level measures, but the economic significance is nominally the same
because the mean and standard deviation of the firm-level governance measure is two orders
of magnitude larger than the country-level governance measures (i.e., anti-self-dealing ∈ [0, 1]
and Gov41 ∈ [0, 100]). As well, the inferences from the other predictors remain the same.
However, when the model includes both country- and firm-level governance measures, the
results indicates that country-level governance dominates firm-level governance. In specifi-
cations (4) and (5) the coefficients on common law and anti-self-dealing are unchanged, but
the coefficients on Gov41 are not significantly different from zero and are both qualitatively
different from the Gov41 coefficient in specification (3) with Gov41 as the only governance
measure. These results suggest that both country- and firm-level governance matter, but
that in a pooled sample country-level dominates.
Given the importance of firm-level governance in other studies, and that its importance
varies with country-level governance, it could also be that there is more nuance in this relation
and that the outcomes of firm-level governance depend on the framework that country-level
governance provides. As a first test of this idea Table 3.4 provides simple univariate tests of
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how changes in firm-level governance relate to changes in dividend payout ratios in high and
low legal regimes. These tests use common law versus civil law as the high versus low legal
differentiator because it is simple and transparent, but later tests show that these results
are robust to the anti-self-dealing index. Table 3.4 provides the mean five-year changes in
dividend payout ratio D/Y split on legal origin and low and high terciles of five-year changes
in Gov41. Using the five-year change in Gov41 is limiting and reduces the sample by more
than one order of magnitude from the full sample in Table 3.3, but is necessary to make
comparisons. As might be expected, one-year changes in both dividend payout ratios and
Gov41 are noisy, often zero, and D/Y can vary slightly through changes in Y without a
conscious change in D. Results are similar using the first or last four years for each firm,
but a nearly full-window change is necessary to identify a univariate relation. In low legal
regimes (i.e., those with civil law legal origins) increases in firm-level governance relate to
statistically significant increases in dividend payout ratios, but in high legal regimes (i.e.,
those with common law legal origins) the relation is negative and not statistically significant.
This is the basic result that motivates the rest of the analysis here. That the relation is
positive in low legal regimes is consistent with improvements to shareholder rights resulting
in less expropriation and better return of capital. But that the relation is negative in high
legal regimes, where shareholder rights are stronger, is puzzling and suggests that there
may be a more complex relation between payout and firm-level governance in high legal
regimes. The univariate results are suggestive, but don’t control for firm characteristics
or unobserved heterogeneity at the firm-, country-, or year-level. Going forward the tests
broaden to include both dividends and repurchases and control for country-level governance
by splitting the sample into high and low legal regimes.6
Table 3.5 presents regression results for the relation between firm-level governance and
6The results are qualitatively similar in pooled tests that control for the interplay between country- and
firm-level governance with interaction terms.
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all three payout ratios by legal regime. Specifications (1)–(3) in Table 3.5 report results for
civil law countries and specifications (4)–(6) report results for common law countries. All
specifications include firm REs and year FEs to control for unobserved heterogeneity, and
standard errors clustered by firm to control for within firm correlation in payout decisions.
All specifications omit firm-years with non-positive net income because negative payout
ratios are difficult to interpret. The relation between dividend payout ratios and firm-level
governance in specifications (1) and (4) are consistent with the univariate results in Table 3.4.
As well, the results are statistically significant at the 1% level and economically meaningful.
For example, in the civil law sample the Gov41 standard deviation is 6.8, so a one standard
deviation increase in firm-level governance relates to 6.8×0.381 = 2.59% (percentage points)
increase in dividend payout ratio. The results are stronger in the common law sample where
the Gov41 standard deviation is 10.6%, so a one standard deviation increase in firm-level
governance relates to a |10.6×−0.469| = 4.97% (percentage point) decrease in dividend
payout ratio.
In civil law countries the results for repurchases and total payout ratios are qualitatively
similar and both are positive significant so all types of payout increase. This is consistent
with the La Porta et al. (2000) outcome model in which improved shareholder rights allow
shareholders to demand higher payout. In common law countries specification (5) shows
that there is no relation between repurchases and firm-level governance, although the total
payout ratio also decreases in firm-level governance. This is consistent with the La Porta
et al. (2000) substitution model in which payout is a substitute for governance, so that
improving firm-level governance allows the firm to reduce payout. However, it could also
be that improving firm-level governance allows the firm to reduce dividend payout, which is
a strong commitment that is expected to be persistent, with a more flexible payout policy,
such as repurchases. Repurchases are better for firms because of the increased flexibility and
shareholders, because of the tax advantage (DeAngelo et al., 2008). Although these tests fail
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to reject no relation between firm-level governance and repurchases, this relation remains
a possibility in later tests. It could also be that investment opportunities differ in these
countries over time, which would change firms’ incentives to payout capital. However, all
specifications include a growth opportunities measure (dA/A) with the expected significant
negative coefficient and controls for unobserved firm- and year-level heterogeneity, so this
explanation is unlikely. Neither size nor life-cycle (RE/BE) are consistently statistically
significant in any of these models, but these predictors should have more explanatory power
on the external margin than on the internal margin.
In all, Table 3.5 paints a picture of payout ratio decisions that differ by country- and
firm-level governance, and that the impact of firm-level governance depends strongly on the
country-level governance environment. Aggarwal et al. (2011) show Gov41 varies in the cross-
section, changes over their short panel of five years, and has a general upward trend at the
country-level. However, firm-level governance is not randomly assigned and is chosen each
year alongside payout ratios. This simultaneous choice would make the results in Table 3.5
inconsistent, but an instrumental variable (IV) can correct this shortcoming.
The Gov41 IV must be correlated with payout (relevance), but only through the possi-
bly endogenous variable Gov41 (exclusion restriction). One candidate is average firm-level
governance Gov41 for all other firms in the same industry and country that year. This is
also known as the “leave out” average of Gov41, which is Gov41−ijct for firm i in industry
j, country c, and year t. For the leave out average to be a valid instrument it must induce
variation in firm-level governance Gov41ijct and affect payout decisions only through this
relation with Gov41ijct and not directly. Aggarwal et al. (2010) use the same instrument
with respect to valuation. Because Aggarwal et al. (2011) show that Gov41 improves in
waves within each of these countries over the sample period, it could be that some portion
of a given firm’s Gov41 improvements are due to outside pressure from a general trend to
improve governance. In addition to Aggarwal et al. (2010), this IV motivation appears else-
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where in the literature. In the context of U.S. governance and the Gompers et al. (2003) G
index, John and Kadyrzhanova (2008) show that good governance leads to good governance
in peer firms and the good governance matters most when peers have good governance. In a
broader setting, Leary and Roberts (2014) find that peer firms determine capital structure
and financial policies and that, at least with respect to capital structure, these peer effects
are more important than many previously identified fundamental determinants. John and
Litov (2010) use an instrumental variable approach similar to the one here and instrument
firm-level governance G index with the leave out average G index at the industry-year level.
John and Kadyrzhanova (2008) define peer firms as within the same state and Leary and
Roberts (2014) define peer firms as within same three-digit SIC code, but in this international
setting it seems that appropriate peers are within country and industry, where industry is
at the Fama and French (1997) 12-industry level. Whether or not Gov41−ijct meets the rele-
vance criteria and explains enough variation in Gov41ijct is empirically testable. In all cases
the Gov41 leave out average passes the weak instrument test rule of thumb of a first-stage
F-test on the excluded instrument of greater than 10, as well the more demanding Stock
and Yogo (2002) minimal F-test scores at all conventional significance levels. The exclu-
sion restriction that Gov41−ijct does not affect D/Y, except through its impact on firm i’s
firm-level governance in year t, must be maintained, but in untabulated results the Gov41
leave out average is not correlated with residuals from the second-stage regression without
IV. Finally, the results here are qualitatively the same if instead the instrument for Gov41
is the leave out average at the country-year level rather than at the industry-country-year
level (i.e., Gov41−ict instead of Gov41−ijct).
Table 3.6 repeats the analyses from Table 3.5, but with Gov41−ijct as an IV for Gov41ijct.
Again, all specifications include firm REs and year FEs to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity, block bootstrap standard errors at the firm-level 500 times to control for within firm
correlation in payout policy, and include only firm-years with positive net income to avoid
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payout ratios less than zero.7
A comparison of the two sets of specifications indicates that, with or without the Gov41
IV, the results are generally similar. However, there are two important differences and cor-
recting the endogenous firm-level governance choice gives a clearer picture of the impact of
firm-level governance on payout policy that supports the outcome model of payout policy.
First, the point estimates on Gov41 in the dividend and total payout ratio models in speci-
fications (1), (3), (4), and (6) are larger in magnitude than the uncorrected point estimates,
and about twice as large in the common law subsample. Using the local average treatment
effect (LATE) interpretation of IV, a one standard deviation change in firm-level governance
leads to a 6.8 × 0.866 = 5.89% increase in dividend payout in civil law countries and a
|10.6×−1.34| = 13.9% decrease in dividend payout in common law countries for firm-level
governance changes induced by peer effects. But, to be clear, it is difficult to isolate or
identify what part of Gov41 changes are due to peer effects. With respect to the fraction
of overall variation in payout ratios explained by Gov41 variation, these effects are fairly
strong at 25% of the payout ratio standard deviation in civil law countries and 35% of the
payout ratio standard deviation in common law countries. Second, the repurchase ratios lose
significance at conventional levels in civil law countries and become positive in the common
law countries and statistically significant at the 5% level. The positive sign in the common
law countries is consistent with an outcome model in which improved firm-level governance
facilitates a substitution from dividends to repurchases. Given that Skinner (2008) shows
that repurchase payout models estimated in two-year bins perform better than those esti-
mated with one-year bins, it could be that that one-year repurchase models are noisy and set
a high hurdle for rejecting the null of no relation. The coefficients on growth opportunities
(dA/A), size, and life-cycle (RE/BE) are qualitatively unchanged with the IV correction.
7There is no analytical correction for clustered standard errors with panel IV regressions (Schaffer, 2010),
so standard errors are block bootstrapped by firms 500 times to correct for within firm correlation in the
payout decision.
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The results on the internal margin about the level of payout via dividends, repurchases,
and in total provide support for different effects of firm-level governance on firm payout policy
that are consistent with the outcome model. In low legal regimes firm-level governance
increases result in higher payout in aggregate, primarily through an increase in dividend
payout, which is expected to be persistent. In high legal regimes increases in firm-level
governance result in the opposite effect and a decrease in dividend and aggregate payout, but
an increase in repurchases. These results are consistent with a substitution from dividends to
repurchases that provide greater flexibility to both firms and shareholders. These results are
robust to an IV approach to address the simultaneous choice of payout policy and firm-level
governance. With a better understanding of firm-level governance and payout policy on the
internal margin, Subsection 3.4.2 moves to the external margin.
3.4.2 External Margin
La Porta et al. (2000) frame the relation between country-level governance and payout in
terms of payout ratios, but does firm-level governance also affect investors’ ability to extract
payout at any level? That is, what is the impact of firm-level governance on the decision
to initiate or omit dividends? As well, now that share repurchases are an increasingly large
portion of payout, what is the impact of firm-level governance on the decision to repurchase?
For simplicity and ease of interpretation the baseline models test this relation with panel
linear probability models and later show the results of robustness tests with logit models in
Section 3.5. The dependent variables in these models are indicators for dividend payers (firm-
years with positive cash dividends) and repurchasers (firm-years with positive repurchases).
These models include the same set of independent variables as before on to proxy growth
opportunities (dA/A), size, and life-cycle (RE/BE). As well these propensity to pay models
add back profitability because the dependent variable no longer conditions on net income.
The dependent variable is now binary rather than deflated by net income, so these models
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also include profitability (E/A) and all available firm years without requiring positive net
income Y.8 All models control for unobserved heterogeneity with firm REs and year FEs,
and cluster standard errors at the firm level to correct within firm correlation in payout
decision.
Table 3.7 presents the regression results for the propensity to pay dividends with respect
to Gov41 (without IV) split on legal origin. In all four specifications the coefficients on the
payout predictors are consistent with Denis and Osobov (2008) and Von Eije and Megginson
(2008). Both dividends and repurchaser status are positively and statistically significantly
related to profitability in both low and high legal regimes. This positive relation is consistent
with the international dividends literature. All types of payout are non-increasing in growth
opportunities (dA/A), but only in the common law repurchase model is the coefficient are
statistically different from zero at conventional levels (i.e., here 10%). The strongest relations
are with size and life-cycle (RE/BE), for which all coefficients are positive and statistically
greater than zero at the 5% level or better, with five of the eight significant at the 1% level
or better. The consistency and statistical significance of the standard payout predictors are
weaker than in the international dividends literature, but this is not surprising given the
short panel in which 89.2% of firm-years are dividend payers and only 1.913% of firm-years
initiate dividends.
Turning to the link between dividend status and firm-level governance, there is a negative
relation in both civil and common law countries between firm-level governance and dividend
status, although the coefficient is only negative significant in common law countries. For
dividend payment in common law countries the Gov41 coefficient is small at -0.00149, but
with a 10.6 standard deviation for Gov41, a one standard deviation increase in firm-level
governance is associated with a |10.6×−0.00149| = 1.58% decrease in the probability of
8The results are qualitatively similar if firm-years with non-positive net income are dropped to mirror
the data used in the internal margin analysis.
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dividend payout. With respect to the repurchase decision the civil law Gov41 coefficient
point estimate is small and negative, but not statistically different from zero. The negative
coefficients in specifications (1)–(3) are difficult to reconcile with the internal margin results
in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 but are consistent with non-payers being able to delay (or at least not
accelerate) dividend initiation when they concede shareholder rights. Finally, with respect
to repurchases and firm-level governance in high legal the relation has the correct, positive
sign but is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The positive Gov41 coefficient
in the common law repurchase model is again consistent with the outcome model in which
increases in firm-level governance facilitate a substitution from dividends to repurchases in
the presence of high country-level governance.
The same possible endogeneity between firm-level governance and payout exist in the
propensity to pay models, so Table 3.8 repeats the Table 3.7 external margin payout analy-
sis with the Gov41 leave out average as an IV for Gov41. Again, these models include firm
REs, year FEs, and block bootstrap standard errors by firm 500 times to correct for within
firm correlation in the payout decision. There are slight changes to inferences with respect to
firm-level governance, but the results are generally consistent with models without the Gov41
IV. The coefficient on the standard payout predictors are consistent with the literature and
qualitatively unchanged from Table 3.7. With respect to firm-level governance in civil law
countries, both dividend and repurchase status are decreasing in firm-level governance and
now significant. Again, this is consistent with a governance model in which increases to share-
holder rights facilitate a delay in dividend initiation. As well, the Gov41 coefficient in the
common law dividend model is still negative significant, but much larger than before, so that
a one standard deviation increase in Gov41 is associated with a |10.6×−0.00718| = 7.61%
decrease in the probability of dividend payment. Finally, the coefficient on the common law
repurchase model is still positive, but still not significant at conventional levels. Although a
non-negative Gov41 coefficient in the common law repurchase model is not inconsistent with
CHAPTER 3. WHAT MATTERS MORE IN INTERNATIONAL PAYOUT? 164
a substitution from dividends to repurchases as firm-level governance improves in high legal
regimes, it paints a less convincing picture of substitution from dividends to repurchases.
The external margin results here seem at odds with the internal margin results. But
are consistent with a more nuanced outcome model where, on the margin, firms are able
to delay payout by improving shareholder rights. That the firm-level governance coefficient
in the common-law repurchase models are non-negative and the result is consistent with
substitution from dividends to repurchases as firm-level governance improves in strong legal
countries.
In conclusion, firm-level governance affects payout decisions on both the internal and
external margins, with respect to both dividends and repurchases, but the relations vary
across governance regimes. On the internal margin, increases in firm-level governance are
associated with increases in dividend and total payout ratios in low governance regimes
and decreases in dividend and total payout ratios in high governance regimes. However,
in high governance regimes there is evidence that improved firm-level governance facilitates
a substitution from dividends to repurchases. As long as shareholders have mechanisms to
control expropriation, repurchases provide the firm with flexibility and the shareholders with
a tax advantage. On the external margin, it appears that improved firm-level governance
has a uniformly negative effect on the probability of initiating or maintaining a dividend,
indicating that improved governance facilitates a delay in dividend initiation. Given the
near permanence of the dividend decision this finding is not surprising. However, on the
less permanent repurchase decision, firm-level governance has a non-negative impact on the
repurchase decision in strong governance regimes. These results are robust to the standard
payout predictors, controls for unobserved firm and year heterogeneity, an IV to correct
possible endogeneity in the firm-level governance choice, and standard errors clustered by
firm to control for within firm correlation in payout decisions.
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3.5 Robustness
This section investigates the robustness of results to alternative definitions of payout ratios,
alternative specifications to acknowledge that payout ratios are censored from below at zero
and that payout initiation or omission is a binary choice, and a more sophisticated measure of
high and low country-level governance. That these results are robust to alternatives indicates
that the relation between payout and firm- and country-level governance is unlikely due to
data or specification error.
3.5.1 Alternative Payout Ratio Denominators
The choice to scale dividends D, repurchases R, and total payout T by net income available
to common shareholders Y is consistent with the literature, but is not the only option. It
could be that the correct denominator is total assets A, sales S, or operating cash flows CF.
Untabulated results repeat the above analysis with total assets, sales, and operating cash
flows as the payout scaling factor and find qualitatively similar results.
3.5.2 Alternative Specifications
The main results use linear panel models, with or without Gov41 IV, for transparency and
ease of interpretation. Although these models succeed along these two dimensions, they are
not the exactly correct models. With respect to payout ratios, it isn’t possible for a firm to
pay out less than zero percent of net income. This is less of a concern for dividend payout
ratio models given that 90% of firm-years pay dividends, but it could matter for repurchase
payout ratio models, as only 54% of firm-years repurchase. By definition the payout ratios
are censored from below at zero, which means that the linear models are not correctly spec-
ified, although this is not uncommon in the literature.9 Given that firm REs models are
9La Porta et al. (2000) use linear panel models in their main payout ratio models
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acceptable in this sample, the correct model is a panel Tobit model censored from below
at zero, which properly incorporates the censored distribution for payout ratio. Table 3.9
replicates the IV payout ratio analyses from Table 3.6, but with a panel Tobit model cen-
sored from below at zero. The panel Tobit with firm REs and Gov41 IV requires the control
function approach (Wooldridge, 2002, page 612). Rather than use the first-stage regression
of Gov41ijct on Gov41−ijct and all other exogenous variables to generate a fitted Ĝov41i.t, the
control function approach includes the first-stage error term in the second stage to “control”
for the endogeneity of Gov41. Because the first-stage coefficients are estimated rather than
known, the first-stage error term is an estimated independent variable and to obtain the cor-
rect inferences second-stage standard errors are block bootstrapped by firms 500 times. The
block bootstrap also corrects for within firm correlation in the payout decision. All models
include firm REs and year FEs to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Table 3.9 presents
the second-stage results, which are qualitatively the same as the IV payout ratio results in
Table 3.6. However the one change is in the common law repurchase ratio model, where
the Gov41 coefficient is positive significant and three times as large as in the linear model
with IV. This continues to lend support to the notion that increased firm-level governance
leads to dividend payout increases in low legal regimes and substitution from dividends to
repurchases in high legal regimes. The inference from all other coefficients are unchanged, as
before the growth opportunities measure is the only other determinant that consistently has
the correct sign (negative) and statistically significance. That the results are qualitatively
unchanged indicates that the earlier results are not due to assuming a full, non-truncated
distribution for dividend, repurchase, and total payout ratios. Also, that the results are con-
sistent with dividend dependent variables and stronger for repurchase dependent variables is
not surprising, given that the repurchase ratios are much more censored than the dividend
ratios (i.e., 53.8% of the sample firm-years repurchase shares, which 89.2% of the sample
firm-years pay dividends).
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The linear assumption is also not exactly correct for the propensity to pay models in Ta-
bles 3.7 and 3.8, as the payer and repurchaser indicator variables can only take values of zero
or one. The correction here is a panel logit model, again with the control function approach.
All models include firm REs and year FEs, and standard errors are block bootstrapped by
firms 500 times. The block bootstrap also corrects for within firm correlation in the payout
decision. Again, the results in Table 3.10 are consistent with the baseline linear models,
without and with Gov41 IV in Tables 3.7 and 3.8. With the exception of the common law
repurchase model, all the Gov41 coefficient point estimates remain negative and significant.
The coefficients are larger, but the marginal effects are consistent with the linear models.
The Gov41 coefficient in the common law repurchase model is positive and consistent with
a substitution from dividends to repurchases, but not significant at conventional levels.
The alternative specifications with non-linear models in Table 3.9 and 3.10 are consistent
with the baseline panel linear results, without or with Gov41 IV, in Section 3.4. These
robustness checks indicate that the baseline results are not driven by either endogeneity
or misspecification. So far, all the evidence supports the La Porta et al. (2000) outcome
model with increases in all payout in civil law countries and substitution from dividends to
repurchases in common law countries.
3.5.3 Alternative Country-Level Governance Measures
It could be the case that the results on the relation between payout decisions and firm-
level governance conditional on country-level governance are an artifact of the definition of
high and low country-level governance. While the differences between common and civil
law countries are significant and pertain directly to the shareholder rights environment,
this subsection shows robustness to an alternative measure of country-level governance. La
Porta et al. (1997, 1998) propose the anti-director rights index as a more fundamentals-
based approach to country-level governance. More recently Spamann (2010) cites problems
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with the index, so the best alternative country-level governance measure is the Djankov
et al. (2008) anti-self-dealing index. Djankov et al. (2008) design the anti-self-dealing index
from the ground up to measure the likelihood of shareholder expropriation through related
party transaction. Further, the anti-self-dealing index is based on both de jure and de facto
laws and enforcement in the country. This is a good alternative to legal origin to measure
country-level shareholder rights and the risk of shareholder expropriation.
The anti-self-dealing index is a cardinal index that lies between zero and one. To provide
a starker contrast between high and low country-level governance (and minimize concerns
about ordinal versus cardinal), the top tercile of the anti-self-dealing index becomes high
governance, the bottom tercile becomes low governance, and the middle tercile drops out
of the sample. Tables 3.11 and 3.12 repeat the linear panel payout ratio and propensity
to pay models with Gov41 IV from Tables 3.6 and 3.8, respectively, but with splits on
top and bottom anti-self-dealing terciles, rather than common and civil law legal origins.
Again, the results are qualitatively similar and suggest that the baseline results are not due
to the dividing line between high and low country-level governance. In fact, the more so-
phisticated country-level governance measure makes an even stronger case for the outcome
model with substitution from dividends to repurchases in strong governance regimes. In low
anti-self-dealing countries dividend and total payout ratios are strongly increasing in Gov41
[Table 3.11, specifications (1) and (3)], while in high anti-self-dealing countries there is a
clear substitution from dividends to repurchases with no net change in total payout ratios
[Table 3.11, specifications (4)–(6)]. Moving to the external margin and the payout initiation
decision, in low anti-self-dealing countries both dividend and repurchase payout are decreas-
ing in Gov41 [Table 3.12, specifications (1) and (2)]. In the high anti-self-dealing countries
there isn’t a significant relation between Gov41 and dividend payout, but there is a strong
relation between Gov41 and repurchase initiation so that a one standard deviation increase
in Gov41 is related to a 10.6 × 0.0150 = 15.9% increase in the probability of repurchase
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[Table 3.12, specification (4)].
In all, the robustness tests provide additional support for the La Porta et al. (2000) out-
come model (i.e., higher dividend payout ratios in low legal environments and substitution
from dividends to repurchases in high legal environments) are not driven by endogeneity,
payout variable definitions, model misspecification, or country-level governance variable def-
initions. Although Aggarwal et al. (2011) show that Gov41 is a relevant measure of firm-level
governance, one last concern is that a linear combination of governance characteristics may
not accurately measure rights that really matter to shareholders. To address this concern
Section 3.6 adds another firm-level governance measure that is likely to have more teeth: the
service of an independent U.S. director.
3.6 Alternative Governance Measures
Although the use of additive governance measures is common in the finance literature (Gom-
pers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009), the equal weighting of 41 indicator variables is suf-
ficiently arbitrary. It would be better to hand-select several of the individual attributes, as
do Bebchuk et al. (2009), but these data are not available.10 Although, Gov41 is less suscep-
tible than the Gompers et al. (2003) G index to de facto versus de jure arguments because
it is based on performance along four major dimensions rather than strictly anti-takeover
provisions, an alternative firm-level governance measure would lend even more credibility to
these results and alleviate concerns about “check the box” governance measures.
One easily observable attribute that should only have de jure effects on firm financial
policy is the presence of an independent U.S. director on a non-U.S. firm’s board. There is
a sizable literature on positive outcomes associated with independent, outside directors. See
Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) for a more complete survey. In an international setting Dahya
10Aggarwal et al. (2011) provide only the consolidated Gov41 measure.
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et al. (2002) study the Cadbury Committee’s 1992 Code of Best Practice recommendation
that boards of U.K. corporations include at least three outside directors and separate the
chairman and CEO positions. Consistent with their expectations about improved governance
with more outside directors they find that after the Code CEO turnover increases, the
negative relation between CEO turnover and performance strengthens, and this increased
sensitivity is concentrated in Code adopters. Further, Aggarwal et al. (2011) find that foreign
institutional ownership, particularly U.S. institutional ownership, leads to changes in firm-
level governance and outcomes, such as CEO turnovers and improved valuations. From
the evidence on governance attributes of both independent directors and U.S. institutional
investors, it stands to reason that U.S. directors provide an alternative measure of firm-level
governance based on a clear channel, rather than the accumulation of 41 small characteristics.
The presence of a U.S. outside director provides an alternative firm-level governance measure
that is less susceptible to additive governance measure critiques and not mechanically related
to Gov41. In untabulated results the correlation between the U.S. director indicator variable
and Gov41 is nominally 20% (slightly lower in the common and civil law subsets) and the
correlation between the changes in both is nominally 2% (slightly higher in the common law
subset and slightly lower in the civil law subset).
Bureau Van Dyck (BVD) data provide information on directors on boards of non-U.S.
firms, including the director’s home country. The U.S. Director indicator variable is one if a
firm-year has at least one U.S. director on its board of directors, and zero otherwise. As is the
case with firm-level governance measure Gov41, the relation between U.S. Dir and payout
ratios is possibly endogenous because director and payout choices are made simultaneously.
It could be that high payout ratio firms attract U.S. directors or that U.S. directors create
high payout ratio firms. This requires the same instrumental variable identification strategy
used with Gov41 and the following analyses instrument U.S. Director with the average of
the U.S. Director indicator variable for all other firms in the same country-year. This
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identification strategy requires that the only way that U.S. directorship at the country-level
can affect payout is by influencing the appointment of a U.S. director.
Table 3.13 repeats the main IV analysis from Table 3.6 in the subsample of firm-years
with both Gov41 and BVD information on directors. Note that the sample is smaller here
than in Table 3.6 because there is only partial overlap between Gov41 and BVD data. The
results are qualitatively the same as before and improved firm-level governance results in
higher dividend and total payout in low legal regimes, and evidence of a substitution from
dividends to repurchases in high legal regimes. With the 25% smaller sample the statistical
significance is weaker, but firm-level governance is still statistically significant at better than
the 10% level in all but the common law repurchase payout ratio regression, and there are
just outside the 10% level. Table 3.14 repeats the external margin IV analysis from Table 3.8,
again in the subsample of firm-years with both Gov41 and BVD information on directors.
Again, the results are qualitatively unchanged. There is no indication of an increase in the
propensity to payout, with the exception of an increase in the propensity to repurchase in
high governance regimes, where the firm-level governance coefficient is positive significant at
the 7% level (t = 1.82). One remaining concern could be that these results are driven by
some peculiarity of the sample or identification strategy that mechanically generates these
results. However, in untabulated results repeating this U.S. director exercise with U.K.
directors finds no relation.
Another benefit of the U.S. director firm-level governance measure is that it is free of
the data availability limits of Aggarwal et al. (2011)’s Gov41, which is only available for the
largest firms in a short panel over 2004–2008. Table 3.15 repeats the analysis of Table 3.13 for
all firm-years with BVD data. This increases the sample fivefold (i.e., from 6,285 firm-years
with positive Y and non-missing Gov41, to 32,7168 firm-years over 2004–2011 with positive
Y and non-missing board data). To some degree this is an out of sample in that the sample
is larger in both the cross section (i.e., six new countries and more firms within each country)
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and the time series (i.e., three more years from 2009–2011), and uses a firm-level governance
measure that is not directly correlated with the main firm-level governance measure. Again,
Table 3.15 confirms the main conclusion that the response to firm-level governance depends
on the country-level governance. Overall there is continued support for the La Porta et al.
(2000) outcome model with increased dividends in low legal regimes and substitution from
dividends to repurchases in high legal regimes.
Finally, Table 3.16 repeats the linear propensity to pay models in the full sample with
BVD board data. Because for the propensity to pay models there is no positive Y restriction,
the sample increases even more from 6,901 to 44,458. Again, and the results are again
consistent with the outcome model. On the external margin all sorts of payout are non-
increasing in firm-level governance, even significant negative for dividends in both high and
low legal regimes, with the exception of repurchases in high legal regimes, which are strongly
increasing in firm-level governance [Table 3.16, specification (4)]. In all, the two samples
with the alternative firm-level governance measure continue to lend support to the outcome
model of payout policy that varies with country-level governance.
3.7 Conclusion
Tests of firm payout policy in a panel of 1,828 firms 20 countries over 2004–2008 provide
evidence in support of the La Porta et al. (2000) outcome model in both firm- and country-
level governance. In low legal regimes increases in firm-level governance are related with
increases in dividend and total payout ratios. New share repurchase ratios also increase
in firm-level governance, but not consistently at conventional significance levels. This is
consistent with La Porta et al. (2000)’s outcome model, in which dividends are the outcome
of strong shareholder rights. Conditional on relatively weak shareholder rights at the country-
level (i.e., civil law countries or countries in the bottom tercile of the anti-self-dealing index),
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shareholders use additional rights to extract higher payout. Further the economic size of the
effect is significant, with a 5.89% (percentage point) increase in dividend payout ratios per
standard deviation change in Gov41.
The opposite occurs with firms with high shareholder rights at the country-level (i.e.,
common law countries or countries in the top tercile of the anti-self-dealing index), share-
holders use additional shareholder rights to substitute from dividends to repurchases. A
different way to think of this relation is that given higher shareholder rights in a strong
shareholder rights environment, shareholders are comfortable with reduced stable dividends
and higher discretionary payout via repurchases. Given the financial flexibility that divi-
dends afford the firm and the tax advantages that repurchases afford shareholders in timing
taxable events (and possibly marginal tax rates), the results here are also consistent with
the La Porta et al. (2000) outcome model.
On the external margin in low legal regimes, with respect to payout initiation, both
dividends and repurchases are less likely as firm-level governance improves. That is, the
coefficients on Gov41 are either small and negative or not statistically different from zero.
While this is not completely consistent with the outcome model, it is consistent with im-
proved firm-level governance facilitating a delayed initiation of payout, which is a costly
governance mechanism for firms with valuable growth opportunities.
The same occurs for increases in Gov41 in high governance regimes, but only for div-
idends. For repurchases the loading on Gov41 is positive and significant, although not at
conventional levels in all models. This is consistent with an interpretation of the outcome
model in which improvements to firm-level governance, conditional on high country-level
governance, facilitate a shift from rigid dividends to flexible repurchases.
Throughout, the results are robust to firm REs and year FEs to control for unobserved
heterogeneity at the firm and year level, standard errors clustered at the firm-level to control
for within firm correlation in payout decisions, an IV approach to correct for the simultaneity
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in the payout and firm-level governance decisions, alternative specifications, and alternative
firm- and country-level governance measures. In all, the results are consistent with the liter-
ature on the value of firm-level governance across the spectrum of country-level governance
regimes. Improvements to firm-level governance provide value through observable channels,
although the exact mechanism differs depending on the country-level governance regime.
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Table 3.3: Panel linear payout ratio models comparing legal origin, Djankov et al. (2008)
country-level, and Aggarwal et al. (2011) firm-level governance. D/Y is cash common divi-
dends scaled by net income. Net income (Y) must be positive to avoid negative payout ra-
tios. Anti-self-dealing is Djankov et al. (2008)’s country-level governance measure. Gov41 is
Aggarwal et al. (2011)’s firm-level governance measure. dA/A is change in total assets scaled
by total assets. Size is percentile ranking by total assets within each country-year. RE/BE
is retained earnings scaled by book value of equity. All ratios are trimmed at 1% in both
tails. Models include firm REs, year FEs, and cluster robust standard errors by firm.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D/Y D/Y D/Y D/Y D/Y




Gov41 0.263∗∗∗ -0.0730 0.0941
(3.36) (-0.75) (1.16)
dA/A -0.334∗∗∗ -0.322∗∗∗ -0.315∗∗∗ -0.333∗∗∗ -0.325∗∗∗
(-6.66) (-6.46) (-6.32) (-6.62) (-6.48)
RE/BE -0.0173 -0.0188 -0.0186 -0.0172 -0.0187
(-0.64) (-0.69) (-0.68) (-0.63) (-0.69)
Size -0.165 -0.150 -0.174 -0.161 -0.156
(-1.68) (-1.52) (-1.74) (-1.62) (-1.58)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6285 6285 6285 6285 6285
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.4: Univariate tests of changes in dividend payout ratio by firm-and country-level
governance. Values are the mean five-year change in dividend payout ratio (D/Y) by terciles
of five-year change in Gov41 and legal origin. D/Y is cash common dividends scaled by net
income. Net income (Y) must be positive to avoid negative payout ratios. Gov41 is Aggarwal
et al. (2011)’s firm-level governance measure. All ratios are trimmed at 1% in both tails.
(1) (2)
Civil Law Common Law
Low 5-year Change in Gov41 21.30 18.98
High 5-year Change in Gov41 38.91 7.790
Observations 333 101
p-value of t-test 0.0453 0.3333
mean coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
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Table 3.5: Panel linear payout ratio models using Aggarwal et al. (2011) firm-level gover-
nance. D/Y is cash common dividends scaled by net income. R/Y is repurchases scaled by
net income. T/Y is total payout (cash common dividends plus share repurchases) scaled
by net income. Net income (Y) must be positive to avoid negative payout ratios. Gov41 is
Aggarwal et al. (2011)’s firm-level governance measure. dA/A is change in total assets scaled
by total assets. Size is percentile ranking by total assets within each country-year. RE/BE
is retained earnings scaled by book value of equity. All ratios are trimmed at 1% in both
tails. Models include firm REs, year FEs, and cluster robust standard errors by firm.
Civil Law Common Law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D/Y R/Y T/Y D/Y R/Y T/Y
Gov41 0.381∗∗ 0.435∗ 0.823∗∗∗ -0.469∗∗ 0.0160 -0.409∗
(2.71) (2.46) (3.69) (-3.23) (0.14) (-2.28)
dA/A -0.300∗∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗ -0.666∗∗∗ -0.342∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗ -0.555∗∗∗
(-3.83) (-5.20) (-5.85) (-5.17) (-2.60) (-4.92)
Size -0.176 -0.127 -0.304∗ 0.0204 0.122 0.137
(-1.64) (-1.61) (-2.26) (0.10) (1.37) (0.62)
RE/BE -0.0264 0.0710∗∗∗ 0.0453 -0.0167 0.0113 -0.00363
(-0.87) (3.46) (1.54) (-0.54) (1.07) (-0.12)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4068 4068 4068 2217 2217 2217
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.6: Panel linear payout ratio models using Aggarwal et al. (2011) firm-level governance
with IV. D/Y is cash common dividends scaled by net income. R/Y is repurchases scaled
by net income. T/Y is total payout (cash common dividends plus share repurchases) scaled
by net income. Net income (Y) must be positive to avoid negative payout ratios. Gov41 is
Aggarwal et al. (2011)’s firm-level governance measure. The instrument for Gov41 is the
mean Gov41 for all other firms in the same country-industry-year, where industry is Fama
and French (1997) 12-industry. dA/A is change in total assets scaled by total assets. Size
is percentile ranking by total assets within each country-year. RE/BE is retained earnings
scaled by book value of equity. All ratios are trimmed at 1% in both tails. Models include
firm REs, year FEs, and block bootstrap on firms 500 times.
Civil Law Common Law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D/Y R/Y T/Y D/Y R/Y T/Y
Gov41 0.866∗∗ 0.282 1.174∗∗∗ -1.311∗∗∗ 0.254∗ -1.065∗∗∗
(3.09) (1.41) (3.33) (-7.06) (2.12) (-5.20)
dA/A -0.308∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗ -0.682∗∗∗ -0.360∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗ -0.611∗∗∗
(-4.12) (-5.31) (-6.13) (-4.54) (-2.86) (-5.07)
Size -0.108 -0.140 -0.249 0.215 0.0583 0.278
(-1.03) (-1.75) (-1.78) (1.02) (0.63) (1.27)
RE/BE -0.0291 0.0749∗∗ 0.0461 -0.0254 0.0134 -0.0108
(-0.83) (3.14) (1.33) (-0.69) (0.99) (-0.29)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3910 3910 3910 2167 2167 2167
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.7: Panel linear propensity to pay models using Aggarwal et al. (2011) firm-level
governance. Dividend payers (repurchasers) have positive cash common dividends (share
repurchases) during the fiscal year. Gov41 is Aggarwal et al. (2011)’s firm-level governance
measure. E/A is earnings before interest scaled by total assets. dA/A is change in total
assets scaled by total assets. Size is percentile ranking by total assets within each country-
year. RE/BE is retained earnings scaled by book value of equity. All ratios are trimmed at
1% in both tails. Models include firm REs, year FEs, and cluster robust standard errors by
firm.
Civil Law Common Law
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Div Payer Repurchaser Div Payer Repurchaser
Gov41 -0.000303 -0.000197 -0.00149∗ 0.00167
(-0.43) (-0.14) (-2.39) (1.33)
E/A 0.00356∗∗∗ 0.00300 0.00251∗∗ 0.00257∗
(3.72) (1.72) (2.99) (2.36)
dA/A -0.000301 -0.000309 -0.0000498 -0.000814
(-0.90) (-0.61) (-0.25) (-1.84)
Size 0.00531∗∗∗ 0.00263∗∗ 0.00830∗∗∗ 0.00595∗∗∗
(7.12) (2.86) (7.77) (5.70)
RE/BE 0.000159∗ 0.000208∗ 0.0000856∗ 0.000142∗∗
(2.31) (2.34) (2.45) (3.28)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4351 4351 2550 2550
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.8: Panel linear propensity to pay models using Aggarwal et al. (2011) firm-level
governance with IV. Dividend payers (repurchasers) have positive cash common dividends
(share repurchases) during the fiscal year. Gov41 is Aggarwal et al. (2011)’s firm-level gov-
ernance measure. E/A is earnings before interest scaled by total assets. The instrument for
Gov41 is the mean Gov41 for all other firms in the same country-industry-year, where in-
dustry is Fama and French (1997) 12-industry. dA/A is change in total assets scaled by total
assets. Size is percentile ranking by total assets within each country-year. RE/BE is retained
earnings scaled by book value of equity. All ratios are trimmed at 1% in both tails. Models
include firm REs, year FEs, and block bootstrap on firms 500 times.
Civil Law Common Law
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Div Payer Net Rep’r Div Payer Net Rep’r
Gov41 -0.00420∗ -0.0117∗∗ -0.00862∗∗∗ 0.00156
(-2.43) (-3.24) (-5.84) (0.76)
E/A 0.00409∗∗∗ 0.00386∗ 0.00257∗∗ 0.00243∗
(3.57) (2.15) (2.86) (2.14)
dA/A -0.000258 -0.000134 -0.0000945 -0.000835
(-0.67) (-0.26) (-0.47) (-1.88)
Size 0.00511∗∗∗ 0.00153 0.00988∗∗∗ 0.00630∗∗∗
(6.73) (1.56) (8.99) (5.63)
RE/BE 0.000199 0.000216 0.0000800 0.000153∗∗
(1.52) (1.60) (1.55) (2.65)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4187 4187 2494 2494
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.9: Panel Tobit payout ratio models using Aggarwal et al. (2011) firm-level governance
with IV. D/Y is cash common dividends scaled by net income. R/Y is repurchases scaled
by net income. T/Y is total payout (cash common dividends plus share repurchases) scaled
by net income. Net income (Y) must be positive to avoid negative payout ratios. Gov41 is
Aggarwal et al. (2011)’s firm-level governance measure. First stage error is the residual from
the first-stage regression of Gov41 on all excluded instruments. The instrument for Gov41 is
the mean Gov41 for all other firms in the same country-industry-year, where industry is Fama
and French (1997) 12-industry. dA/A is change in total assets scaled by total assets. Size
is percentile ranking by total assets within each country-year. RE/BE is retained earnings
scaled by book value of equity. All ratios are trimmed at 1% in both tails. Models include
firm REs, year FEs, and block bootstrap on firms 500 times.
Civil Law Common Law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D/Y R/Y T/Y D/Y R/Y T/Y
Gov41 0.561∗ 0.220 1.255∗∗∗ -1.108∗∗∗ 0.709∗ -0.774∗∗∗
(2.31) (0.64) (3.78) (-5.42) (2.39) (-3.40)
dA/A -0.320∗∗∗ -0.501∗∗∗ -0.696∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗ -0.433∗∗ -0.653∗∗∗
(-3.54) (-4.72) (-5.76) (-4.71) (-2.93) (-4.75)
Size -0.00687 -0.105 -0.159 0.369 0.673∗∗ 0.435
(-0.06) (-0.79) (-1.07) (1.62) (2.80) (1.72)
RE/BE 0.00129 0.232∗∗∗ 0.0918 -0.0167 0.0374 -0.00314
(0.03) (4.13) (1.89) (-0.45) (0.90) (-0.08)
1st Stage Err -0.532 -0.106 -1.311∗∗ 1.346∗∗∗ -0.824 0.778
(-1.21) (-0.24) (-2.64) (3.61) (-1.52) (1.72)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3910 3910 3910 2167 2167 2167
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.10: Panel logit propensity to pay models using Aggarwal et al. (2011) firm-level
governance with IV. Dividend payers (repurchasers) have positive cash common dividends
(share repurchases) during the fiscal year. Gov41 is Aggarwal et al. (2011)’s firm-level gover-
nance measure. First stage error is the residual from the first-stage regression of Gov41 on all
excluded instruments. The instrument for Gov41 is the mean Gov41 for all other firms in the
same country-industry-year, where industry is Fama and French (1997) 12-industry. dA/A is
change in total assets scaled by total assets. Size is percentile ranking by total assets within
each country-year. RE/BE is retained earnings scaled by book value of equity. All ratios are
trimmed at 1% in both tails. Models include firm REs, year FEs, and block bootstrap on
firms 500 times.
Civil Law Common Law
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Div Payer Repurchaser Div Payer Repurchaser
Gov41 -0.121∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗ 0.0179
(-3.50) (-3.68) (-3.10) (1.31)
E/A 0.0927∗∗ 0.0408 0.0948∗ 0.0276∗
(2.71) (1.92) (2.40) (2.30)
dA/A -0.00530 -0.00282 -0.00148 -0.00688
(-0.47) (-0.45) (-0.15) (-1.86)
Size 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0237 0.275∗∗∗ 0.0557∗∗∗
(6.46) (1.68) (5.69) (5.23)
RE/BE 0.00848 0.00696 0.00641 0.00153∗
(1.04) (1.70) (1.72) (2.03)
1st Stage Err 0.149∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗ -0.0102
(3.00) (3.72) (2.74) (-0.47)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4187 4187 2494 2494
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.11: Panel linear payout ratio models using Aggarwal et al. (2011) firm-level gov-
ernance with IV split on Djankov et al. (2008) anti-self-dealing terciles rather than legal
origin. D/Y is cash common dividends scaled by net income. R/Y is repurchases scaled by
net income. T/Y is total payout (cash common dividends plus share repurchases) scaled
by net income. Net income (Y) must be positive to avoid negative payout ratios. Gov41 is
Aggarwal et al. (2011)’s firm-level governance measure. The instrument for Gov41 is the
mean Gov41 for all other firms in the same country-industry-year, where industry is Fama
and French (1997) 12-industry. dA/A is change in total assets scaled by total assets. Size
is percentile ranking by total assets within each country-year. RE/BE is retained earnings
scaled by book value of equity. All ratios are trimmed at 1% in both tails. Models include
firm REs, year FEs, and block bootstrap on firms 500 times.
Low Anti-Self-Dealing High Anti-Self-Dealing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D/Y R/Y T/Y D/Y R/Y T/Y
Gov41 0.866∗∗ 0.282 1.174∗∗∗ -0.944 0.828∗ -0.0564
(2.93) (1.39) (3.49) (-1.67) (2.57) (-0.09)
dA/A -0.308∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗ -0.682∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗ -0.216∗ -0.592∗∗∗
(-3.92) (-5.34) (-6.11) (-4.09) (-2.21) (-4.28)
Size -0.108 -0.140 -0.249 0.175 0.0625 0.241
(-1.02) (-1.75) (-1.83) (0.83) (0.65) (1.07)
RE/BE -0.0291 0.0749∗∗ 0.0461 -0.0277 0.0117 -0.0137
(-0.84) (3.20) (1.30) (-0.74) (0.75) (-0.36)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3910 3910 3910 1646 1646 1646
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.12: Panel linear propensity to pay models using Aggarwal et al. (2011) firm-level
governance with IV split on Djankov et al. (2008) anti-self-dealing terciles rather than le-
gal origin. Dividend payers (repurchasers) have positive cash common dividends (share re-
purchases) during the fiscal year. Gov41 is Aggarwal et al. (2011)’s firm-level governance
measure. The instrument for Gov41 is the mean Gov41 for all other firms in the same
country-industry-year, where industry is Fama and French (1997) 12-industry. E/A is earn-
ings before interest scaled by total assets. dA/A is change in total assets scaled by total
assets. Size is percentile ranking by total assets within each country-year. RE/BE is retained
earnings scaled by book value of equity. All ratios are trimmed at 1% in both tails. Models
include firm REs, year FEs, and block bootstrap on firms 500 times.
Low Anti-Self-Dealing High Anti-Self-Dealing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Div Payer Repurchaser Div Payer Repurchaser
Gov41 -0.00420∗ -0.0117∗∗∗ 0.000742 0.0150∗∗
(-2.54) (-3.32) (0.33) (2.99)
E/A 0.00409∗∗∗ 0.00386∗ 0.00290∗∗ 0.00134
(3.63) (2.10) (2.75) (0.97)
dA/A -0.000258 -0.000134 -0.000153 -0.000341
(-0.73) (-0.26) (-0.67) (-0.71)
Size 0.00511∗∗∗ 0.00153 0.00901∗∗∗ 0.00495∗∗∗
(7.02) (1.49) (8.40) (4.15)
RE/BE 0.000199 0.000216 0.0000813 0.000132∗
(1.43) (1.63) (1.59) (2.21)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4187 4187 1888 1888
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.13: Panel linear payout ratio models using U.S. director indicator variable for firm-
level governance for firm-years with non-missing Gov41. D/Y is cash common dividends
scaled by net income. R/Y is repurchases scaled by net income. T/Y is total payout (cash
common dividends plus share repurchases) scaled by net income. U.S. director is one if firm
has one or more U.S.-based directors that year. The instrument for U.S. director is the
mean U.S. director for all other firms in the same country-year. dA/A is change in total
assets scaled by total assets. Size is percentile ranking by total assets within each country-
year. RE/BE is retained earnings scaled by book value of equity. All ratios are trimmed at
1% in both tails. Models include firm REs, year FEs, and block bootstrap on firms 500 times.
Civil Law Common Law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D/Y R/Y T/Y D/Y R/Y T/Y
US Dir 92.01 52.57∗∗ 135.5∗ -80.07 35.44 -88.85∗
(1.61) (2.79) (2.29) (-1.77) (1.56) (-2.18)
dA/A -0.322∗∗ -0.464∗∗∗ -0.781∗∗∗ -0.217∗ -0.237∗ -0.516∗∗
(-3.00) (-5.64) (-5.37) (-2.47) (-2.45) (-3.11)
Size -0.379∗∗ -0.163∗ -0.533∗∗∗ 0.0462 0.0255 0.198
(-2.92) (-2.20) (-3.37) (0.16) (0.20) (0.64)
RE/BE -0.0425 0.0691∗ 0.0215 0.00893 0.0296 0.0503∗
(-1.21) (2.43) (0.45) (0.42) (1.39) (2.15)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2832 2832 2832 1574 1574 1574
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.14: Panel linear propensity to pay models using U.S. director indicator variable for
firm-level governance for firm-years with non-missing Gov41. Dividend payers (repurchasers)
have positive cash common dividends (share repurchases) during the fiscal year. U.S. director
is one if firm has one or more U.S.-based directors that year. The instrument for U.S. director
is the mean U.S. director for all other firms in the same country-year. E/A is earnings before
interest scaled by total assets. dA/A is change in total assets scaled by total assets. Size
is percentile ranking by total assets within each country-year. RE/BE is retained earnings
scaled by book value of equity. All ratios are trimmed at 1% in both tails. Models include
firm REs, year FEs, and block bootstrap on firms 500 times.
Civil Law Common Law
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Div Payer Repurchaser Div Payer Repurchaser
US Dir 0.0701 0.114 -0.382 0.390
(1.24) (0.51) (-1.31) (1.82)
E/A 0.00511∗∗∗ 0.00166 0.000190 0.00186
(3.69) (0.82) (0.16) (1.07)
dA/A -0.000395 0.000422 0.0000131 -0.000712
(-0.94) (0.68) (0.05) (-1.29)
Size 0.00521∗∗∗ 0.00273∗∗ 0.00865∗∗∗ 0.00467∗∗
(6.29) (2.62) (5.19) (3.19)
RE/BE 0.000147 0.000190 0.000171∗ 0.000127
(0.79) (0.90) (2.08) (1.40)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3021 3021 1771 1771
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.15: Panel linear payout ratio models using U.S. director indicator variable for firm-
level governance for all available firm-years. D/Y is cash common dividends scaled by net
income. R/Y is repurchases scaled by net income. T/Y is total payout (cash common div-
idends plus share repurchases) scaled by net income. U.S. director is one if firm has one
or more U.S.-based directors that year. The instrument for U.S. director is the mean U.S.
director for all other firms in the same country-year. dA/A is change in total assets scaled
by total assets. Size is percentile ranking by total assets within each country-year. RE/BE
is retained earnings scaled by book value of equity. All ratios are trimmed at 1% in both
tails. Models include firm REs, year FEs, and block bootstrap on firms 500 times.
Civil Law Common Law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D/Y R/Y T/Y D/Y R/Y T/Y
US Dir 22.87 21.88∗∗ 43.98∗∗ -62.11∗∗ 22.90∗ -35.13
(1.69) (2.80) (2.78) (-2.63) (2.07) (-1.56)
dA/A -0.462∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -0.714∗∗∗ -0.374∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.567∗∗∗
(-14.40) (-7.94) (-16.36) (-5.78) (-7.43) (-7.46)
Size 0.0675∗∗ -0.0197 0.0463 0.402∗∗∗ 0.0244 0.428∗∗∗
(2.87) (-1.39) (1.68) (9.35) (0.83) (8.04)
RE/BE 0.0137∗∗ 0.00752∗ 0.0212∗∗ 0.00316 0.000956 0.00402
(3.10) (2.37) (2.83) (1.65) (1.06) (1.55)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21496 21496 21496 11222 11222 11222
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.16: Panel linear propensity to pay models using U.S. director indicator variable
for firm-level governance for all available firm-years. Dividend payers (repurchasers) have
positive cash common dividends (share repurchases) during the fiscal year. U.S. director is
one if firm has one or more U.S.-based directors that year. The instrument for U.S. director
is the mean U.S. director for all other firms in the same country-year. E/A is earnings before
interest scaled by total assets. dA/A is change in total assets scaled by total assets. Size
is percentile ranking by total assets within each country-year. RE/BE is retained earnings
scaled by book value of equity. All ratios are trimmed at 1% in both tails. Models include
firm REs, year FEs, and block bootstrap on firms 500 times.
Civil Law Common Law
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Div Payer Repurchaser Div Payer Repurchaser
US Dir -0.307∗ -0.133 -0.686∗ 0.639∗∗∗
(-2.42) (-1.02) (-2.30) (4.11)
E/A 0.00447∗∗∗ 0.00134∗∗∗ 0.000868 0.000884∗∗
(11.38) (3.45) (0.86) (2.97)
dA/A -0.0000743 -0.000654∗∗∗ -0.000639 -0.000612∗∗∗
(-0.53) (-3.49) (-1.35) (-3.77)
Size 0.00593∗∗∗ 0.00321∗∗∗ 0.00693∗∗∗ 0.00223∗∗∗
(26.66) (15.23) (13.53) (9.10)
RE/BE 0.000137∗∗ 0.0000593∗∗ -1.15e-08 0.00000244
(3.06) (3.08) (-0.01) (1.40)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25893 25893 18565 18565
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Chapter 4
World Dividends and Tax Shocks
4.1 Introduction
Dividend taxation reduces the net return to investors, which raises firms’ cost of capital and,
in aggregate, reduces the level of capital within a country. Given that firms are aware that
their shareholders bear such costs, then this could induce firms to retain earnings rather
than pay out earnings as dividends. However, Jensen (1986)’s free cash flow theory predicts
that retained earnings are more likely to be misspent by senior management, so that higher
dividend tax rates could lead to inefficient investment. From a policy perspective, dividend
tax rates balance the level of capital against efficient investment. This issue is further
complicated by the often differential treatment of capital gains and dividends, the rise in
share repurchases in the U.S. (Skinner, 2008) and internationally (Von Eije and Megginson,
2008), and that dividend (and capital gains tax) cuts accrue largely to the wealthiest citizens.
In light of this trade-off between efficiency and equity, it is difficult to say what is the correct
level of dividend taxation, either absolutely or relative to capital gains taxation, but an
understanding of the relation between dividend taxes and payout is a first step that has not
been taken in an international panel.
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For an international panel of 220,609 firm-year observations across 30,071 firms, and
30 countries from 1990 through 2010, the relation between dividends and dividend taxes is
consistent with the “old view” of dividend taxation and shows that firms respond to dividend
tax changes. Specifically, firms alter payout policy to reduce the tax load on investors. The
changes to dividend payout in response to tax law changes are economically meaningful. For
example, around large changes (i.e., one standard deviation) in dividend taxation there is
an average change in the proportion of dividend payers in the population of between 1%
and 4%. Using the continuous variation in dividend tax rates rather than large shocks, the
results are less pronounced, but still a 1% (percentage point) increase in the dividend tax
rate results in a 0.151% decrease in the propensity to pay dividends.
There are generally two views on dividend taxation and how it affects a firm’s financial
policy and Auerbach (2002) provides a more thorough survey of both. Under the “old view”
the firm finances projects with new share issues. Because dividend taxes reduce the return
that shareholders receive, dividend taxes also reduce net savings, so that when dividend tax
rates fall shareholders receive a higher net return and therefore save more, so that firms
invest more and pay out more in the future. Poterba and Summers (1985) find support
for the old view of dividend taxation using data from the U.K. and Poterba (2004) reports
similar results using data from the U.S.
The alternative is the “new view”. Under the new view firms finance investments entirely
out of retained earnings, rather than new share issues, so that dividend taxation is irrelevant
to the firm. The original work on the old and new views is complicated by the rise of share
repurchases as another means of returning capital to shareholders. Nonetheless, the original
theory still provides a context to understand the relation between dividend taxation and
firm financial policy.
Tests of the old versus new views examine the relation between firm-level dividends and
country-level dividend taxation. Here the identification strategy is fairly straightforward
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because, relative to any given firm, dividend taxation at the country-level is exogenous
so that dividend tax rates can be an independent variable in standard dividend payout
model models (Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo et al., 2006; Skinner, 2008; Denis and
Osobov, 2008; Von Eije and Megginson, 2008). One possible concern with this identification
strategy is that dividend taxation responds to prevailing economic conditions, but to the
extent that these impact the firm, they can be controlled for with the standard dividend
predictors of profitability, growth opportunities, size, and ratio of earned to contributed
equity (i.e., firm life-cycle). As well, firm and year fixed effects (FEs) are included to control
for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm, country, and year levels. This allows regressions of
payout decision and payout level on either indicator variables for large shocks to dividend
taxation or continuous measures of dividend taxation (absolute and relative to capital gains
taxation). An added benefit of a large panel of international data is that it permits further
investigation of impact of country-level governance on payout changes following tax shocks.
The U.S. sample receives ample attention in the payout and tax shocks studies (Chetty
and Saez, 2004, 2005; Blouin et al., 2004; Julio and Ikenberry, 2004; Nam et al., 2004),
particularly around the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003.
Although there are some minor differences in the findings of these studies, which Chetty
and Saez (2005) are able to mostly reconcile, the results generally support the old view of
dividend taxation with a general upward trend in both the number of dividend payers and
the level of dividend payout in the U.S. following the JGTRRA. However, there is slight
conflict with 1986 Tax Relief Act (TRA), which doesn’t support the old view of dividend
taxation in which decreases in dividend taxation lead to increase in dividend payout. This
leaves the U.S. data with a sample size of two and somewhat mixed results. To address these
concerns about the small sample size and somewhat mixed results this chapter examines the
impact of tax changes on dividends in an international panel. The benefit of expanding the
focus to many countries is an increase in sample size (i.e., the number of tax changes), as
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well as an increase in the diversity of tax changes (i.e., the direction and magnitude of tax
changes). These benefits come some drawbacks. For example, the U.S. data are generally
higher quality with better information on dividend type and the ability to focus on specific
dates and special dividends, while international data do not always provide the same level of
detail. There could be a concern that aggregating many tax law changes with only knowledge
of years rather than specific dates may add noise, but this noise makes it more difficult to
find the results found here.
In short, the analysis here on a large sample of firms from around the world reveals
a statistically significant negative relation between dividend taxation and dividend payout,
which is economically large with an average change between 1% and 2% around large changes
(i.e., one standard deviation) in dividend taxation.1 This relation exists for both increases
and decreases in the level of the dividend tax rate, as well as both increases and decreases
in the dividend tax rate relative to the capital gains tax rate (i.e., changes to the dividend
tax preference, which is the ratio of the after-tax value of dividends to the after-tax value of
realized capital gains). This relation exists on both the external and internal margins.
The external margin is the decision to initiate, maintain, or omit a dividend. In simple,
univariate tests in response to one standard deviation shocks to the dividend tax rate there
is a 2% increase in the proportion of firms that pay dividends. This increase occurs through
both an increase in the proportion of firms that initiate dividends after the dividend tax cut
relative to before and a decrease in the proportion of firms that omit dividends after the
dividend tax cut relative to before. Firms’ responses are qualitatively similar to dividend tax
rate increases and decreases, both absolute and relative to capital gains tax rates, although
the results are strongest and most consistent for shocks directly to dividend tax rates.
These results are robust controlling for typical dividend predictors (Fama and French,
1Results are qualitatively similar for a variety of thresholds for dividend taxation shocks, including 1, 1.5,
and 2 standard deviation changes, as well as 5%/95% and 1%/99% changes. As expected, larger shocks to
dividend tax rates result in larger changes in observed dividend payout.
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2001; DeAngelo et al., 2006; Denis and Osobov, 2008; Von Eije and Megginson, 2008). That
is, profitability, growth opportunities, size, life-cycle, and unobserved heterogeneity do not
remove the ability of tax rate changes to explain payout behavior. As well, the results persist
using the full time series for each firm and the continuous variation in dividend and capital
gains tax rates.
If the external margin is about dividend initiation, continuation, and omission, then the
internal margin is about the level of payout. The result that firms respond to changes in
country-level dividend taxation holds on the internal margin, too. Further, the response
is asymmetric, which presents an anomaly to survey evidence that strongly supports the
view that managers dislike reducing or omitting dividends (Lintner, 1956; Brav et al., 2005).
Dividend payout scaled sales also increases by 0.04% (percentage points) around one standard
deviation decreases in dividend tax rates and decreases by 0.158% (percentage points) around
one standard deviation increases in dividend tax rates. The results are qualitatively similar,
but slightly weaker in both economic magnitude around one standard deviation changes in
dividends tax rates relative to capital gains tax rates. Given that the capital gains tax
rate data are hand-collected, there could be noise in the capital gains tax rate data that
is exaggerated by an identification strategy that uses large changes. Finally, these results
persist using the continuous variation in dividend taxation, rather than large shocks.
Given that an international panel significantly increases the amount of tax law variation,
a logical next step is to test country-level governance implications. Using both legal origin
and Djankov et al. (2008)’s country-level anti-self-dealing index, the results show that firms
in regimes that afford investors greater protection are more responsive to shareholders’ tax
loads. There are two interpretations here, both in support of strong shareholder rights. The
first is that when dividend tax rates increase, shareholders with strong legal protection are
more comfortable with firms increasing retained earnings. The second is that when dividend
tax rates decrease, shareholders with strong legal protection are able to extract earnings as
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dividends. These results show that, on average, firms are responsive to shareholders’ tax
loads, and even more responsive in strong legal regimes. However this relation only exists
on the external margin with respect to dividend initiation and continuation. In untabulated
results there is no consistent and economically meaningful relation between dividend payout
ratios, dividend taxation, and country-level governance.
From a policy perspective one key final question concerns the elasticity of total dividends
and dividend taxation. In the subset of negative dividend tax rate shocks there is a -0.4
elasticity, so that a 10% decrease in dividend taxation is associated with a 4% increase in
aggregate payout. These results are consistent with single-country study results elsewhere
(Chetty and Saez, 2005; Poterba, 2004). Although dividend tax cuts lead to high dividend
payout around the world, because the relation between dividends and dividend tax rates is in
the inelastic region, from a policy perspective there should be no expectation that dividend
tax cuts are revenue-neutral.
In all, these results are consistent with the old view and that firms around the globe
respond to shareholders’ tax loads. The point isn’t to make policy prescriptions from these
findings, but to highlight an important efficiency versus equity consideration. Given that
higher dividend taxes lead to higher retained earnings and possible inefficient investment,
dividend tax decisions could have implications beyond the sharing of tax expenses.
4.2 Literature Review
The literature on the relation between taxes and dividend policy covers both the market
response to dividend decisions conditional on a tax regime and dividend decisions in response
to tax regime changes. The latter set of studies is directly relevant to the work here because
dividend payments are taxable events, unlike capital gains, which can be left unrealized.
These two sets of studies address two sides of the same relation and find their roots in the
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Miller and Modigliani (1961) dividend irrelevance proposition, but are otherwise distinct.
The distinction between these two literatures is that the marginal value of a dividend to
investors doesn’t determine a firm’s dividend policy without also knowing the firm’s marginal
return on investment. The following subsections review both literatures for completeness
with the acknowledgment that only direct tests can characterize the impact of tax regimes
on dividend decisions.
4.2.1 Market Pricing
The market pricing literature on the relation between dividends and taxes tries to determine
if the market assigns a tax penalty to dividends relative to capital gains. That is, given
that dividends create taxable events, do investors penalize dividend payers to provide the
same after-tax risk adjusted return? Brennan (1970) proposes a capital asset pricing model
(CAPM) in which investors demand a premium that increases linearly in payout to test
this hypothesis.2 However, in empirical tests Black and Scholes (1974) are unable to find a
relation between risk-adjusted returns and dividends. With a different model specification
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) find a positive relation between dividends and returns,
which implies a dividend tax penalty. However, these two studies use different specifications
have subtle differences in their identification strategies so that Black and Scholes (1974)
identify cross-sectional variation and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) identify time
series variation. However, it is difficult to accept a relation between dividends and taxes that
is priced in the time series but not in the cross-section. Kalay and Michaely (2000) revisit
this puzzle and reduce the Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) tests to cross-sectional
tests and find no relation between dividends and returns. Although this study does reconcile
Black and Scholes (1974) and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), it does not identify the
2The Brennan (1970) model is E [rit − rft] = α1+α2βit+α3(dit−rft) where βit is firm i’s systematic risk
for period t and dit is firm i’s dividend yield for period t. A positive significant α3 implies that shareholders
require a return that increases linearly with dividend yield dit.
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supposed relation between returns and taxable dividends.
Fama and French (1998) propose a more general model than Brennan (1970) and try to
value the tax deductibility of interest and the tax expense of dividends, which they expect to
be a premium and a penalty, respectively. Surprisingly, Fama and French (1998) find that the
expected interest tax deductibility premium is a penalty and that the expected dividend tax
penalty is a premium. The market penalizes the debt tax shield and rewards the dividend tax
expense. These results are inconsistent with the expectation that investors demand a higher
pre-tax return to compensate for the taxable event associated with dividends, which capital
gains via retained earnings are able to avoid. Fama and French (1998) argue that these
results could indicate that debt indicates a violation of the Myers and Majluf (1984) pecking
order theory and that dividends signal information about profitability otherwise omitted in
earnings and growth measures. In any case, given these confounding effects, Fama and French
(1998) are unable to determine if and how investors capitalize the dividend tax penalty.
A feasible alternative to the Brennan (1970) and Fama and French (1998) approaches
is to focus on price changes around ex dividend days. Price changes around ex dividend
dates permit a more direct comparison of the valuation of one Dollar of dividends relative
to one Dollar of realized capital gains. In their model an investor should be indifferent
between after-tax Dollars from either capital gains or dividends so that (1− τD)D = −(1−
τCG)(Pcum−E [Pex]) and DPcum−E[Pex] = 1−τ
CG
1−τD on the assumption that overnight risk is zero so
that arbitrage maintains this relation and identifies the relative marginal tax rates on each
source of capital. Unfortunately, Kalay (1982) highlights that there are several different
tax clienteles with different relative values of dividends and realized capital gains that can
potentially arbitrage one another. Incorporating transactions costs establishes an equilibrium
relation, but makes it difficult to infer the relative tax rates of the marginal investor. Kalay
(1982)’s claim later receives considerable empirical support (Michaely, 1991; Eades et al.,
1994; Barclay, 1987). For a more complete survey of the literature on the market pricing
CHAPTER 4. WORLD DIVIDENDS AND TAX SHOCKS 200
aspects of dividends and taxes see Allen and Michaely (2003) and Lease et al. (2000).
Although the pricing literature is unable to consistently identify the relative tax rates
of the marginal investor, this does not preclude identifying the relation between taxes and
dividend policy. Even with perfect knowledge of the market price of dividends it is not
possible to determine the tax impact on payout policy without knowledge of the firm’s
marginal return on investment. As a result, it is necessary to directly examine the relation
between taxes and payout.
4.2.2 Payout Decisions
The literature that directly examines the relation between taxes and dividend payout is
largely U.S.-centric, which limits identification strategies to two major U.S. tax law changes.
This literature focuses on the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) and the 2003 Jobs and Growth
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA). However, there are also a few studies that examine
the relation between taxes and dividends through the Undistributed Profits Tax (UPT) in
1936–1937, which motivated distributing profits as dividends (and possibly lower profits via
higher wages). The U.S.-focus also limits studies to a single governance regime and limited
variation in ownership structures.
Of these three tax shocks, the 2003 JGTRRA has three attributes that provide an ex-
cellent natural experiment. First, the tax law change was largely unanticipated. The Bush
administration proposed the law on January 7, 2003 and signed it into law on May 28,
2003. The policy was neither part of Bush’s election campaign nor discussed seriously in
any context before December 2002. Auerbach and Hassett (2005) detail the specific timing
of the JGTRRA which provides a small window with little advance notice to evaluate the
treatment effect of tax law changes.
Second, the change in tax rates was economically meaningful. One of the main provisions
of the JGTRRA was to lower the dividend tax rate paid by individual investors from the
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regular, progressive income tax schedule with a maximum rate of 35% to a flat 15% tax for
qualified dividends. In addition, there was a provision for lower tax bracket investors to pay
a flat rate of 5% on qualified dividends, although the literature treats these as infra marginal
investors.
Third, the JGTRRA brought the tax rate on qualified dividends to parity with the tax
rate on qualified capital gains (i.e., both τD = τCG = 15%). This isn’t to say that the
marginal investor should be indifferent between price appreciation and dividends, but the
situation is much less stark than when the rates are markedly different. This specifically
addresses the Black and Scholes (1974) critique that dividends are tax disadvantaged so in-
vestors should prefer “homemade dividends” from realized capital gains to regular dividends.
Abstracting away from the tension between free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) and valuation con-
cerns from issuing new securities (Myers and Majluf, 1984), the tax implications of regular
and “homemade” dividends are identical post-JGTRRA.
Aggregating across a large international panel of firms domiciled in 30 countries does
not provide these three, specific attributes, but this is not a concern for the identification
strategy here. First, given that the focus is dividend policy itself rather than valuation, pre-
alerting the firm or shareholders to pending changes in taxation does not change firm policy
because the firm and shareholder cannot reap the benefits (or losses for tax hikes) until the
new tax law changes are in effect. Second, not all tax law changes are as large in magnitude
as the JGTRRA, but there are many more tax law changes outside the U.S. that provide
enough country-level shocks that exceed an arbitrarily large dividend tax shock threshold,
either positive or negative, absolute or relative to capital gains tax rates. Third, using the
dividend tax preference (DTP = 1−τ
D
1−τCG ) the analysis here can compare dividend tax rates to
capital gains rates and use variation in both rates to identify the relation between dividends
and dividend tax rates, even in the absence of large, isolated shocks to dividend tax rates.
A handful of papers address the main relation between dividends and the JGTRRA
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(Chetty and Saez, 2004, 2005; Blouin et al., 2004; Julio and Ikenberry, 2004). These three
studies differ in their conclusions about the magnitude and the casualty of dividend changes
in response to the JGTRRA tax law change. Blouin et al. (2004) focus on dividend yields
for a panel of firms that initiate dividends in the last six months of 2002 and 2003 and find
that the dividend tax cut was associated with increased regular and special dividend yields
and decreased share repurchases. Given the short analysis window around the JGTRRA,
they caution that the 10% increase in regular dividends was concentrated in fewer than 20
firms and could be due to factors beyond the dividend tax cut. Further, they find no relation
between regular dividend increases and individual investors, who are the only beneficiaries
of the JGTRRA tax cut, but do find a positive relation between regular dividends and
insider ownership. In all Blouin et al. (2004) are unable to rule out non-tax influences on
the dividend yields. Rather than dividend yields Julio and Ikenberry (2004) focus on the
fraction of firms paying regular dividends and also conclude that there is an increase in
regular dividends around the JGTRRA. They use a larger panel and begin their analysis in
the 1980s, which helps them conclude that regular dividends began their rise several years
before the 2003 tax cut and following the decades-long decline in dividend payers that Fama
and French (2001) document. Although they examine the fraction of dividend payers rather
than dividend yields, this finding is consistent with Blouin et al. (2004) and support the
view that non-tax reasons drive the rise in dividends around the JGTRRA.
In contrast, Chetty and Saez (2004, 2005) find that the 2003 tax cut was causally related
to increases in both dividend yields and the fraction of dividend payers. Chetty and Saez
(2004, 2005) reconcile Blouin et al. (2004) and Julio and Ikenberry (2004) by looking at both
the internal and external margins (i.e., both dividend yields and fraction of dividend payers,
respectively), using a larger panel that extends an additional year after the JGTRRA, and
controlling for the entry and exit of firms, particularly around the dot com bubble and bust
period. Their novel approach helps them identify three key findings. First, on the external
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margin, dividend initiations increased significantly in the year following the JGTRRA, from
20% of listed firms paying dividends at the end of 2002 to 25% of listed firms paying dividends
by the middle of 2004. Second, on the internal margin, firms that already paid regular
dividends were more likely to increase their regular dividend following the JGTRRA. Finally,
they find that the JGTRRA also leads to an increase is special dividends. All in all, Chetty
and Saez (2005) suppose that the tax elasticity of regular dividend payments is -0.5.3
Despite their intuitive findings and reconciliation of differences with Blouin et al. (2004)
and Julio and Ikenberry (2004), outcomes from the JGTRRA are not entirely consistent
with those from the 1986 TRA. The TRA reduced the dividend tax rate from 50% to 28%,
however with similar methods Chetty and Saez do not find an increase in either the number
of regular dividend payers or the amount of regular dividends paid. However, they do find
a short-lived increase in special dividends among a subset of large firms (Chetty and Saez,
2004).
Both Nam et al. (2004) and Chetty and Saez (2005) find that dividend decisions vary
based on firms’ ownership structures. They report that dividend responses to the JGTRRA
are strongest where the incentives are strongest and that firms with top executives with
larger ownership stakes and smaller unexercised option holdings are more likely to initiate
dividends. As well, firms with high, taxable institutional ownership or with independent
board members with large ownership stakes were also more likely to raise dividends.
These findings suggest that firms do respond to significant tax law changes, providing
support for the old view of dividend taxation over the new view, but leave room for better
understanding of the different responses to the TRA and JGTRRA. The analysis here seeks
to better characterize the relation between tax rates and payout decisions using a panel
3Chetty and Saez (2005) base their elasticity estimate on the change in cash dividends from the fourth
quarter of 2002 to the fourth quarter of 2004 relative to the change in the average dividend tax rate around
the JGTRRA. They find that regular cash dividends increase by $4.8 billion from a base of $20 billion and use
the Poterba (2004) estimate of a decline in average dividend taxation, including tax-advantaged investors,
from 29% to 17%. This leads a elasticity estimate of 4.8/25−12/29 ≈ 20%−40% = −0.5.
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of 220,609 firm-year observations, across 30,071 firms and 30 countries over 21 years (1990–
2010). As noted earlier, international data offer a wider and longer panel with more variation
in dividend taxes, including large and small changes, and increases and decreases, both
absolute and relative to capital gains taxes. As well, international data offer a chance to
incorporate a wider variety of governance and ownership structures. Looking at the impact
of tax law changes on dividend policy outside the U.S. increases the sample and expands the
literature on the strength of the relation between taxes and dividend policy, reduces concerns
about data mining or unobserved effects, and helps make broader inferences about how this
relation varies in the cross-section. The multinational dividends research is relatively sparse,
particularly with respect to the relation between taxes and payout policy, with most studies
focusing on unique aspects of a single country and only a few key studies characterizing
multinational payout policy.
La Porta et al. (2000) provide the first international study of payout policy and find that
owners in good governance regimes (e.g., common law or high anti-director index countries)
can force payout so that dividend payout ratios are higher than in poor governance regimes.
As well, in good governance regimes dividend payout ratios (i.e., cash dividends scaled by
sales, assets, or operating cash flows) are decreasing in investment opportunities, while in
the poor governance regimes dividend payout is unrelated to investment opportunities with
the interpretation that owners in these poor governance regimes demand payout whenever
feasible rather than with full consideration to growth or investment opportunities. La Porta
et al. (2000) control for dividend tax preferences and find that the dividends to sales ra-
tio increases in the dividend tax preference, but their study is cross-sectional, rather than
longitudinal, and does not consider within-country tax law changes.
Denis and Osobov (2008) and Von Eije and Megginson (2008) provide the first large
scale, longitudinal studies on multinational payout policy. Denis and Osobov (2008) extend
Fama and French (2001) to six major countries (U.S., U.K., Canada, France, German, and
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Japan) and find that firms in all six countries exhibit a declining propensity to pay dividends
that Fama and French (2001) document in the U.S. Von Eije and Megginson (2008) use a
larger sample of 15 countries (European Union members over 1989–2005) with a focus on the
evolving nature of repurchases relative to dividends. They find that international repurchases
follow the increase that Skinner (2008) documents in the U.S. with a ten-year lag. Their
robustness checks provide a first look at the relation between dividends, repurchases, and
taxes with a short panel over 2001–2005. They use the La Porta et al. (2000) dividend
tax preference variable and find that the propensity to pay dividends is positively related
to the dividend tax preference and that the level of dividends is positively related to the
dividend tax preference. In contrast, both the probability of repurchase and repurchase level
are unrelated to taxes. Again, however, their panel is short and ignores country-level tax
law changes.
Finally, there are several contributions at the single-country level that show the relation
between payout decisions, both dividends and repurchases, and very specific tax law changes.
Most notably Rau and Vermaelen (2002) look at U.K. repurchases in a changing tax and
regulatory environment and find that tax incentives matter. In a similar study in Australia,
but with a dividend focus, Pattenden and Twite (2008) find that more firms initiate dividends
and increase dividend levels following adoption of an imputation system in Australia that
gives shareholders tax credits for taxes paid on profits by the firm.
This chapter’s contribution to the literature is to provide a large scale investigation of
the relation between dividend payout, dividend tax rates (absolute and relative to capital
gains tax rates), and governance regimes. The analysis here uses a large panel of 30,071
firms across 30 countries over 21 years, and provides results that validate the old view of
dividends and taxes in an international setting.
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4.3 Data
The sample consists of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
firms over 1990–2010 and the data are from a variety of sources. Firm fundamental data are
from Worldscope’s annual file. Country-level governance data are from Djankov et al. (2008).
Dividend tax rates (τD) are from the OECD Tax Database (http://www.oecd.org/tax/
tax-policy/oecdtaxdatabase.htm#) and capital gains tax rates (τCG) are hand-collected
from several sources. Both dividends and capital gains tax rates are the personal tax rates
on gains from long-term investments. Because the capital gains tax rates are hand-collected
rather than audited by the OECD, there is the potential for measurement error, but the
focus here is on the relation between dividends and tax rates, so measurement error should
downward bias the tax rate coefficients and make it more difficult to identify a relation
between tax rates and dividends. This section discusses specifics about the tax rate and firm
fundamentals data.
4.3.1 Tax Data
Tax rates are the limiting data at the country-level, so the data discussion begins there.
There is an economically significant time series variation in dividend tax regimes across
OECD countries and this variation is directly in the statutory tax rates on dividend income,
as well as the imputations and credits at the firm or shareholder level that reduce double
taxation of corporate profits. Further, dividend tax rates change relative to capital gains tax
rates, which provides additional time series variation. Dividend tax regimes in the OECD
fall into one of the following seven categories: classical system, modified classical system,
imputation (full or partial), partial inclusion, split rate, no shareholder taxation of dividends
(i.e., dividends are exempt from taxation at the shareholder level), and corporate deduction.
Under the classical system the government taxes corporate profits at both the firm and
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shareholder levels, and both the firm and shareholders pay taxes on profits and dividends
at their own marginal rates. For the shareholder the marginal rate is the same marginal
rate for many types of capital income (e.g., interest and dividends). The modified classical
system reduces double taxation of corporate profits by taxing dividends at a preferential
rate relative to other sources of capital income. As a note, the United States has a modified
classical dividend taxation system.
Under imputation shareholders receive a tax credit for taxes paid at the firm level and
this imputation can be full or partial. Mexico has a full imputation dividend tax policy.
The top marginal dividend tax rate is 30%, but shareholders receive full imputation of taxes
paid at the firm level, also at 30%, which reduces the net personal tax rate on dividends in
Mexico to 0%. For example, for $100 in distributed profits, the grossed up dividends are
$100
1−30% = $142.86, which earns a tax credit of 30%×$142.86 = $42.86. This $42.86 tax credit
offsets the shareholder tax liability of 30%×max($100, $142.86) = $42.86 for a net personal
tax rate on dividends of 0%. Alternatively, the United Kingdom has a partial imputation
dividend tax policy. The top marginal dividend tax rate is 37.5%, but shareholders receive
a 10% partial imputation, which reduces the net personal tax rate on dividends in the
U.K. to 30.6%. For example, for £100 in distributed profits, the grossed up dividends are
£100
1−10% = £111.11, which earns a tax credit of 10%×£111.11 = £11.11, which only partially




Under partial inclusion shareholders pay taxes on dividends at their marginal income
tax rate, but only on a portion of dividends. For example, Finland has a partial inclusion
dividend tax policy with a 32% dividend tax rate, but only 70% dividend inclusion, which
reduces the net personal tax rate on dividends to 70% × 32% = 22.4%. Under a split
rate system distributed dividends are taxed at higher rates than retained earnings at the
corporate level. Only two countries in the sample have split rate dividend taxation policies.
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Germany had a split rate system with full imputation over 1990–2000 and Poland had a split
rate system in 2002 only. Under no shareholder taxation of dividends, there is an exemption
for dividends. This is the case for Estonia, Greece, Mexico, and the Slovak Republic at
some point during the sample period. Finally, under corporate deduction systems firms can
deduct dividend distributions. This is the case for Norway over 1990–1991 and Sweden over
1990–1993.4
In all cases the dividend tax rate (τD) is the “net personal tax on dividends” from the
OECD Tax Database (Table II.4). This abstracts away from the underlying dividend taxa-
tion regime and provides the net tax rate paid by shareholders on received cash dividends.
Unfortunately, the OECD capital gains tax rates are not available from one source.
Several of the large accounting firms provide annual tax guides, but in many cases these
guides are either difficult to locate or no longer available, and provide a cross section each
year rather than an annually updated panel.5 As a result, capital gains tax rates are hand-
collected from several sources. There are four basic capital gains tax regimes. Capital gains
4For the case of Sweden the corporate tax deductibility of dividends does not factor into the net personal
tax rate on dividends calculations because the deduction only accrued to item new shares and item up 10%
per year with a 100% lifetime limit. In this case ignoring the corporate tax deductibility of dividends for
Sweden overestimates the net personal tax on dividends, but the magnitude of this error is difficult to estimate
and likely very small. The OECD database provides the following justification for this simplification.
Sweden: from 1969 and until 1993, a special deduction for distributed income at the corporate
level was at force, the so called Annell deduction. The system gave the right to deduct dividends
on new share issues according to special rules of a rather complex nature. Therefore, that
system is not accounted for in the calculations above which means that the overall tax burden
on corporate profits is overestimated as far as the dividends distributed are on newly shared
issues. In short, the system worked as follows. Firstly, it was applicable for dividends to
persons liable to tax on dividends in Sweden (e.g., dividends to tax exempt institutions were
not covered by the system). For dividends to such persons, those were deductible against the
corporate tax. However, there were two ceilings applicable: 1) For a single year, the maximum
dividends deductible were maximized to 10 per cent of the value of the new issue. 2) The total
deductions were maximized to 100 per cent of the value of the new issue. In principle, this
meant that the dividends were fully deductible in some years after the share was issued (the
period dependent on the dividend growth rate), and after that dividends = 10 per cent of the
issue were deductible until the sum of all deductions reached 100 per cent of the original issue.
5Von Eije and Megginson (2008) note the same difficulty and include only tax rates for 15 countries over
a five-year interval.
CHAPTER 4. WORLD DIVIDENDS AND TAX SHOCKS 209
can be taxed at a given capital gains tax rate, a marginal income tax rate or discount to the
marginal income tax rate, a dividend tax rate or a discount to the dividend tax rate (i.e.,
the same as other capital income), or exempt. In the absence of tax information, the capital
gains tax rate used is the marginal income tax rate from the OECD Tax Database (Table
I.1).6 Any noise in the capital gains tax rate (τCG) makes it more difficult to find a relation
between dividend payout and the relative tax rates.
Shareholders and firms could respond to both changes in the after-tax value of dividends
(i.e., (1− τD)D), as well as the after-tax value of dividends relative to the after tax value of
capital gains (i.e., (1− τCG)∆P ). The price appreciation that any given investor can realize
is unknown, but the dividend tax preference (DTP = 1−τ
D
1−τCG ) is a commonly used proxy that
relates the after-tax value of one unit of dividends to the after-tax value of one unit of capital
gains (Poterba and Summers, 1985). This controls for the explicit tax opportunity cost of
share repurchases (and “homemade dividends”) relative to dividends. The sharpest test of
the relation between dividends and taxes is to look at large, distinct changes in dividend tax
rates, either absolute or relative to capital gains tax rates. For this analysis large shocks are
changes one standard deviation above or below the mean change in the dividend tax rate or
dividend tax preference at the country-year level. This is a sufficiently arbitrary threshold to
define shock thresholds, but requires economically significant changes to either dividend tax
rates or capital gains tax rates (or both). Results are robust to a several other thresholds
for each of the four tax shocks, including 1, 1.5, or 2 standard deviation changes relative
to the mean change, as well as 5%/95% and 1%/99% percentiles changes, again, all at the
country-year level. The results are qualitatively similar for all of these threshold definitions,
although the results are stronger, both economically and statistically, as the magnitude of
the threshold increases. That is, as the size of the tax change stimulus increase, so does the
6For France the full 1990–2010 time series of capital gains tax rates isn’t available, so the capital gains
tax rates are backfilled until the next known rate.
CHAPTER 4. WORLD DIVIDENDS AND TAX SHOCKS 210
size of the dividend payout response. As well, the analysis here uses continuous dividend tax
rates and dividend tax preferences to identify the relation between taxes and payout, rather
than just tax shock indicators.
Table 4.10 provides the panel of tax rates for country-years with complete data. Ta-
ble 4.10 includes both tax rates τD and τCG, as well as the dividend tax preference, DTP =
1−τD
1−τCG . Note that “+” and “-” indicate positive and negative shocks to both τ
D and DTP.
4.3.2 Firm Fundamental Data
Worldscope provides the best fundamental data coverage for the 30 OECD countries for
which dividend and capital gains tax rate data are available. The analysis here uses only
industrial and transportation firms that report consolidated data and omits financial and
utility firms (i.e., omits firms with SIC codes in the ranges 6000–6999 and 4900–4949). This
is common in the dividend literature, as financial and utility firms may be constrained in
their ability to respond to tax law changes (Fama and French, 2001; Von Eije and Meggin-
son, 2008). Interestingly, the findings here are qualitatively similar with or without these
regulated firms.
The dividend determinants here are the same as those from Fama and French (2001) and
DeAngelo et al. (2006) and follow Denis and Osobov (2008)’s approach to generate them
with Worldscope data. Assets A is Worldscope’s “Total Assets” and sales S is Worldscope’s
“Net Sales or Revenues”. One approach would be to convert all firm fundamentals data to
constant U.S. Dollars, but a simpler approach given data timing uncertainty is to convert
all values to ratios by scaling by either total assets or sales. The non-dimensional size proxy
is each firm’s percentile ranking by total assets within each country-year, although results
are the same with a size percentile based on sales. RE is Worldscope’s “Retained Earnings”
while BE is Worldscope’s “Common Shareholder Equity”. The two profitability proxies are
Y/BE and E/A, where Y is profits available to common shareholders from Worldscope’s “Net
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Income Available to Common” and E is earnings before interest and is Worldscope’s “Net
Income Basic” plus “Interest Expense” (if available) plus “Deferred Taxes” (if available).
Market value V is total assets minus the book value of common equity plus the market value
of common equity. The two growth opportunities proxies are dA/A and V/A, where dA
is this year’s total assets minus last year’s total assets (i.e., dA/A = At − At−1/A), and
profitability proxies E/A and Y/BE, which are akin to return on assets (ROA) and return
on equity (ROE).
The focus here is on the dividend payment decision and Worldscope’s “Common Divi-
dends - Cash” is the proxy for common dividends paid to common shareholders.7 A firm is
a “Payer” in a given year if cash common dividends are positive, an “Initiator” if it pays a
cash common dividends following at least two years of non-payment, and an “Omitter” if it
omits cash common dividends following at least two years of dividend payment. If dividend
initiations and omissions measure marginal firms (“external margin”), then there are also
infra marginal firms that already pay dividends (“internal margin”) and are measured with
several payout ratios. The ideal measure would be cash dividends paid relative to earnings
available to common shareholders (D/Y) or relative to earnings before interest (D/E). How-
ever, accounting and governance standards differ across countries and make these earnings
measures less comparable across countries, given that large panel and diversity of firms in
the cross section (La Porta et al., 2000). Sales and revenue are less susceptible to measure-
ment or reporting error, so the main dividend payout ratio here is cash common dividends
relative to sales (D/S), although results are robust to scaling by total assets (A) or market
capitalization.
The final sample comprises 220,609 firm-year observations of 30,071 OECD firms over
1990–2010 that meet the following requirements. To remain in the sample firm-years must
7Results are also robust to filling in missing values for the cash common dividends variable with “Cash
Dividends - Total” minus “Preferred Dividends - Cash”.
CHAPTER 4. WORLD DIVIDENDS AND TAX SHOCKS 212
be an industrial firm (i.e., SIC codes outside of 4900–4949 and 6000–6999) with non-missing
information on cash dividends, non-missing dividend determinants (i.e., E/A, Y/BE, dA/A,
V/A, size percentile on total assets, and RE/BE), cash common dividends less than sales
[i.e., D/S < 100%], and non-missing country-level data on tax rates (i.e., dividend and capital
gains) and governance (i.e., legal origin and anti-self-dealing index Djankov et al. (2008)).
Finally, after meeting these data requirements, all ratios are trimmed at 1% in each tail by
country and observations without complete data are dropped. Table 4.1 provides summary
statistics for the dividend determinants by country and dividend status. Values in Table 4.1
are the time-series means of cross-sectional medians within each country and dividend payer
status group. Although this is a larger sample than Denis and Osobov (2008) and Von Eije
and Megginson (2008), descriptive statistics are similar and dividend payers tend to be more
profitable than non-payers. As well, consistent with La Porta et al. (2000) there is a general
relation between dividend status, growth opportunities (dA/A and V/A), and governance
regime. In high governance regimes, such as the U.S. and U.K., payers tend to have lower
growth opportunities, while in poor governance regimes the relation between dividend status
and growth opportunities is less clear.
The goal of this study is to identify the relation between dividend payout decisions
(external and internal margins) and dividend tax rates (absolute and relative to capital gains
tax rates). The clearest identification will come from changes to dividend payment status
around significant tax change events. Table 4.2 provides a first pass at these significant tax
shocks and provides the percent of dividend initiators, payers, and omitters in years relative
to each of the four types of tax shocks by country. Again, tax shocks are changes to dividend
tax rates and dividend tax preferences one standard deviation outside the mean change at the
country-year level. For dividend tax rates these are ∆τD outside −0.34%±4.55% (or outside
-4.89% to +4.21%). For dividend tax preferences these are ∆DTP outside −0.06%± 8.61%
(or outside -8.67% to 8.54%).
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Tax shock windows are five-year windows centered on the year of the new tax rate.
Windows of the same type of tax shock (i.e., positive or negative shocks to dividend tax
rates or preferences) in the same country can’t overlap, although they can be adjacent. For
example, the same type tax shock in one country is permissible in both 2002 and 2007,
because 2000–2004 and 2005–2009 are adjacent, but do not overlap. However, if the same
type tax shocks occur in both 2002 and 2006, then only the first is used because 2004–2008
overlaps the previous shock window during 2000–2004. Tax shock windows of different types
tax shocks can overlap (e.g., negative dividend tax rate shocks can overlap with positive
dividend tax preference shocks, and are often contemporaneous). The analysis here tests
each of the four tax shock types in different models and interfering tax shocks of a different
type should add noise and make it more difficult to find a relation. Many times a dividend
tax preference shock corresponds directly to a dividend tax rate shock, but this isn’t strictly
the case. Table 4.10 provides the complete panel of tax rates and shocks.
Changes to dividend tax rates or preferences are in percentage points rather than percent
because these changes are clearest to market participants, are always material, and represent
pennies on the dollar to firms and shareholders. That is, a 5% dividend tax rate increase from
10% to 15% is equivalent to a 5% dividend tax rate increase from 30% to 35% because both
result in $0.05 less in shareholders’ pockets. With respect to DTP, results are qualitatively
similar for shocks in percentage points and percent because µ(DTP) = 99.44% at the country-
year level. All else equal, negative changes in dividend tax rates increase the after-tax value
of dividends and positive changes in dividend tax preferences increase the after-tax value
of dividends relative to capital gains. Under the old view and the hypothesis that firms
respond to tax changes to reduce shareholder tax loads, negative changes in dividend tax
rates should be related with more dividends (in fraction of firms paying dividends or payout
ratios), as should be positive changes in dividend tax preferences.
The purpose of Table 4.2 is twofold. First, it summarizes countries with each of the four
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types of tax shock and data coverage over 1990–2010. Note that by defining tax shocks as
changes greater than one standard deviation there are roughly the same number of each
of the four types of tax shocks at the country-year level. Not every shock has complete
data coverage before and after. This incomplete coverage is clear at the country-level (e.g.,
Greece’s positive dividend tax rate shock in Table 4.2a runs up against the right end of the
sample and there are no data for the second year after the shock). But there is also incomplete
coverage at the firm-level that isn’t obvious, as firms can enter and exit in the real world,
or there can be incomplete data coverage or trimming. Second, Table 4.2 provides a first
look at how firms respond to tax shocks. For example, Table 4.2a present the proportion
of dividend initiators, payers, and omitters in the window around large positive shocks to
the dividend tax rate by country. The results here are consistent with the hypothesis that,
on the margin, firms provide more dividends when dividend tax rates are more favorable
for shareholders. In almost all cases the proportion of dividend initiators or payers is lower
in years 1 and 2 than in years -2 and -1. Of course, these results aren’t statistical tests
and don’t control for common dividend determinants, but provide a feel for the data at the
country-shock level. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 provide univariate and multivariate test results,
respectively.
4.4 Univariate Results
The simplest statistical test of the relation between dividends and tax changes is to look at
the proportion of initiators, payers, and omitters in the population after a tax shock relative
to before. The three panels in Table 4.3 answer this question in several ways. Table 4.3a
provides the results of a proportional ratio test of initiators, payers, and omitters in t = 1
(year after the tax shock) relative to t = −1 (year before the tax shock) for each of the four
tax shock types. The results are qualitatively similar with a smaller window that compares
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t = 0 to t = −1 (untabulated). The columns indicate each type of shock and the rows
indicate the change in the proportion of each group (initiator, payer, or omitter) after the
tax shock relative to before (i.e., proportion after minus proportion before). The results
are generally consistent with the hypothesis that firms alter dividend policy to reduce the
shareholders’ tax loads. Looking first at the change in dividend initiators (row one), around
both negative dividend tax rate and positive dividend tax preference shocks [columns (2)
and (3)] the proportion of initiators increases by 0.780% and 1.07%, respectively. This is
an economically significant increase given that the unconditional proportion of initiators in
the sample is 2.22%. For both the positive dividend tax rate and negative dividend tax
preference shocks [columns (1) and (4)] the change in the proportion of initiators is negative
as expected, but not significantly different from zero in either case.
Moving to the proportion of dividend payers in row two, the proportion of dividend payers
decreases for adverse shocks to the dividend tax rate [absolute and relative to the capital
gains tax rate, columns (1) and (4)]. In fact, these decreases in the proportion of dividend
payers are quite large at about 7%. But for negative shocks to the dividend tax rate and
positive shocks to the dividend tax preference [in columns (2) and (3) of the same table] there
is no clear and consistent relation. This is where the clearest and most convincing results
should appear, but it could be that including the dividend determinants is necessary to get a
clearer picture. Finally, the omitter results in row three are consistent with the expectation
that there are fewer omitters after tax changes that favor shareholders of dividend-paying
stocks [i.e., positive dividend tax preference shock in column and (3)] and more omitters
after tax shocks that disfavor dividends relative to capital gains [i.e., negative dividend tax
preference shock in column (4)], but the changes are not significantly greater than zero for
changes to dividend tax rates in columns (1) and (2).
Given that Chetty and Saez (2004) show that changes in the population of firms around
the JGTRRA of 2003 affect their conclusions, it could also be that changes to the sample
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population affect the results in Table 4.3a. Sample changes are even more likely in World-
scope data, given that (1) coverage is less complete than Compustat and CRSP and (2)
Table 4.2 shows that some countries are truncated by the left and right edges of the sample.
One solution is to repeat 4.3a, but only in the subset of firms that are present with complete
data both one year before and one year after the tax shock. Table 4.3b presents the results of
this balanced panel analysis, which are now completely consistent with the hypothesis that
firms respond to dividend tax changes to reduce the tax load on shareholders. Focusing on
the dividend payer row, all difference are significant at the 5% level with the hypothesized
signs. Following negative shocks to dividend tax rates and positive shocks to dividend tax
preferences [columns (2) and (3)] there are nominally 2% increases in the proportion of divi-
dend payers. Following positive shocks to dividend tax rates and negative shocks to dividend
tax preferences [columns (1) and (4)] there are nominally 3.5% decreases in the proportion
of dividends payers. Elsewhere in Table 4.3b results are consistent with the hypothesis that
firms alter payout policy in response to tax shocks to reduce the tax load on shareholders.
Although all tests have the correct sign, some are not statistically different from zero at the
5% level.
Finally, an alternative to the proportional ratio tests is a paired t-test of dividend payer
status after each type of tax shocks relative to before. In this context the initiator and
omitter statuses are not relevant since the test is within firm changes (i.e., if a firm initiates
in year -1, then it can’t initiate in year +1 by definition; likewise for dividend omissions).
Table 4.3c presents the paired t-test results in the balanced sample (paired tests are balanced
by definition as every firm in the sample in year -1 is in the sample at year +1, and vice
versa), and again the results are consistent with the old view of dividend taxation and the
hypothesis that firms respond to dividend tax changes to reduce tax loads on sharehold-
ers. Standard errors for the paired t-tests in Table 4.3c are robust and clustered by firm.8
8Note that the sample size in Table 4.3c is one half the sample size in Table 4.3b. This is because here
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The point estimates are the same as Table 4.3b because the sample is the same, but the
statistical significance is stronger, even with robust standard errors that control for within
firm correlation in the dividend decision. This is because the paired t-test makes general
distributional assumptions and doesn’t consider that changes in payer status can only take
one of three values: -1, 0, or +1. The Wilcoxon signed rank test and sign test don’t make
any assumptions other than ordinality, which is met by changes in payer status. The footer
in Table 4.3c provides the p-values for the Wilcoxon signed rank test and sign test, which
both support the proportional ratio and paired t-tests with p-values of 0.01% or less.
Overall these univariate tests support the old view of dividends and taxes once the sample
is balanced to control for firm entry and exit through missing data, trimming for outliers,
or real firm entry and exit. Even without adjusting the sample to correct for entry and exit
the initiator and omitter results support the old view. However, these tests don’t control for
firm and country characteristics, either observed or unobserved. The multivariate analysis
in Section 4.5 addresses these issues.
4.5 Multivariate Results
4.5.1 External Margin
The univariate results suggest that firms are sensitive to changes in dividend tax rates and
are more likely to pay and less likely to omit dividends in response to tax changes that favor
dividends (and more likely to omit and less likely to pay following tax changes that disfavor
dividends). However, it could be that firm-level dividend determinants drive these results
rather than a response to tax regime changes. This section addresses these concerns with
multivariate models. These multivariate models also control for unobserved heterogeneity
the paired t-test is implemented as a linear regression of the after status minus before status regressed on
the intercept. This allows robust standard errors clustered by firm.
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at the firm- and country-levels, heteroskedastic standard errors, and correct within firm
correlation in the dividend decision. As well, multivariate models allow the use of continuous
variation in tax measures, rather than looking strictly at short event windows centered on
tax shocks that exceed some arbitrary threshold.
Table 4.4 reports the results for panel linear probability models with firm FEs to control
for unobserved heterogeneity in the dividend decision at the firm- and country-level. These
regressions include the common dividend predictors (Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo
et al., 2006) and cluster robust standard errors by firm.9 Throughout profitability is E/A,
growth opportunities are dA/A, size is the percentile ranking by total assets within the
country-year, and life-cycle is RE/BE. The results are qualitatively similar is profitability is
Y/BE, growth opportunities are V/A, and size is the percentiles ranking by sales. Using E/A
as the profitability proxy reduces concerns about accounting standard differences between
countries that affect net income more than earnings before interest and taxes. Using dA/A
as the growth opportunities proxies avoids the dual interpretation of V/A as a proxy for both
valuation and growth opportunities, as well as possible endogeneity if dividend policy affects
valuation (Fama and French, 1998). The first four models in Table 4.4 [i.e., specifications
(1)–(4)] use data in the five-year windows centered on each of the four types of tax shocks
and the shock variable is an indicator variable that is zero for the two years before the tax
shock and one the year of the year tax shock and the two years after. In this setting dividend
payer status is the key variable, as it aggregates the impact of both dividend initiations and
omissions. Further, Table 4.3a suggests that this is the most difficult variable for which
9Given that there may be error correlation by country as well as by firm, an alternative is to cluster
standard errors by country. However given that there are only 30 countries in the OECD sample and about
10 in any given tax shock window, this solution introduces problems larger than the one it tries to solve.
Bertrand et al. (2004) discuss such clustering issues and find that clustering groups on the order of ten
reduces Type I errors, but also significantly reduces power and makes it difficult to identify known effects of
2%, which given the results in Table 4.2 is exactly the magnitude of the effect here. In untabulated results,
clustering robust standard errors by country in the models that use the continuous tax measures and all 30
countries yield qualitatively similar results at slightly lower significance levels.
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to find a relation between taxes and dividend status. All models include firm FEs and
cluster robust standard errors by firm. These results are again consistent with the old view
and statistically the same as the univariate payer results in Tables 4.3b and 4.3c. Because
these are linear probability models with an indicator variable the interpretation is simple.
Following adverse shocks to dividend taxation there is a 3.5% decline in the fraction of
dividend payers [specifications (1) and (4)]. Following favorable shocks to dividend taxation
there is a 1% rise in the fraction of dividend payers. Note that these four shock models
include firm FEs, but omit year FEs. Because the shocks occur across time and each shock
type has nominally 10 countries in the sample, so that the year FEs act like country-year
FEs and absorb almost all of the variation in dividend taxes and dividend tax preferences.
The final two models in this same table use the continuous variation in dividend tax
rates and dividend tax preferences [specifications (5) and (6), respectively] and use the en-
tire 21-year sample, rather than the five years centered on each tax shock. Again, the results
are consistent with the old view of dividend and taxes. The relation between dividend
payer status and dividend tax rates is negative, implying that within each firm, as dividend
tax rates rise the management are less likely to initiate or maintain their dividend status.
Likewise, with respect to dividend tax preference the relation is positive and as the tax
treatment of dividends becomes more favorable relative to capital gains, so does the likeli-
hood of initiating or maintaining dividends. The coefficients differ because the identification
strategies differ, but the results are consistent. A negative shock to the dividend tax rate is
a change in the dividend tax rate more negative than -4.89%, so the -0.151 coefficient on τD
is specification (5) is nominally the same at the 0.00614 coefficient in specification (2) (i.e.,
−0.151 × −0.0489 = 0.00738 ≈ 0.00614), but uses the continuous variation in the dividend
tax rate over all country-years in the sample. The same holds for the continuous variation
in the dividend tax preference (i.e., 0.0649× 0.0854 = 0.00554 ≈ 0.0108).
The panel linear probability models in Table 4.4 are attractive because coefficients on
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the four tax shock indicator variables are easily interpreted as the change in probability of
each dividend status. However, the dividend decision is binary, not continuous, so the more
correct model is a binary choice model. Table 4.5 presents the same tests in panel logit
models to address this issue.
Panel logit models correct for the binary choice of dividend status, but are unable to
estimate FEs for all of the firms and identification of these models requires a change in
payer status for each firm. That is, the sample reduces to firms that either change status
from payer to non-payer or non-payer to payer. This constraint reduces the sample to about
20% to 30% of the complete sample, in either the five-year windows around shock events
[specifications (1)–(4)] or the whole time series with continuous variation in the tax measures
[specifications (5)–(6)]. Again, all models in Table 4.5 control for unobserved firm- and
country-level heterogeneity and cluster robust standard errors by firm. With a panel logit
model there isn’t an analytical correction for clustered standard errors, so standard errors are
block bootstrapped on firms 500 times. These results are consistent with the multivariate
results in Table 4.4 with marginally higher significance levels. Although the results are
stronger here, they should be interpreted with caution given that all six models are identified
with only the 20% to 30% of firms that change their dividend status either during either the
five-year shock window or the whole time series. For example, with the negative dividend
tax shock in specification (2), a one standard deviation shock increases the probability of
becoming a dividend payer by exp(0.267) − 1 = 30.1%. With the continuous dividend tax
rate specification (5) the increase in the probability of becoming a dividend payer with a
4.89% decrease in the dividend tax rate is exp(−3.110)× 4.89% = 0.0446× 4.89% = 21.8%.
These increased probabilities are estimated in the sample of switchers and are consistent
with the old view of dividends and taxes, but the magnitudes of these coefficients should be
interpreted with caution.
The analysis so far focuses on the external margin. That is, firms that change dividend
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status in response to tax changes. These results, whether they are univariate or multivariate
(linear or logistic), all support the old view and the hypothesis that firms respond to tax law
changes and alter dividend policy to reduce the tax load on shareholders. As well it could
be that on the internal margin firms that already pay dividends alter their dividend payout
ratio in response to tax changes. The next subsection investigates the relation between tax
changes and payout ratios, which is commonly referred to as the internal margin.
4.5.2 Internal Margin
Table 4.6 provides the results for panel linear models of the relation between cash common
dividends scaled by sales (D/S) and tax law changes. Sales is the scaling factor in the
primary analyses because sales figures are less susceptible to differing accounting standards
and governance (La Porta et al., 2000). The results are qualitatively similar for other scaling
factors, such as total assets (A) or market capitalization. Table 4.6 again provides six
specifications for the four types of tax shock windows [specifications (1)–(4)] and the two
continuous tax measures [specifications (5)–(6)]. All regression models include firm FEs and
cluster robust standard errors by firm.
The results on the internal margin are again consistent with the old view of dividends
and taxes. For all four tax shock windows the relation between payout and tax shocks is
significant at the 10% level with the expected sign and firms increase payout ratios when
dividend tax rates fall (absolutely or relative to capital gains taxes) and decrease payout
when dividend taxes rise. Again, these linear models provide easy interpretation, particularly
those with tax shock indicator variables. For example, specification (1) suggests that a one
standard deviation increase in dividend tax rates is related with a 0.171% decrease in the
D/S payout ratio. This is not a large economic effect absolutely, but a reasonable size given
that in the negative dividend tax rate shock window the unconditional D/S payout ratio is
1.15%, so this equates to a 14.9% decrease. Using the whole sample and continuous variation
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in dividend tax rates, the results are less clear and the coefficients on the continuous tax
measures have the wrong signs and are not significant at conventional levels, although all
other dividend determinants in these models (i.e., profitability, growth opportunities, size,
and life-cycle) have the correct signs and statistical significance. Given the noise in the
payout ratio D/S, it could be too much to expect tax rates to explain the level of payout
over the life of the firm. So it seems that tax rates explain short-term payout ratios, but not
long-term.
In all, the battery of tests in Tables 4.3 through 4.6 provide evidence consistent with
the hypothesis that firms alter dividend payout in response to changes in tax laws to reduce
shareholders’ tax burdens, or to take advantage of relaxed dividend tax rates. Although the
identification strategy of using firm FEs and both shocks and continuous variation address
a lot of potential alternate explanations, Section 4.6 addresses concerns about changes in
sample composition, country-level governance, and the real impact at the country-level.
4.6 Robustness Checks
4.6.1 Changes in Sample Composition
The univariate results in Tables 4.3a and 4.3b, as well as Chetty and Saez (2004), show that
changes in sample composition can affect results and inferences, even in a short event window.
Table 4.3b shows that the univariate results are robust to a balanced panel on both sides of
the tax shocks, but this hasn’t yet been shown in a multivariate setting. Table 4.7 repeats
the linear models from Tables 4.4 and 4.6, but in balanced panels of five and three years
(i.e., plus or minus two and one years from the year of the tax shock). Table 4.7a presents
the linear probability models and Table 4.7b presents the linear layout ratio models. All
models include firm FEs and cluster robust standard errors by firm. Note that this analysis
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includes only the tax shock window analysis, as it isn’t feasible to require a balanced panel
over the entire 21-year panel.
The results in Table 4.7a are generally consistent with specifications (1)–(4) in Table 4.4.
The point estimates in the five-year balanced sample in specifications (1)–(4) in Table 4.7
are slightly higher than those in the raw sample, but not significantly so. Moving to the
balanced three-year sample in specifications (5)–(8), the shock indicator variables point
estimates change slightly, but not statistically speaking and basic inferences are unchanged.
Likewise for the payout ratio models in Table 4.7b. Balancing the panel eliminates the
noise from firm entry and exit and shows that in short windows taxes have a strong impact on
payout ratios. With the exception of specification (4), the tax variables in all models have the
correct signs, and are significant at the 1% level or better with the exception of specification
(1), which is significant at just outside the 5% level. Comparing these results with the first
payout ratio model results in Table 4.6 suggests that changes to tax rates explain a dividend
payout ratios in the short-term, but have a harder time explaining payout ratios over the
life of the firm.
As before, the results are consistent with the old view of dividends and taxes, and not
driven by changes in sample composition around tax rate shocks.
4.6.2 Country-Level Governance
La Porta et al. (2000) show that payout policy differs by country and that shareholders in
strong shareholder rights regimes receive higher payout in general and are willing to accept
lower payout if the firm has sufficient investment opportunities. Given that payout policy is
in general more responsive to shareholder interests in strong legal environments, a natural
question is if this relation extends to changes in payout policy in response to tax law changes?
This subsection addresses this question by examining the relation between payout, dividend
taxation, and country-level governance. Table 4.8 presents panel linear probability models of
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the propensity to pay dividends. To test the differential impact of country-level governance
on dividend responses to tax law changes each specification includes an interaction between a
continuous tax measures [i.e., either the dividend tax rate (τD) or the dividend tax preference
(DTP)] and a country-level governance measure [i.e., either legal origin or anti-self-dealing
index (Djankov et al., 2008)]. Specifications (1) and (2) interact the dividend tax rate
(τD) with an indicator for common law legal origin and the Djankov et al. (2008) anti-self-
dealing index, respectively. Specifications (3) and (4) interact the dividend tax preference
(DTP) with an indicator for common law legal origin and the Djankov et al. (2008) anti-
self-dealing index, respectively. In all four cases the strong legal regimes, either common
law countries or higher anti-self-dealing index scores, are more sensitive to shareholders’ tax
burdens. In specification (1) the interpretation of the dividend tax rate interaction with the
indicator variable is straightforward. Both coefficients on the dividend tax rate measures
are significantly negative, indicating that firms across the country-level governance spectrum
respond to higher dividend tax rates with reduced likelihood of paying dividends. Further,
the coefficient on the interaction term is twice that of the dividend tax rate level term,
indicating that firms in common law countries are three times as responsive to dividend tax
rate changes as are firms in civil law countries. In specification (2), which uses the continuous
country-level governance measure, the interpretation is less clear, but of similar magnitude.
The interaction term coefficient is -0.425 so moving along the interquartile range in the anti-
self-dealing index changes the dividend tax rate coefficient from −0.425× 0.47 = −0.200 to
−0.425 × 0.65 = −0.276 for an increase of about 50%. The dividend tax rate level term is
not significant.
In specifications (3) and (4), the dividend tax preference level term is not statistically
significant, but the interaction terms are strongly positive. This again suggests that as
country-level governance improves the response of firms to the favorable treatment of divi-
dends relative to that of capital gains also improves. The the dividend tax preference level
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term in specification (3) is not positive significant at conventional levels is not consistent with
the earlier assertion that firms respond across the governance spectrum, regardless of legal
origin, but given that the dividend tax rate level term is strongly significant in specification
(1) with the common law indicator, it could also be that measurement error in the dividend
tax preference makes it more difficult to find a result on the level term in specification (3).
Again, these results are completely consistent with the old view of dividend taxation.
In addition they show that as shareholder rights improve at the country-level, so does the
consideration of shareholders’ tax loads at the firm-level.
4.6.3 Elasticity
The literature on the old versus new views of dividend taxation is largely motivated from
a policy perspective. A key question from the policy perspective is how firms respond in
aggregate, but the analysis thus far has been at the firm level. Table 4.3b shows that
the proportion of dividend initiators and payers increases and the proportion of omitters
decreases, but this test is essentially equivalent to a paired t-test of the decision to pay
dividends. The analysis in Tables 4.4 through 4.7 is exclusively at the firm-level and all the
regression models include firm FEs to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm-level.
To test aggregate firm response at the country-level, Table 4.9 sums cash common div-
idends at the country-year level and regresses it against the dividend tax rate. All models
are log transformed to yield an elasticity interpretation. To control for firm entry and exit
the elasticity models use only data from the balanced panel in three- and five-year windows
around negative dividend tax rate shocks. That is, these models use the negative dividend
tax rate shocks from Table 4.2b and include only firms that span the three- and five-year
windows centered on the tax shock [i.e., these are the same data as specifications (2) and (6)
in Table 4.7, but aggregated to the country-year level]. All models include country FEs to
control for unobserved heterogeneity at the country-level and cluster robust standard errors
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by country.
The results in both specifications in Table 4.9 are consistent with the elasticity estimates
of Chetty and Saez (2005) and Poterba (2004), who find an elasticity between cash common
dividends and dividend tax rates of about -0.4. These magnitudes are large enough to
indicate that changes in dividend tax rates do lead to significant increases in aggregate
payout. However, given that both values are in the inelastic region indicates that from a
policy perspective that reductions to the dividend tax rate are not revenue neutral, further
highlighting the efficiency versus equity trade-off in dividend taxation.
Figure 4.1 provides a visualization of the data used in the panel elasticity regressions
in specification (2) of Table 4.9. That is, Figure 4.1 is the sum of cash common dividends
within each country-year over the five years centered on each of the negative dividend tax
rate shocks from Table 4.2b using only the firms with data that span the entire five years
to control for entry and exit. Note that (1) Norway is not part of either specification or
Figure 4.1 because it isn’t clear how to interpret a log change from zero and (2) Hungary is
not part of specification (2) or Figure 4.1 because it lacks complete data, with no observations
in the second year after the tax shock (see Table 4.2b). With the exception of Germany and
the Netherlands, the slopes of the lines for all other countries are strongly positive.
4.7 Conclusion
For a sample of 30,071 firms from 30 countries over 1990-2010 there is strong support for the
old view of dividend taxation, which states that firms respond to changes in dividend taxes
to reduce the tax burden on shareholders. These findings are consistent with the extant
literature at the single-country level. In short, the results show that firms around the world
alter their dividend payout policy in response to dividend tax law changes.
Further, the relation holds on both the external and internal margins. On the external
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margin, which pertains to the decision to initiate or continue dividend payment, the relation
is both economically and statistically significant. A one standard deviation decrease in
dividend taxation, either absolute or relative to capital gains taxation, is associated with a
1% increase in the proportion of dividend payers. This relation is bidirectional and a one
standard deviation increase in dividend taxation is associated with a 3.5% decrease in the
proportion of dividend payers, which is somewhat at odds with survey data about manager
aversion to cutting dividends (Lintner, 1956; Brav et al., 2005). Firms also respond to
changes in dividend taxation on the internal margin, which pertains to the level of payout.
One standard deviation shocks to the dividend tax rate cause 1% to 4% changes in the
dividend payout ratio. However the results are less clear using the entire time series of
tax rates and the tax measure coefficients have the wrong signs and are not significant at
conventional levels. This suggests that tax rates explain more of observed payout ratios in
the short-term rather than in the long-term.
These results are not due to firm entry or exit around dividend tax shocks and are
robust to controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, as well as
correction for within firm correlation in the dividend decision. Nor are these results due to an
arbitrary selection of a tax shock threshold and results are qualitatively similar with shocks
of 1, 1.5, and 2 standard deviations from the mean change in dividend taxation, as well as
non-parametric thresholds such as the 5%/95% percentiles or the 1%/99% percentiles.
Consistent with the country-level governance literature, the relation between dividends
and dividend tax rates varies with the level of shareholder rights. Across all governance
regimes the decision to initiate, maintain, or omit dividend payout (i.e., the external margin)
is negatively related to dividend tax rates. This negative relation holds for either dividend
tax rates are in isolation or dividend tax rates relative to capital gains tax rates. Further,
consistent with the La Porta et al. (2000) outcome model, the relation is stronger in common
law countries and increases in the anti-self-dealing index (Djankov et al., 2008).
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Finally, from a policy perspective, consistent with the U.S. and U.K. literatures, the
inverse relation between dividends and dividends taxation that holds at the firm-level also
holds in aggregate at the country-level. Elasticity estimates from a balanced panels in three-
and five-year windows centered on negative dividend tax rate shocks indicate that at the
country-level the elasticity between aggregate cash common dividends and dividend taxation
is about -0.4, which is consistent with the -0.5 estimates from the U.S. (Chetty and Saez,
2005; Poterba, 2004).
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics by country and dividend status. All values are the time
series means of the median each year by country and dividend status. The sample is OECD
industrial firms from the Worldscope annual file over 1990–2010. All ratios are trimmed at
1% in each tail. Country is country of incorporation. First (Last) is first (last) year each
country has firms in the sample. N is number of observations with complete data. Status
is dividend status where Payers (Non-payers) have positive (zero) cash dividends paid to
common shareholders during the fiscal year. E/A is earnings before interest scaled by total
assets. Y/BE is earnings available to common scaled by book value of equity. V/A is market
value of total assets scaled by book value of total assets. dA/A is change in total assets
scaled by total assets (dA/A = (At − At−1)/At). RE/BE measures the earned to paid-in
equity ratio and is retained earnings scaled by book value of equity.
Country First Last N Status % E/A Y/BE dA/A V/A RE/BE
Australia 1990 2010 439.8 Payer 48.4 0.077 0.117 0.070 1.33 0.218
Nonpayer 51.6 -0.045 -0.081 0.032 1.33 -0.725
Austria 1990 2010 54.3 Payer 72.4 0.052 0.096 0.057 1.20 0.402
Nonpayer 27.6 0.028 0.022 0.021 1.23 0.105
Belgium 1990 2010 43.3 Payer 67.4 0.058 0.111 0.044 1.22 0.305
Nonpayer 32.6 0.030 0.024 0.062 1.31 -0.006
Canada 1990 2010 613.8 Payer 31.8 0.065 0.100 0.056 1.26 0.428
Nonpayer 68.2 0.008 0.004 0.080 1.37 -0.051
Chile 2001 2010 105.5 Payer 85.1 0.062 0.092 0.057 1.12 0.300
Nonpayer 14.9 0.002 -0.013 0.019 0.94 -0.078
Czech Republic 1996 2010 17.5 Payer 36.5 0.070 0.101 0.012 1.02 0.334
Nonpayer 63.5 0.034 0.027 0.011 0.69 0.112
Denmark 1990 2010 84.9 Payer 65.1 0.069 0.108 0.052 1.21 0.636
Nonpayer 34.9 0.032 0.017 0.020 1.18 0.288
Finland 2000 2010 104.5 Payer 82.3 0.067 0.116 0.035 1.36 0.614
Nonpayer 17.7 0.001 -0.036 -0.027 1.27 -0.015
France 1990 2010 473.9 Payer 66.4 0.055 0.111 0.060 1.21 0.130
Nonpayer 33.6 0.028 0.030 0.022 1.21 0.038
Germany 1990 2010 422.1 Payer 56.3 0.053 0.099 0.053 1.27 0.386
Nonpayer 43.8 0.020 0.003 0.001 1.27 -0.045
Continued on next page.
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Table 4.1 – continued from previous page.
Country First Last N Status % E/A Y/BE dA/A V/A RE/BE
Greece 1992 2010 142.7 Payer 73.3 0.068 0.096 0.113 1.43 0.064
Nonpayer 26.7 0.026 -0.007 0.048 1.26 -0.093
Hungary 1993 2010 16.4 Payer 36.9 0.115 0.157 0.104 1.48 0.527
Nonpayer 63.1 0.013 -0.039 0.052 0.95 0.038
Ireland 1990 2010 44.6 Payer 59.4 0.073 0.142 0.080 1.27 0.509
Nonpayer 40.6 -0.007 -0.010 0.056 1.59 -0.403
Israel 2000 2010 196.5 Payer 37.2 0.065 0.129 0.067 1.24 0.422
Nonpayer 62.8 0.008 -0.012 0.032 1.19 -0.234
Italy 1990 2010 140.3 Payer 69.0 0.046 0.081 0.053 1.13 0.178
Nonpayer 31.0 0.017 -0.022 0.023 1.12 -0.026
Japan 2000 2010 3,032.8 Payer 86.3 0.025 0.046 0.012 0.97 0.565
Nonpayer 13.7 0.011 0.010 -0.023 1.05 0.027
Korea 2000 2010 892.5 Payer 61.0 0.056 0.082 0.072 0.87 0.441
Nonpayer 39.0 0.027 0.014 0.031 1.00 0.058
Luxembourg 2000 2010 19.5 Payer 57.0 0.067 0.125 0.081 1.11 0.189
Nonpayer 43.0 0.027 0.026 0.047 1.36 -0.164
Mexico 1990 2010 69.5 Payer 52.1 0.081 0.116 0.144 1.34 0.726
Nonpayer 47.9 0.049 0.039 0.122 1.05 0.412
Netherlands 1990 2010 60.0 Payer 57.8 0.075 0.153 0.068 1.43 0.279
Nonpayer 42.2 0.033 0.033 0.069 1.62 -0.087
New Zealand 1990 2010 52.6 Payer 73.5 0.081 0.112 0.041 1.29 0.333
Nonpayer 26.5 0.001 -0.063 -0.026 1.20 -0.742
Norway 1990 2010 62.2 Payer 42.7 0.066 0.112 0.082 1.26 0.408
Nonpayer 57.3 0.027 -0.000 0.076 1.29 0.062
Poland 2000 2010 142.5 Payer 36.2 0.063 0.095 0.080 1.26 0.114
Nonpayer 63.8 0.052 0.079 0.104 1.26 0.068
Portugal 1990 2010 39.3 Payer 65.5 0.056 0.093 0.065 1.06 0.070
Nonpayer 34.5 0.028 -0.005 0.029 0.98 -0.223
Continued on next page.
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Table 4.1 – continued from previous page.
Country First Last N Status % E/A Y/BE dA/A V/A RE/BE
Spain 1990 2010 86.4 Payer 69.0 0.063 0.115 0.077 1.22 0.215
Nonpayer 31.0 0.030 -0.004 0.034 1.14 -0.014
Sweden 1990 2010 193.5 Payer 57.1 0.071 0.128 0.066 1.34 0.297
Nonpayer 42.9 -0.004 -0.047 0.037 1.42 -0.112
Switzerland 1990 2010 135.0 Payer 72.8 0.060 0.104 0.037 1.23 0.435
Nonpayer 27.2 0.033 0.036 -0.013 1.16 0.117
Turkey 2000 2010 166.8 Payer 34.9 0.104 0.135 0.178 1.26 0.248
Nonpayer 65.1 0.064 0.036 0.154 1.15 -0.025
United Kingdom 1990 2010 1,100.3 Payer 69.1 0.071 0.125 0.063 1.36 0.491
Nonpayer 30.9 -0.018 -0.039 0.021 1.44 -0.233
United States 1990 2010 3,799.2 Payer 25.2 0.072 0.121 0.053 1.47 0.769
Nonpayer 74.8 0.021 0.054 0.056 1.59 0.124
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Table 4.3: Univariate tests of dividend status in the year after each of the four types of tax
shock relative to the year before.
(a) Proportional ratio tests of the change in the proportion of dividend initiators, payers, and
omitters. Analysis windows are one year after relative to one year before each tax shock (i.e.,
t = 1 relative to t = −1). Payers have positive cash dividends paid to common shareholders during
the fiscal year. Initiators initiate (omitters omit) a cash dividend following at least two years of
non-payment (payment). Dividend tax rate (τD) is the personal tax rate on dividends net of credits
and imputations. Dividend tax preference (DTP = 1−τ
D
1−τCG , where τ
CG is the capital gains tax rate
on long-term investments) relates the after-tax value of dividends to the after-tax value of capital
gains. Shocks are changes in τD and DTP that exceed one standard deviation from the mean change
for the sample at the country-year level (i.e., ∆τD outside -4.89% to 4.21% or ∆DTP outside -8.67%
to 8.54%).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pos Shock to τD Neg Shock to τD Pos Shock to DTP Neg Shock to DTP
Div Init -0.00644 0.00780∗∗∗ 0.0107∗∗∗ -0.00247
(-1.58) (3.47) (4.50) (-0.52)
Div Payer -0.0746∗∗∗ -0.00910 0.00242 -0.0779∗∗∗
(-6.17) (-1.22) (0.31) (-5.63)
Div Omit 0.00162 -0.00281 -0.00572∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗
(0.33) (-1.38) (-2.65) (4.13)
Observations 6380 16177 15299 4111
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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(b) Balanced proportional ratio tests of the change in the proportion of dividend initiators, payers,
and omitters. Analysis windows are one year after relative to one year before each tax shock (i.e.,
t = 1 relative to t = −1). Firms must have complete data after and before the shock to remain in
the same to control for firm entry and exit. Payers have positive cash dividends paid to common
shareholders during the fiscal year. Initiators initiate (omitters omit) a cash dividend following
at least two years of non-payment (payment). Dividend tax rate (τD) is the personal tax rate on
dividends net of credits and imputations. Dividend tax preference (DTP = 1−τ
D
1−τCG , where τ
CG is
the capital gains tax rate on long-term investments) relates the after-tax value of dividends to
the after-tax value of capital gains. Shocks are changes in τD and DTP that exceed one standard
deviation from the mean change for the sample at the country-year level (i.e., ∆τD outside -4.89%
to 4.21% or ∆DTP outside -8.67% to 8.54%).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pos Shock to τD Neg Shock to τD Pos Shock to DTP Neg Shock to DTP
Div Init -0.0129∗ 0.00768∗∗ 0.00883∗∗ -0.00778
(-2.56) (2.92) (3.26) (-1.54)
Div Payer -0.0344∗ 0.0195∗ 0.0210∗ -0.0357∗
(-2.40) (2.25) (2.36) (-2.34)
Div Omit 0.0242∗∗∗ -0.000960 -0.00233 0.0337∗∗∗
(3.90) (-0.41) (-0.97) (5.12)
Observations 3716 12494 12004 3084
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.4: Panel linear probability models for dividend payer status with controls for common
dividend status predictors. The sample is OECD industrial firms from the Worldscope annual
file over 1990–2010. Payers have positive cash dividends paid to common shareholders during
the fiscal year. E/A is earnings before interest scaled by total assets. dA/A is change in total
assets scaled by total assets (dA/A = (At−At−1)/At). Size is each firm’s percentile ranking
by total assets within each country-year. RE/BE measures the earned to paid-in equity ratio
and is retained earnings scaled by book value of equity. Dividend tax rate (τD) is the personal
tax rate on dividends net of credits and imputations. Dividend tax preference (DTP = 1−τ
D
1−τCG ,
where τCG is the capital gains tax rate on long-term investments) relates the after-tax value
of dividends to the after-tax value of capital gains. Shocks are changes in τD and DTP that
exceed one standard deviation from the mean change for the sample at the country-year
level (i.e., ∆τD outside -4.89% to 4.21% or ∆DTP outside -8.67% to 8.54%). All ratios are
trimmed at 1% in each tail. All models include firm FEs to control for unobserved firm- and
country-level heterogeneity. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Div Payer Div Payer Div Payer Div Payer Div Payer Div Payer
E/A 0.0472∗ -0.00163 -0.000671 0.0369 0.00529∗∗∗ 0.00534∗∗∗
(2.13) (-1.04) (-0.45) (0.97) (3.58) (3.62)
dA/A 0.0219 0.0128∗∗∗ 0.00627 0.0109 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0165∗∗∗
(1.80) (3.48) (1.76) (0.70) (6.75) (6.96)
Size 0.303∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗
(6.30) (6.11) (7.28) (5.40) (24.55) (24.04)
RE/BE 0.00410∗ 0.000627∗∗∗ 0.000441∗∗∗ 0.00209 0.00117∗∗∗ 0.00117∗∗∗
(2.39) (4.06) (3.37) (0.76) (10.02) (10.03)
Pos Shock to -0.0344∗∗∗
τD (-6.23)
Neg Shock to 0.00614∗
τD (2.08)
Pos Shock to DTP 0.0108∗∗∗
(3.56)






Year FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 16252 40705 38141 9997 220609 220609
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.009 0.005 0.014 0.024 0.023
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.5: Panel logit models for dividend payer status with controls for common dividend
status predictors. The sample is OECD industrial firms from the Worldscope annual file
over 1990–2010. Payers have positive cash dividends paid to common shareholders during
the fiscal year. E/A is earnings before interest scaled by total assets. dA/A is change in
total assets scaled by total assets (dA/A = (At − At−1)/At). Size is each firm’s percentile
ranking by total assets within each country-year. RE/BE measures the earned to paid-in
equity ratio and is retained earnings scaled by book value of equity. Dividend tax rate (τD)
is the personal tax rate on dividends net of credits and imputations. Dividend tax preference
(DTP = 1−τ
D
1−τCG , where τ
CG is the capital gains tax rate on long-term investments) relates
the after-tax value of dividends to the after-tax value of capital gains. Shocks are changes
in τD and DTP that exceed one standard deviation from the mean change for the sample
at the country-year level (i.e., ∆τD outside -4.89% to 4.21% or ∆DTP outside -8.67% to
8.54%). All ratios are trimmed at 1% in each tail. All models include firm FEs to control for
unobserved firm- and country-level heterogeneity. Standard errors are block bootstrapped
500 times by firm to control for within firm correlation in the dividend decision.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Div Payer Div Payer Div Payer Div Payer Div Payer Div Payer
E/A 0.921 1.230∗∗ 1.288∗∗ 0.215 2.121∗∗∗ 2.103∗∗∗
(1.90) (2.96) (3.09) (0.39) (11.27) (11.19)
dA/A 0.321 0.650∗∗∗ 0.257 0.109 0.198∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗
(1.91) (3.85) (1.37) (0.42) (3.21) (3.57)
Size 3.813∗∗∗ 4.544∗∗∗ 7.499∗∗∗ 4.893∗∗∗ 5.534∗∗∗ 5.291∗∗∗
(5.95) (5.67) (6.24) (3.81) (24.31) (23.49)
RE/BE 0.106 0.130∗∗ 0.109∗ 0.0274 0.114∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(1.92) (2.86) (2.15) (0.41) (8.58) (8.60)
Pos Shock to -0.417∗∗∗
τD (-5.27)
Neg Shock to 0.267∗∗∗
τD (3.65)
Pos Shock to DTP 0.332∗∗∗
(4.35)






Year FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 3950 5699 4954 1808 73948 73948
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.062 0.054 0.057 0.089 0.083
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.8: Panel linear probability models with country-level governance interactions and
controls for common dividend status predictors. The sample is OECD industrial firms from
the Worldscope annual file over 1990–2010. Payers have positive cash dividends paid to
common shareholders during the fiscal year. E/A is earnings before interest scaled by total
assets. dA/A is change in total assets scaled by total assets (dA/A = (At−At−1)/At). Size is
each firm’s percentile ranking by total assets within each country-year. RE/BE measures the
earned to paid-in equity ratio and is retained earnings scaled by book value of equity. Com-
mon Law is an indicator variable for English Common Law legal origin. Anti-self-dealing
index is Djankov et al. (2008)’s country-level governance measure that falls between zero
and one. Dividend tax rate (τD) is the personal tax rate on dividends net of credits and
imputations. Dividend tax preference (DTP = 1−τ
D
1−τCG , where τ
CG is the capital gains tax
rate on long-term investments) relates the after-tax value of dividends to the after-tax value
of capital gains. All ratios are trimmed at 1% in each tail. All models include firm FEs to
control for unobserved firm- and country-level heterogeneity. Standard errors are robust and
clustered by firm.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Div Payer Div Payer Div Payer Div Payer
E/A 0.00492∗∗∗ 0.00523∗∗∗ 0.00503∗∗∗ 0.00531∗∗∗
(3.30) (3.53) (3.39) (3.60)
dA/A 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0166∗∗∗
(6.56) (6.71) (6.82) (7.01)
Size 0.383∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗
(24.81) (24.56) (24.33) (23.97)
RE/BE 0.00117∗∗∗ 0.00117∗∗∗ 0.00117∗∗∗ 0.00117∗∗∗













Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 220609 220609 220609 220609
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.023
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.9: Panel regressions of aggregate cash dividends versus dividend tax rates. All
variables are log transformed to yield an elasticity interpretation. Specification (1) uses data
in the three-year windows centered on each negative dividend tax rate shock and specification
(2) uses data in the five-year windows centered on each negative dividend tax rate shock. The
sample is OECD industrial firms from the Worldscope annual file over 1990–2010. Firms must
have complete data after and before the shock to remain in the same to control for firm entry
and exit. Sum Div is the sum of all cash common dividends in the country-year. Dividend
tax rate (τD) is the personal tax rate on dividends net of credits and imputations. Shocks
are changes in τD and DTP that exceed one standard deviation from the mean change for
the sample at the country-year level (i.e., ∆τD outside -4.89% to 4.21% or ∆DTP outside
-8.67% to 8.54%). All models include country FEs to control for unobserved country-level
heterogeneity. Standard errors are robust and clustered by country.
(1) (2)




Adjusted R2 0.442 0.394
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 4. WORLD DIVIDENDS AND TAX SHOCKS 257
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Canada (1) Canada (2) Germany Italy
Netherlands Portugal Spain (1) Spain (2)













Figure 4.1: Aggregate cash common dividends for balanced panels in five-year windows cen-
tered on negative dividend tax rate shocks by country (i.e., Table 4.2b). Numbers in paren-
theses identify the shock if the country has more than one shock of that type (i.e., positive
or negative, dividend tax rate or dividend tax preference). The sample is OECD industrial
firms from the Worldscope annual file over 1990–2010. Firms must have complete data after
and before the shock to remain in the same to control for firm entry and exit. Dividend tax
rate (τD) is the personal tax rate on dividends net of credits and imputations. Shocks are
changes in τD and DTP that exceed one standard deviation from the mean change for the
sample at the country-year level (i.e., ∆τD outside -4.89% to 4.21% or ∆DTP outside -8.67%
to 8.54%).
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